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ABSTRACT 
 
Water policymakers around the world currently face a challenging task of managing 
water resources that have deteriorated due to overuse or mismanagement and 
Zimbabwe is not spared in this challenge. The neo-classical economics approach is 
limited in its approach to water management and is increasingly being questioned on its 
ability to provide answers to the many economic problems and issues in low- as well as 
high-income countries. As such, there is scope for alternative, multi-dimensional 
approaches. The New Institutional Economics (NIE) tradition offers one such alternative 
and provides an exciting and challenging new paradigm. The NIE can provide an 
alternative and more holistic approach to agricultural water resources management.  
 
Institutions do structure economic forces and play an important role in expanding 
human choice, a fundamental goal of economic development. However, when 
considering agricultural water management, formal institutions tend to overshadow the 
local informal ones, although the latter guide the day-to-day interactions on water use. A 
study was carried out to evaluate how the formal water management institutions and the 
informal institutional arrangements influence irrigation water management in 
Mashonaland East Province in Zimbabwe. The objective was to evaluate the 
effectiveness and institution-performance linkages of the irrigation water institutions, 
with more emphasis on the effectiveness of formal and informal institutions in dealing 
with efficient irrigation water management. The NIE emphasises the need to focus, 
alongside formal institutions, on social institutions such as cultural norms and 
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behavioural attitudes towards agricultural water resources. Therefore, this thesis 
presents the application of the NIE analytical framework to the problems of agricultural 
water resources management.  
 
The descriptive results of the study revealed the importance of both the formal and 
informal institutions in managing water resources, in particular, water law provisions to 
promote private sector participation, influence of other policies on the water policy, 
capacity to administer water resources and impact of private sector participation on 
water administration burden. However, most of the variables were either non-existent or 
non-effective to assist in the management of water resources.  
 
With regards to the role and significance of irrigation water management institutions in 
the management of water resources, the research found significant relationship 
between the formal- and informal institutions and their components. Notably was the 
significance relationship between the informal institutions and water law, policy and 
administration, with t-statistic values of 0.173, 0.314 and 0.279 respectively, which were 
all significant and positive at the 10% significance level. This suggests a clear 
relationship between the informal institutions and the formal institution, implying policy-
makers cannot afford to ignore the informal institution when they are dealing with water 
management institutions.  
 
The study concludes that the interplay mechanisms between the formal and informal 
water institutions such water law, policy administration as well as norms, ideas and 
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incentives do promote effective institutional interplay and may serve to overcome 
coordination problems of irrigation water management. Moreover, it is expected that 
institutional interplay will improve over time resulting in sustainable irrigation water 
management. 
 
The study concludes that informal water management institutions work together with the 
formal water management arrangements and should not be simply overlooked. In 
addition, future water irrigation management objectives in Zimbabwe must prioritise 
irrigation water development and management institutions in communal, small-scale 
commercial, and resettlement areas, both new and old schemes.  
 
Although markets were not under the scope of the study, they play a crucial role in 
poverty alleviation and rural livelihood improvement as they provide an arena in which 
agricultural produce is traded, and different services to the water sector are provided, 
and interactions with the wider economy, takes place. As such, there is need to open 
markets to new water users among communal, small-scale commercial and 
resettlement farmers and there is need for the government, private sector and non-
governmental organisations to actively intervene and promote the engagement of new 
water users with markets.  
 
The study therefore recommends that the formal and informal institutions should be 
amalgamated to bring forth a real integrated irrigation water resource management 
framework. Water management practitioners, governments and private sector should 
viii 
 
not uncritically embrace the formal state-based institutions as a panacea for irrigation 
water management. The government, private sector, local water users and other 
stakeholders dialogue and agree on the basis, modality, policy and procedures for 
managing irrigation water resources.  
 
Key words: New Institutional Economics (NIE); water management; formal institutions; 
informal institutions; farmers; users; resources; institutions; WUAs: norms; 
rules 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Introduction  
 
Despite considerable advances in technology across the world, some scholars (Bratton, 
1987; Namara et al., 2010) have argued that declining agricultural productivity among 
smallholder farmers in Africa remains a major bottleneck in the development of the 
continent. Unganai (1993) indicates that about 60% of the southern African region is 
semi-arid or arid and suffers from periodic droughts. In addition, World Bank (2003) 
notes that agricultural production is dominated by rain-fed agriculture and irrigation 
systems are limited. This is compounded by the scarcity and poor management of 
irrigation water resources. 
 
Water scarcity in agriculture has large impacts on the population, especially in rural 
areas, where more than 60% of the population are engaged in agriculture which 
represents their main source of food and income (FAO, 2008). On the macroeconomic 
level, agricultural share of the GDP is about 37% and 75% of the export value is 
generated from the agricultural sector globally. To this effect, management of 
agricultural water particularly in rain-fed systems remains imperative for improved farm 
level yields because the bulk of the food comes from rain-fed agriculture (FAO, 2008; 
Namara et al., 2010).  
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However, increasing water scarcity and poor accessibility may become a limiting factor 
not only for agricultural production and the welfare of rural population but also for the 
entire economy. Improving the management of water resources and an efficient use of 
water by all sectors, including agricultural production, are therefore important if the 
welfare and health of the population, particularly in rural areas, are to be maintained and 
improved (Nyong & Kanaroglou, 1999).  
 
In light of the above, effective management of agricultural water requires continuous 
backup from policies and institutional frameworks. According to FAO (2008), a 
conducive policy framework is essential for increasing productivity in developing 
countries. Research has confirmed that lack of enabling policies and effective 
institutional frameworks are a major contributor towards poor management and 
utilisation of agricultural water in Sub-Saharan Africa (Nhira & Mapiki, 2005; Namara et 
al., 2010). 
 
Managing water effectively is fundamental for human society. Yet, evidence of the 
problems of water management is found throughout history (Merrey et al., 2007). Over 
the past 50 years, a series of institutional arrangements have been presented as 
panaceas to improve water management: strong government agencies, user 
organizations, and water markets. Seemingly successful cases of state, user, or market 
governance of water were compared with problematic performances in other cases 
governed by other institutions, with the implication that if the institutions from the 
successful cases, whether a strong bureaucracy, a water users’ association (WUA), or 
transferable water rights, were only replicated, they would solve the problems. Each of 
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these approaches has failed to live up to expectations, largely because the variability of 
local situations and the difficulty of transplanting institutions from one context to another 
were not taken into account (Merrey et al., 2007), in particular, the irrigation water 
management institutions, yet irrigation reduces the risks and uncertainties associated 
with agriculture. 
 
Irrigation is a vital component of agricultural production in almost all developed and 
developing countries. Therefore, in most cases agriculture becomes the major 
consumer of water among its other uses. This intense water use, in conjunction with its 
inherent low efficiency, is considered to be a significant burden in agricultural water 
management, while at the same time restrains a proper allocation of all water resources 
(Latinopoulos, 2005). Careful management of scarce water resources is essential to 
achieving global food security (Tiwari & Dinar, 2002; World Bank, 2003, Faures et al., 
2002; Rosegrant & Cai, 2002). 
 
However, water allocation is indeed a complex, hence, difficult task, especially when 
decisions on meeting all types of water demand have to be reached under various 
socio-economic objectives, like economic efficiency, sustainability and equity. Greece is 
a typical example of a country in which the current water allocation policy highly favours 
the agricultural sector, thus causing negative impacts on the national water resources 
sustainability (Latinopoulos, 2005). The management of irrigation water in developing 
countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America has become a critical issue for policy makers 
in recent decades due to increasing scarcity of water (Lam, 2001; Gulati & 
Narayananan, 2002). For nearly half a century, governments have invested heavily on 
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large irrigation infrastructure often supported by donor agencies such as the Asian 
Development Bank and the World Bank. However, governments also undertook the 
responsibilities for the management of irrigation water supplies. Government 
intervention in irrigation water management resulted in increasing government subsidies 
and higher levels of government regulation and control. The cost to the farmers of this 
heavily subsidized canal water is extremely low, varying between 5 percent and 15 
percent of the canals’ operating costs.  
 
This has led to the creation of perverse incentives for farmers, bureaucrats and 
politicians to engage in rent-seeking activities (Lam, 2001; Gulati & Narayananan, 
2002). The lower than expected returns have also been attributed to the inability to price 
irrigation water at their opportunity costs (Rosegrant et al, 1995). Wrong pricing policies 
for irrigation water have been implicated for the major deficiencies of irrigation systems 
throughout the developing world. A flat fee is levied, implying a zero marginal cost for 
water. Moreover, it is very rare to find the use of marginal cost pricing for irrigation in 
any country. The departures from marginal cost pricing do not seem to follow any 
regular principles and often ad hoc charges are used.  
 
Mainstream economists champion greater adoption of market approaches, which use 
the price system to overcome the complexities of irrigation water management. 
However, available evidence confirms that market approaches alone cannot guarantee 
a satisfactory outcome to irrigation water management problems because of common 
property characteristics of water (Vandenberg, 2002; Lam, 2001; Saleth & Dinar, 2004). 
The design of incentives that will ensure that full social and economic costs of irrigation 
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water are covered is challenging. Furthermore, market-based policies are unlikely to 
achieve efficient use of water unless they are linked to institutions capable of 
implementing, monitoring and enforcing pricing policies at the local and national levels.  
 
Scholars have argued that institutions are very important to improve irrigation water 
management problems (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom & Gardner, 1993). However, 
neoclassical economics provided very little insight in understanding institutional 
conditions in developing countries and how a wide diversity of institutional 
arrangements can be used to achieve improved water allocation in different settings. 
How to incorporate and sustain institutional innovations to ensure efficient use and 
management of irrigation water under diverse ecological, economic, social, and political 
constraints is an on-going debate on irrigation water resource development (Saleth & 
Dinar, 2004).  
 
Efficient use and management of irrigation water require changes in institutions and 
new institutions. To achieve this, a clearer understanding of the dynamics of institutional 
change including the dynamics between individual choice, institutional design, and the 
incentives embedded in the institutional environment is essential (Lam, 2001). 
Therefore, this study seeks to use the New Institutional Approach to evaluate the 
effectiveness of irrigation water management institutions. 
  
The New Institutional Economics paradigm (NIE) provides a flexible framework to 
understand a wide network of institutions that influence economic behaviour and 
performance (Williamson, 1985; North, 1990). Unlike neoclassical economics, NIE 
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provides a finer theoretical focus by which to analyse the structure of transactions and 
their governing institutions. NIE recognises that the allocation of rights and 
responsibilities of transactions depend on the nature of the transaction, costs of 
monitoring and enforcement, the bargaining position and the relationship between the 
trading parties.  
 
The NIE paradigm is an interdisciplinary research programme that deals explicitly with 
the link between institutions, institutional change and economic performance (Alston et 
al, 1996). It is a line of investigation that departs from, but does not abandon neo-
classical economics. Central to the research agenda is an emphasis on property rights, 
the transaction costs of measurement and enforcement and incomplete information. 
Furthermore, NIE has been further enriched through cross-fertilisation with law, political 
science, sociology, anthropology and history (Alston et al, 1996).  
  
NIE can play a crucial role in the context of developing economies where legal rights 
could be murky and information asymmetry would be widespread. As such, this study 
seeks to attempt to adopt this conceptual framework in its efforts to evaluate the 
effectiveness of institutions involved in irrigation water management in Zimbabwe.  
 
1.1 Background to the study 
 
An estimated 70% of the Zimbabweans live in impoverished rural areas (CSO, 2002), 
and dependent by and large on smallholder agriculture for their livelihoods. It follows 
that improvements in this sub-sector can lift a significant proportion of the country’s 
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population out of poverty. In this regard, the “fast track” land reform programme (in 
which the majority of white-owned commercial farmland was acquired for resettlement) 
that the Government embarked upon in 2000, potentially provided an important means 
with which to address the worsening poverty.  
 
By August 2003 slightly over 130 000-farming households were resettled (Utete, 2003) 
adding to the existing 1 000 000 and 60 000 households in the communal and old 
resettlement areas respectively (Muir, 1994). However, these figures are not indications 
of a success story as increasing food insecurity remains a poignant illustration of the 
worsening poverty.  
 
Access to land alone, without extending it to water in semi-arid environments does not 
bode well for an informed analysis of the agrarian question in general or an 
understanding of how sustainable smallholder agricultural production can be structured 
(Cleaver, 1995). Ideally both land and water accessibility should be addressed 
simultaneously as these two resources complement each other in agricultural 
production (Manzungu, 2001). In this regard appropriate land and water legal 
arrangements are important (since all human interactions are mediated through one 
form of legal framework or another) especially to protect the interests of the less 
powerful members of the society, such as smallholder farmers.  
 
In light of the above, a quick caveat needs to be added. Successful agricultural 
production also depends on other factors such as access to agricultural markets, 
affordable finance, appropriate technologies, adequate transport network, to mention 
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but a few. Moreover, productive water use by smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe cannot 
be achieved by merely changing the water legislation (IFAD, 1997). This has been 
illustrated by the fact that changes in water legislation in the post-colonial era failed to 
elicit the much-needed increase in productive water use in the smallholder sector. A 
case in point is the 10% of water in government dams reserved for smallholder farmers, 
which has remained unutilised. 
 
Further to that, Utete (2003) acknowledges that Zimbabwe has taken steps to water 
reforms, majors challenges still remain as outlined below: 
 
 Regularising water use; 
 Inculcating a culture of paying for commercial use of water; 
 Ensuring that (part of) the water revenue is invested in water development; 
 Prioritisation of the development of water/irrigation projects according to well 
defined criteria; 
 Strengthening new water institutions by ensuring that they are adequately 
funded; and 
 Strengthening the statutory aspects of water resource management, which 
include planning of the country’s water resources, undertaking collection and 
analysis of hydrological data, and water quality monitoring. 
 
The challenges, according to Utete (2003), which have increased particularly in the 
aftermath of the land redistribution exercises, include: 
 Ensuring that existing irrigation facilities are used efficiently and effectively; 
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 Carrying out a proper assessment of irrigation investments and projects for their 
financial sustainability, without ignoring social and political objectives; 
 Streamlining institutions for cost effectiveness and efficient service delivery; 
 Promotion of low cost irrigation and water harvesting technology to contribute to 
increased agricultural water productivity, as well as ensuring food security for the 
poor; 
 Determining the respective roles of private and public sector irrigation; 
 Establishing mechanisms to achieve equity as irrigation tends to benefit a 
privileged few; 
 The Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) has provided more 
development challenges to irrigation institutions, some of which are still in their 
infancy  
 
Given the above challenges which have hampered plans to successfully engage in 
sustainable water reforms before and after the land reform exercises in Zimbabwe, 
Utete (2003) suggests some policy objectives and strategies to ensure sound water 
management results. Some of these issues as put forward by the Utete (2003) are 
outlined below: 
 
 Establishing a water pricing structure consistent with cost and social efficiency 
 Establishing an effective institutional structure  
 Promotion of farmer-managed and operated systems 
 Better coordination in implementation between public-public and public-private / 
NGO sector bodies, and 
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 Formation of effective, farmer-defined water users associations 
 Issuance of water permits to water users where it applies 
 Information dissemination campaigns where importance of regularising water use 
are undertaken 
 Strengthening local water management where stakeholder and local people 
participation is promoted 
 Co-opting new settlers in water management structures and processes to ensure 
their co-operation. 
 
In summary it has been seen that the system of water allocation in the colonial period 
was based on the matrix of ideas of efficiency, modernity, white power, male supremacy 
and the conception of starving Africans of land and water (Campbell, 2003). Campbell 
(2003) further argues that the planning mechanism of the settler state was organised 
around the concept of the scarcity of water. Politicians, agricultural extension officers, 
water resource managers, hydrologists, engineers, planners and economists 
propagated the concept of water scarcity when in reality; the problem of water 
availability was one of democratic distribution and not availability. This was re-enforced 
by the myth of white supremacy, which was backed up in law and in the allocation of 
resources. Commercial agriculture was considered a part of the modern sector 
therefore commercial farmers. 
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1.2 Smallholder irrigation in Zimbabwe 
 
Twenty years into independence the smallholder irrigation sub-sector in Zimbabwe was 
considered to be of little socio-political significance since its economic contribution was 
low. This was because of the fact that it accounted for a mere 10% of the country’s 
irrigated area. This has, however, increased to about 26% since the fast track land 
reform programme incorporating the new model A1 and A2, and the communal and 
resettlement farmers (Utete, 2003).  
 
Utete (2003) further highlights that the A1 resettlement model was designed and 
intended to decongest communal lands, therefore, consisted of smaller hectarages with 
room for beneficiaries establishing a new home. The A2 model was designed to create 
a cadre of black commercial farmers on the concept of full cost recovery from the 
beneficiary (therefore had bigger hectarages).  
 
A number of evaluation studies have suggested that formal smallholder irrigation 
schemes (initiated and constructed by the government and these may be community or 
government managed) have poor performance and are not sustainable. Problems 
identified include poor water utilisation in terms of its timeliness and adequacy to the 
field and poor water application to the field (Pearce & Armstrong, 1990; Donkor, 1991; 
Makadho, 1993). Crop yields have been low and way below those achieved in the 
commercial farming sector.  
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The poor agricultural performance has translated into poor financial and economic 
viability, thereby necessitating heavy government subsidies, up to 75% in some cases. 
The problem, according to Rukuni (1993), is the inappropriate conventional budgeting 
technique, which ignores the sub-sector’s unique history. Meinzen-Dick et al (1996) on 
the other hand, emphasises that agro-economic performance of smallholder irrigation 
schemes depends on a number of factors such as plot size, level of education of plot 
holders, access to markets and management structure.  
 
The idea of modernising smallholder agriculture has characterised intervention in both 
the colonial and postcolonial era. This has resulted in a culture of evaluating smallholder 
irrigation on the basis of the technical efficiency of water delivery from the source to the 
field (and the crop). In addition, the focus on scientific observations as the standard for 
all agricultural practices has over-shadowed indigenous methods of water management 
in irrigation. Commercialisation was also one of the pillars of the modern drive. If 
sustainable smallholder irrigation is to be realized there is a need to reflect on what 
exactly modernization means and how it can be used to improve the livelihoods of the 
concerned people.  
 
It would appear that the point of departure between the state and farmers seemed to 
have been the definition of ‘commercial’ farming or what constitutes it (Manzungu, 
2003). The state relied on scientific models of cropping programmes, crop rotations etc., 
and equated what was considered to be scientific farming with commercial farming. 
However, the smallholder farmers had no fixed philosophical position but looked for 
practical solutions that could improve their livelihoods.  
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In this ‘game’, farmers do not consider themselves permanent commercial farmers 
(Manzungu, 2003). Depending on circumstances, they can be commercial farmers but 
also turn subsistence when the situation so demands. An informed analysis shows that 
this was about risk management. Issues of crop intensification based on market 
principles, where there is in reality no market, presented problems for farmers. Farmers 
were therefore reluctant to follow all the advice offered by state agencies precisely 
because of different perceptions they held about risk compared to that of the farmer. 
 
The above discussion emphasises that one of the main reasons behind faltering 
smallholder irrigation was the neglect of indigenous water and irrigation management. 
State intervention tended to disenfranchise smallholder farmers because of the 
introduced legal systems. For example smallholder irrigators lost their rights over land, 
water and other resources. In addition, traditional water management practices have 
been realized to contribute to rural food security, but there has been a failure to 
acknowledge these practices by both the colonial and post-colonial state. This 
subsequently leads to the problem statement being formulated in the sub-section 1.3 
below. 
 
1.3 Statement of the Problem  
 
One of the key problems of agricultural development in Zimbabwe is that most of the 
smallholder producers rely on rain-fed agriculture to make a living. Only one growing 
season per year is possible in Zimbabwe along with most of Southern Africa, compared 
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with two or three in parts of Asia (FAO, 2000). Given that most of the smallholder 
farmers are in drought prone areas of the country, it is clear that farm livelihoods are a 
high risk venture dependent on good rainfall seasons. This implies that availability of 
water for agricultural use is a major limiting factor even after the land reform 
programme. In light of this, it is imperative that agricultural water management becomes 
a key panacea in as much as irrigation farming is concerned. As such, it is relevant to 
study conditions under which institutions become effective in dealing with water 
management issues and this thesis attempts to address this phenomenon for better 
management of irrigation water systems.  
 
However, in light of the above, the Government of Zimbabwe has continued the colonial 
practice of controlling all irrigated activities in the irrigation schemes. For example, 
farmers were required to follow set cropping programmes and irrigation schedules 
(Manzungu, 1999). In 1983 Irrigation Management Committees (IMCs) were introduced 
in smallholder irrigation in order to improve coordination between irrigators and water 
management. However, it is significant that these have not been able to take over 
management of the schemes, principally because the state applied a technical measure 
to their readiness, which underlined state distrust of local farmer institutions (Manzungu, 
1999). In addition, there were also institutional problems where management was 
located in various ministries. This has resulted in duplication of efforts and in some 
cases, in lack of clarity on division of responsibilities thus creating problems of 
coordination. This presents a situation where the management of agricultural water 
resources is jeopardised.  
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Moreover, productive water use by smallholder farmers cannot be achieved by merely 
changing the water legislation (IFAD, 1997). In Zimbabwe, as noted by the same report, 
(IFAD, 1997), changes in water legislation in the post-colonial era failed to elicit the 
much-needed increase in productive water use in the smallholder sector. Supporting 
such an argument is Manzungu & Machiridza (2005), who posit that water laws are 
likely to succeed if they are underpinned by a sound economic ideology1, referring to 
economic fundamental ideals/values that are popularised and translated into practice 
throughout society. A case in point is the 10% of water in government dams reserved 
for smallholder farmers, which has remained unutilised. As such, the research study 
seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of irrigation water management institutions and 
develop a sound platform for appropriate water-related policies for sustainable irrigation 
water management. 
 
According to Gebremedhin et al. (2002), the solution to water management in most 
developing countries depends not only on appropriate technologies and efficient market 
prices, but also on local level institutions of resource management and organisations 
that enforce them.  This implies that just establishing the institutional set-up for the 
resource management is not a sufficient condition for sustainable use of the resources. 
Effectiveness in internal governance is needed for the effective application of 
                                                          
1 Ideology incorporates legal, political, religious, artistic and philosophical values, all encapsulated in a ‘set of norms’. It is referred to 
as a ‘philosophy’, ‘spirit of the age’, and a political programme ’,‘ form of social consciousness’ or a ‘political theory’ that legitimizes a 
particular type of social action  
Apart from political connotations, ideology also has economic connotations. This is because it is a product of economic relations of a 
given epoch that may continue to exist after these relations have become outmoded or replaced, and may exert a considerable 
influence on future social development (Taras, 1984: 4).  
Seen in this light ideological difference are not necessarily about proving the validity of any one ideology per se, but about achieving 
a desired social effect with economic issues/interests playing a central role. Ideology performs a critical social function in that it 
makes it possible for society to better perform the necessary roles and functions. Without ideology, society lacks an influential 
regulatory mechanism and motivating force (Taras, 1984). 
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community rules. Therefore, the need to identify factors that facilitate or hinder the 
development and effectiveness of local formal and informal institutions and 
organisations becomes important. 
 
The “fast track” land reform programme (in which the majority of white-owned 
commercial farmland was acquired for resettlement) that the Government embarked 
upon in 2000, potentially provided an important means with which to address the 
worsening poverty. However, the newly acquired irrigated areas of the “fast track” land 
reform programme, wherein their former white commercial farm owners were achieving 
good crop yields and reasonable water use, are facing sustainability challenges (Utete, 
2003). This has been coupled with limited support in the form of inputs and markets. In 
addition, the fast track programme has also presented some challenges to irrigation 
institutions (Utete, 2003), some of which are still in their infancy. Some of the institutions 
mandated to oversee water resource development have found it difficult to cope. As 
such, this study seeks to find ways and conditions under which institutions should 
effectively function with regards to agricultural water.  
 
Moreover, payment of water charges in Zimbabwe has been affected by the political 
climate. Most large-scale white commercial farmers, who previously paid for water, 
stopped paying when their farms were illegally invaded during the ‘fast track” land 
reform programme (Kujinga, 2002). Consequently, this has resulted in poor agricultural 
water management in Zimbabwe and the research study seeks to study how best 
effective institutions can be put in place and how best they can be capacitated to fully 
deliver on their mandates.  
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In addition, many governments have moved away from imposing the full costs upon the 
users of irrigation for political reasons because charges are resisted by farmers 
(Samad, 2005). The political consequences of reallocating water away from agriculture 
are too high. In South Asia, the cost of foregone agricultural production, multiplier 
effects regionally, and the resulting social problems of large pockets of poor rural 
residents are possible results that are politically unacceptable to governments and 
present little incentive to promote open water markets”.  
 
Similarly, in Zimbabwe, most of the smallholder irrigation farmers have refused to pay 
water levies arguing that water is a natural resource that comes from “God” and not 
from the government (Kujinga, 2002). They also argue that even if they pay, none of 
that money will be reinvested in their schemes which they have been managing 
themselves for years without government assistance. Machingambi & Manzungu (2002) 
carried out a study in the Save Catchment area and found that most water users in 
Zimbabwe consider water as a free good. Although the issue of making water users pay 
could be seen as legitimate, charging users for irrigation water services is a sensitive 
issue in many parts of the world. This usually involves political, historical, social, 
religious and economic dimensions. Water beneficiaries, especially farmers, tend to 
believe that low or zero charges are justified and this belief is usually reflected in their 
political system (Abu-Zeid, 2001). Though some irrigation farmers do not generally like 
to pay for water, there is a general belief that the purpose of making farmers pay is to 
ensure sustainability of services, water conservation, and mitigation of damages (Gorriz 
et al., 1995). In light of this, the research seeks to evaluate the nature of the existing 
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water management institutions and how effective they are in ensuring effective water 
management through paying for water use.   
 
Several studies on smallholder irrigation schemes in developing countries have 
observed that the smallholder schemes under-perform partly due to inadequate inputs 
and inaccessible markets (Makadho, 1994; Rukuni, 1994; Chancellor & Hide, 1997; 
FAO, 2000). In some cases, according to Tafesse (2003), government policies on land 
tenure and water allocation do not create a conducive environment for successful 
operation of smallholder irrigation schemes. Mpande (1984); Motsi et al. (2001) & 
Manzungu (1999) ascribed the failure of the smallholder schemes in Africa to 
substandard infrastructure, unclear irrigation scheduling and inefficient water use. 
Inefficient water use could be a result of poor, ineffective or absence of water 
management institutions. It is the goal of this research study to evaluate the existing 
water management institutions and their effectiveness to manage water resources 
efficiently.   
 
Water is liquid, it is characterised as flowing, seeping, evaporating and transpiring. 
These attributes cause problems in identifying the source and measuring the resource 
and also result in interdependencies among water users (Young et al, 1986). Moreover, 
water supplies are often uncertain and variable. As a result of these attributes, the 
exclusive property rights which are the basis for an efficient exchange economy are 
difficult to establish and enforce. Relatively complex legal and administrative systems 
are needed in water allocation and it is believed that the research study will provide 
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meaningful insights on the formulation of water management systems that will ensure 
effective water management. 
 
Above all, several studies have acknowledged the fact that informal local level 
institutions can make a difference in water management (Bruns & Meinzen-Dick, 2000; 
Bruns & Meinzen-Dick, 2003; Maganga, 2003; Mwakaje & Sokoni, 2003; Shah et al., 
2001; Sokile et al., 2003; van Koppen, 2003). However, the majority of practitioners and 
decision-makers remain inclined towards supporting and propelling formal state-based 
water rights, water fees and WUAs, while closing their eyes to some local informal best 
practices. On the other hand, scholars supportive of informal arrangements are 
reluctant to push the case for practical local practices, choosing instead to combine 
(new) formal and (existing) informal arrangements. Hence, the risk is real that, even if 
local rights are recognized as legitimate by formal law, the way in which this is done i.e. 
privileging the formal will stifle the dynamics that are at the core of local arrangements 
and thus negatively affects local rights, hence poor irrigation water management. In light 
of this, the research study seeks to find answers to the following questions; 
 
 Which institutions are involved in irrigation water management and what are their 
roles with respect to water management? 
 Are existing irrigation water management institutions effective in managing 
irrigation water resources? 
 Are irrigation water management institutions linked? If so, what is the nature of 
the relationship?  
 20 
 
 What mechanisms should therefore be put in place for an  effective and 
sustained agricultural water management framework  
 What are the key policy implications that can be drawn to foster an effective 
agricultural water management framework in Zimbabwe? 
 
1.4 Hypotheses and Objectives of the research study 
 
The primary objective of the research study was to evaluate the effectiveness of 
irrigation water management institutions in managing irrigation water in Zimbabwe. 
Consequently, this will identify the potential in strengthening, capacitating and 
developing effective irrigation water management institutions for improved and 
sustained agricultural water management in Zimbabwe.  
 
The working/general hypothesis is that irrigation water management institutions are 
existent in Zimbabwe and are effective in managing irrigation water resources 
efficiently. The general hypothesis is supported by the following specific hypotheses: 
 
 Formal and informal irrigation water management institutions are effective in 
managing irrigation water resources in Zimbabwe 
 There exists linkages between the formal and informal irrigation water institution 
in managing irrigation water resources 
In light of the above tentative answers, the specific objectives of this study are therefore 
to:  
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 Assess the existing agricultural water institutions in managing agricultural water 
resources 
 Evaluate the effectiveness of agricultural water management institutions in 
Zimbabwe. 
 Assess the nature of linkages between the agricultural water management 
institutions  
 Identify mechanisms to develop an effective and sustained agricultural water 
management framework  
 
1.5 Justification of the research study 
 
Although the post-2000 period presented complex social, economic and political 
challenges to water sector reform, there were inherent limitations embedded within the 
concept of integrated water resources management which lie at the heart of water 
sector reform in Zimbabwe (FAO, 2000). As such, this thesis attempts to find conditions 
aimed at re-engaging water reform policy with the objective of improving rural 
livelihoods in a post-crisis Zimbabwe, taking into cognisant the ‘old’ and ‘new’ issues 
that undermine improved access to, and management of, water for rural livelihood 
improvement.  
Further to the above, efficient use and management of irrigation water require changes 
in water management institutions and new institutions. To achieve this, a clearer 
understanding of the dynamics of institutional change including the dynamics between 
individual choice, institutional design, and the incentives embedded in the institutional 
environment is essential (Lam, 2001). 
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Moreover, establishing appropriate irrigation water management institutions and 
strengthening capacity of water management organisations could help for efficient and 
equitable distribution of irrigation water for beneficiaries, thus contributing to increased 
productivity. Water management institutions are also important to avoid and manage 
conflicts and ensure the participation of women and the poor. In this regard, the findings 
of this study will contribute to narrowing the information gaps regarding the 
organisational and institutional context, management practices and collective action 
regarding irrigation water, and the major problems of irrigation development at the 
grass-root level. It will also shed some light on the problems of management and 
sustainability of agricultural water use in Zimbabwe. 
 
Water management at the scheme and plot levels is a major factor influencing the 
success of smallholder irrigation schemes (Motsi et al., 2001; Samakande, 2002). 
Hence, this research study seeks to analyse the nature of the existing institutions and 
come up with best institutional practices for irrigation water management. Moreover, 
poor water management by farmers can lead to problems of land degradation and soil 
salinisation in smallholder irrigation schemes. In addition to that, inequitable water 
allocation was also identified as a cause of poor performance by some farmers 
(Pazvakavambwa & Van der Zaag, 2000).  
 
Market approaches through proper pricing of water can efficiently allocate water 
resources, reduce drain on financial resources and limit government’s role as suppliers 
of irrigation water. Demand side water saving can provide incentives for farmers to shift 
from water intensive crops to higher valued and less water intensive crops (Rosegrant 
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et al., 1995). Furthermore, market-based approaches are unlikely to achieve efficient 
use of water unless they are linked to institutions capable of implementing, monitoring 
and enforcing pricing policies at the local and national levels. 
 
Gulati & Narayanan (2002) argue that better management of irrigation water can be 
achieved if the irrigation systems are distanced from political interference and de-
bureaucratised. This ostensibly reduces the role of government, achieves higher returns 
to irrigation investment, ensure greater control, responsibility, greater equity and 
fairness in the distribution of benefits and can lead to poverty reduction. The WUAs 
reflect empowerment of farmers to make their own decisions in water allocation and 
management. In this light, the study seeks to find ways of limiting government role in 
irrigation water management and how best water users can be empowered to effectively 
manage irrigation water resources.   
 
It is based on the above justification that the research study will attempt to come up with 
a best irrigation water management framework for an improved, efficient, effective and 
sustained agricultural water management in Zimbabwe. 
 
1.6 Delineation and definitions of the study 
 
The term ‘Agricultural Water Management’ as used in this study refers to management 
of all water put into irrigation agriculture (crops, etc.) and is used inter-changeably with 
irrigation water management. The study was carried out in one province of Zimbabwe, 
Mashonaland East Province. Basically, the study population included A1, A2 and 
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communal/resettlement farmers who have been in irrigation farming for at least five 
years and their irrigation systems were functional at the time of the interview. The 
farmers were not interviewed and analysed based on whether they were A1, A2, etc. 
because the study sought to evaluate the effectiveness of irrigation water institutions in 
managing water resources. The same institutions under the study are rules that apply 
universally to all the farmers, irrespective of the category in which they fall. The 
institutions included the “rules and regulations”, whether formal or informal institutions. 
Formal institutions were defined as the irrigation water law, irrigation water policy and 
irrigation water administration, while the informal included issues like norms, culture and 
social settings in a given context.   
 
1.7 Organisation of the thesis 
 
Chapter one presents the introduction of the study. It attempts to give a general 
overview of water management issues, in general and with specific reference to 
irrigation. In addition, the chapter also discusses the challenges of water management 
and some mechanisms of best water management practices. The background to the 
study, paying particular reference to Zimbabwe is also presented in Chapter 1. The 
problem statement, objectives, research questions and justification of the study are 
presented in this chapter.  
 
Chapter two discusses the water sector reforms and management in Zimbabwe, 
paying particular attention to water management in the colonial era and after the post-
independence era, highlighting critical changes to water management.  
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Chapter three presents the theoretical framework of the study. This chapter discusses 
the neo-classical theories, the old and new institutional economics approaches and the 
justification of adopting the new institutional approach in this study. A review of other 
theories, paying particular attention to irrigation water and how they are related to the 
study is also presented in this chapter.  
 
Chapter four is a review of literature on other studies done by other scholars with the 
application of the new institutional economics as an analytical framework. This is 
important as it presents a ground for comparison with the research findings. In addition, 
a review of the analytical framework to be used is also discussed in this chapter.   
 
Chapter five presents the description and major characteristics of the study area. It 
also presents the methodology of the study. The research design is also explained in 
this chapter.  
 
Chapter six presents the descriptive inferences of the study.  
 
Chapter seven presents and discusses the empirical analysis results, mainly focussing 
on the institution-performance relationships.  
 
Lastly, Chapter eight discusses the conclusions and policy recommendations of the 
study. Areas for further research are also presented in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 – WATER- SECTOR REFORMS AND MANAGEMENT IN ZIMBABWE 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
Although water was perhaps more inequitably distributed than land, there was little 
organised political agitation around inequitable access by the various agricultural users. 
However, repeated droughts and a realisation that having access to surface water can 
make a difference meant that the late 1990s witnessed a dramatic transformation in 
water policy in Zimbabwe. Underlying this transformation was the adoption of the 
concept of ‘integrated water resources management’ (IWRM) within national policy 
framework. At the core of the integrated water resources management concept was an 
emphasis on the management of water on the basis of: 
 
 Hydrological boundaries, namely the catchment and sub-catchment areas,  
 Decentralization of water management,  
 Stakeholder participation and representation in water management processes, 
and  
 The treatment of water as an economic good.  
 
In combination, these four principles were viewed as providing an effective framework 
for water management aimed not only at the participation of water users in processes 
and decision making on water, but also at poverty reduction and livelihood 
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improvement, particularly among previously disadvantaged water users, namely 
communal, resettlement and small-scale farmers. 
 
2.1 Objectives of water reforms and management 
 
The twin objectives of the water reform were tied to the four key IWRM principles 
discussed above. First, starting from the premise that water must be managed on the 
basis of hydrological boundaries since they constitute the ‘natural’ boundaries of a river 
system (Newson, 1997), the case for decentralisation was advanced. Catchment and 
sub-catchment areas became the bedrock upon which decentralized institutions of 
water management, catchment and sub-catchment councils were constructed.  
 
Secondly, stemming from this, the case for decentralised institutional framework for 
water management was drawn from the theoretical appeal of decentralization which 
postulates that a more decentralized framework is more exposed, and therefore more 
responsive to local needs and aspirations (Crook & Sverisson, 2001). As such, 
decentralization was viewed as providing systems of water governance that are 
accountable to local people (Crook & Manor, 1998; Manor, 1999). In addition to this, it 
was suggested that decentralization of water management provides an institutional 
forum for promoting participation and representation of different water users in decision 
making processes.  
 
Thirdly, by treating water as an economic good with a price attached to the resource, 
proponents argued that this would lead not only to the efficient use of water but also 
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generate revenue necessary for financing decentralized institutions of water 
management, and water resources development and management at a broader level.  
 
However, despite that Zimbabwe’s water reforms reflected the embedment of the 
concept and principles of integrated water resources management, this was at variance 
with local concerns and aspirations for water sector reform. According to Matinenga 
(1999); Manzungu et al. (1999) & Bolding et al. (1998), central to local concerns was the 
need to ‘redress colonial injustices in the water sector’  as some government officials 
were pointing out that ‘continued privileged access to water by commercial interests, 
mainly large scale commercial agriculture, was no longer aligned to the political 
dispensation of an independent Zimbabwe.  
 
In light of the above, it was therefore argued that there was an urgent need to reform 
the water sector, and establish a legal framework that ensured equal access to water for 
all Zimbabweans. Equitable access to water was viewed as providing a basis for rural 
people to gain access to water for productive uses which would contribute to the 
improvement of their livelihoods derived from the use of water. 
 
The Water Act governs the use of water in Zimbabwe (Makurira & Mugumo, 2002). Two 
different processes drove the water sector reforms of 1994 in Zimbabwe 
(Pazvakavambwa, 2002), ahead of other sub-Saharan countries in Africa. The first 
factor was the general global concern pressing for a more efficient and sustainable 
approach to water management. The second factor was water legislation that was 
perceived to be inconsistent with present trends in Zimbabwe. More water users were 
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applying for water rights, yet the existing legislation was not sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate more players. This was evident in highly committed areas, where almost 
all available water had already been allocated and therefore new users could not be 
accommodated. For instance, the 1976 Water Act was intended to protect the interests 
of commercial farmers, despite that they only constituted less than 1 percent of the 
country’s population of 13 million (Manzungu, 2002). 
 
2.2 Water Resources in Zimbabwe: Hydrological and Historical Context  
 
There exists great variation in the spatial distribution of water resources in Zimbabwe 
based on rainfall potential, and this has played a major role in determining how the 
country divides into six agro-ecological zones. It is onto this landscape of diverse 
variation in water resources and agricultural potential that deprivation of water to 
smallholder farmers not only created a skewed distribution of land, but also an 
inequitable access to water (Weinrich, 1975). Based on this land alienation and 
inequitable distribution of water, African irrigation schemes were developed with the 
view to promoting productive uses of water in selected ‘native reserves’ ‘on small 
pockets of irrigable land partly with the objective to allow the resettlement of a larger 
population of people whose land had been ‘alienated’’ (Weinrich, 1975). 
 
According to Kambudzi (1997); Mtisi & Nicol (2003), the colonial state, based on the 
dual division of land, established a legal and administrative framework that governed 
access to, and control of, water in favour of certain sectional interests, namely urban 
areas, commercial agriculture, mining and manufacturing industries. From the 1890s up 
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to 1927, water was governed by a set of loosely coordinated pieces of legislation which 
apportioned water to a nascent urban, mining, railway and agricultural sectors. Water 
for agriculture was apportioned and managed under the Water Ordinance of 1913, 
which was repealed by the 1927 Water Act, which was, in turn, repealed by the 1976 
Water Act. To this end, the 1976 Water Act became the most comprehensive piece of 
water legislation that set the parameters of access, use and control of water from 1976 
to 1997. Central to the water legislation was the denial of access to water for productive 
purposes to the majority of Africans. 
 
2.2.1 Water legislation: The early years: 1890-1927 
 
In the early years, the preoccupation with mining resulted in a situation where water was 
committed to mining, which later changed to agriculture. Varying concepts of water law 
were tried. For example in the allocation of water rights a frontier mentality was 
displayed with such claims as: 
 
‘… being a new country, Southern Rhodesia is unhampered by the 
pernicious common law relating to riparian ownership’. In this way the 
water rights of the indigenous population, which predated the settler 
claims were disregarded (Manzungu & Senzanje, 1996).  
 
Conflicts over water did not take long to develop. The frequent and often costly 
litigations between rival claimants to the use of water culminated in the Union Irrigation 
Act of 1912. This made provisions for the control, apportionment and use of water. The 
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Act was based on the common law as evolved and expounded by the Courts (McIlwain, 
1936). In 1913, the Water Ordinance was passed as a way of comprehensively dealing 
with problems of rights to water (Mcllwain, 1936). 
 
The South African connection had a strong influence on some aspects of water 
management. For example the settlers, encouraged by the British South Africa 
Company (BSAC) used the Roman Dutch Law that had been brought from Holland and 
then in use in South Africa. This was regarded as unsuited to the water resources and 
production of the region (McIlwain, 1936). There was, however, continued use of the 
riparian2 rights doctrine in interpreting access rights and differentiated water use types. 
The 1920 Water Ordinance explained that: 
 
                                                          
2 Riparian water rights system is an arrangement where water is allocated among those who possess 
land about its source.  
 
General principle of the Riparian system 
Under the riparian principle, all landowners whose property is adjoining to a body of water have the right 
to make reasonable use of it. If there is not enough water to satisfy all users, allotments are generally 
fixed in proportion to frontage on the water source. These rights cannot be sold or transferred other than 
with the adjoining land, and water cannot be transferred out of the watershed. 
Riparian rights include such things as the right to access for swimming, boating and fishing; the right to 
wharf out to a point of navigability; the right to erect structures such as docks, piers, and boat lifts; the 
right to use the water for domestic purposes; the right to accretions caused by water level fluctuations. 
Riparian rights also depend upon "reasonable use" as it relates to other riparian owners to ensure that the 
rights of one riparian owner are weighed fairly and equitably with the rights of adjacent riparian owners.  
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‘If a farmer has land well suited for irrigation and there is a stream 
that can be economically utilised, he can acquire the right to use the 
whole of the water for irrigation even though it may leave others 
without water except for primary purposes’. 
 
The granting of responsible government in 1923, however, did not result in complete 
dissociation from the principles of the Roman Dutch Law. The riparian doctrine 
remained on the statutes until 1998 albeit with some modifications. What needs to be 
pointed out is that although there were disagreements between the settlers over which 
was the better legal ideology to guide water allocation, the situation was worse for 
indigenous people. Land appropriations disadvantaged them in that they were 
downstream of white settlers and were generally no longer riparian to perennial rivers; 
the whole legal system was against them and this was compounded by a shortage of 
the necessary finance for accessing water rights.  
 
Another concept that was reflected in the water law was primary water use. This was 
water for human and farm livestock use and was set at 50 gallons (~228litres) per 
person per day. This was quite generous more-so because it could be used in and 
around the homestead, which did not preclude gardening. Water for ‘secondary 
purposes’ was for irrigation and watering of stock other than farm stock. ‘Tertiary 
purposes’ included the needs of the mines and railways. The water resources legal 
environment in the colony (Rhodesia) was marked by three major laws as discussed in 
the following sections. 
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2.2.2 Agriculture-based water law: 1927-1980 
 
Table 2.1 below shows the main changes to the water legislation during the time 
agriculture became a dominant water user.  
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Table 2.1: Main characteristics of water legislation between 1927 and 1980 
Source3: Cited in Manzungu & Machiridza (2005) 
                                                          
3
 Vincent & Manzungu (in press) 
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By the Act of 1927, the priority right to water, granted to the mining industry within the Gold 
Belt areas, was modified in favour of irrigation (National Archives of Zimbabwe,). Therein 
were a number of clauses that disadvantaged the indigenous native population. First of all 
water rights were attached to land, which disadvantaged the natives who had been 
dispossessed and placed in the reserves where they did not enjoy full rights. Rights to 
land in the reserves were registered with Communal Area bodies (formerly known as 
Tribal Trust Lands) and not with individuals. Natives could therefore only apply for water 
rights as a community, and through government officials. Even then the District 
Administrator or Minister of Water Development held the water right on the behalf of the 
natives.  
 
However, there was provision for the appointment of representatives of ‘native interests’ in 
the Irrigation Boards and in the Water Courts. Not much is known about whether or not 
they were actually represented. Settlers on the other hand could individually apply for 
water rights because they owned land in their own private capacity. Another problem was 
that water rights were issued based on the priority date system; this meant that rights were 
granted on a first-come first-served basis.  
 
The Black indigenous people were disadvantaged because they had not applied for water 
rights (Manzungu, 2001). When they later understood this, most of the water was 
committed to rights held by the settlers. Water rights were also issued in perpetuity, which 
meant that a water right once issued could not be revoked except in special circumstances 
such as the declaration of a drought or when someone else applied for the same water 
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and was willing to pay compensation. By virtue of the fact that settlers applied for the 
rights way before the indigenes, most of the water was committed. It should be noted that 
although racial water allocation was provided for in the 1927 Water Act, it was only in the 
1940s that massive transfers of water to the whites actually occurred because of cheap 
finance. This emphasizes the argument that it is not necessarily changes in water 
legislation that determines (lack of) access to water. 
 
The 1947 Water Amendment Act had loose allowances for primary water uses especially 
for gardens and riparian users. The Act also defined vleis (dambos [seasonally flooded 
wetlands] or wetlands in depressions), springs and streams that stayed outside public 
management because they were defined as ‘private water’. This changed later with 
restrictions on dambo cultivation mainly because of fear of degradation, which had been 
noticed in the white farms. The Act also identified new water uses such as fish farms and 
conservation activities that were a result of new commercial interests. 
 
The Water Act of 1976 affirmed the Roman Dutch Law concept in water management and 
upheld the principles of the 1927 Water Act, that is, rights to water were linked to land, the 
priority date system of allocating water and granting a water right in perpetuity. The Act 
also provided for catchment outline plans to be prepared for the development and use of 
surface water. Three types of water were recognised, public water, private water and 
underground water. The Act, under a 1984 amendment, also provided for some 
stakeholder participation in such institutions as River Boards. The participation was, 
however, restricted to water right holders. The Act also required applicants for water rights 
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to put in place water measuring devices for a water right to be confirmed as permanent. 
This explains why most water rights in the native areas were temporary – the natives could 
not afford to put in the requisite measuring devices.  
 
In addition, the Act set differential access to water based on the type of water one wants to 
gain access to, whether ‘private water’ or ‘public water’. Access to ‘private water’ was 
vested in the owner of the land on which it was found and its sole and exclusive use 
belonged to such an owner4. The Act allowed the owners, lessees or occupiers of any land 
to construct wells and drill boreholes of which the amount of water abstracted was not 
controlled (Matinenga, 1999). On the other hand, access to ‘public water’ was vested in 
the state and its use, apart from primary purposes, required that a water right be granted 
to the user by the Water Court. Right of access to ‘public water’ was based on prior 
appropriation doctrine, which meant that access is based on the date on which an 
appropriation to the beneficial use of water was made. Simply put, earlier applicants had 
the first appropriation right of access to water. 
 
Legal access to water and associated water rights were attached to land, and were 
granted in perpetuity. Thus, only individuals with title deeds to land could apply for, and be 
granted, water rights. This included groundwater, whereby rights to water were attached to 
the title deed of the land on which it was found. The granting of water rights under the 
1976 Water Act took cognisance of the pre-existing rights to riparian owners, which meant 
that each riparian owner was entitled to claim all the water which he could have claimed 
                                                          
4
 Section 32 (1), Water Act No. 41 of 1976. 
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under the previous water laws. This ensured continued privileged access and rights to 
water for earlier applicants. 
 
The main weaknesses of the Water Act of 1976: 
 
 The issue of all water rights was centralized at the Water Court in Harare. 
 A water right was issued in perpetuity on a first-come-first-served basis. This meant 
that when water resources were fully allocated, no further water rights would be 
issued, regardless of the need. 
 In the event of water shortage, the process of reallocation was very long and 
complex. 
 A water right would not be revised, even if the right holder was not exercising his or 
her water rights. The water rights could only be revised if the holder volunteered to 
do so. 
 The process of acquiring a water right was very long. Once granted, there was no 
requirement to pay for the possession of the water right or to contribute towards 
general water service provision. 
 The act was silent on water quality and factors relating to the environment. 
 There was little consideration given to groundwater supplies. The Secretary of 
Water in the Ministry of Water Resources and Development had to be informed if a 
deep borehole was drilled, but there was no control on the amounts of groundwater 
pumped, or the number and spacing of such boreholes. 
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In general, the Water Act of 1976 was a good piece of legislation that brought any form of 
water use under control and aimed at the systematic allocation of water among users. 
According to the act, anyone was entitled to access to water, as long as the water was for 
primary use (basic human sustenance). Any use of water from which the user would 
derive a benefit was deemed commercial use, and required a water right. All water rights 
were issued in Harare by the Water Court, which was based at the Administrative Court of 
Zimbabwe. 
 
The Water Act (1976) was amended several times, and global modern trends pushed for a 
review of existing approaches to water management in Zimbabwe. This led to the 
complete overhaul of the Water Act (1976), which was replaced with the Water Act (1998), 
conforming to global trends and addressing pressing national issues. 
 
2.2.3 Redressing past water injustices 
 
The lack of a clear ideology can also be traced to the water reforms. For close to two 
decades into independence water resource management continued to be governed by the 
1976 Water Act. However, it has been established that the need for water reform 
emanated from two distinct concerns. One strand was partly rooted in the need to ‘redress 
colonial injustices in the water sector’ (Matinenga, 1999; Manzungu et al., 1999, Bolding et 
al., 1998). Continued privileged access to water by commercial interests especially white 
large scale commercial agriculture ensured that there was an urgent need to reform the 
water sector, and establish a legal framework that ensured equal access to water for all 
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Zimbabweans. Equitable access to water was viewed as providing a basis for rural people 
to gain access to water for productive uses which would contribute to the improvement of 
their livelihoods derived from the use of water. 
 
Secondly, the water reforms that culminated in the 1998 Water Act also began as a knee 
jerk reaction to the 1991/92 drought, the worst in the country’s history (Makarau, 1999).  
 
Within this context, the 1976 Water Act was repealed by two pieces of water legislation, 
namely the Water Act and the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) Act, both 
promulgated in 1998. The Water Act of 1998 set the parameters of access and use of 
water as well as providing for the establishment of Catchment and Sub-catchment areas 
based on hydrological boundaries. Catchment and sub-catchment areas formed the basis 
for water management. In this vein, seven catchment areas were established in Zimbabwe 
and are shown in Figure 2.1 below. 
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Source: Chimhowu et al., (2009) 
Figure 2.1: Catchments in Zimbabwe5 
 
  
 
The creation of catchment and sub-catchment areas led to the introduction of Catchment 
and Sub-catchment councils respectively. Broadly, Catchment Councils (CCs) are 
composed of elected representatives, mainly chairpersons and vice-chairpersons, of sub-
catchment councils. Catchment Councils also include the Catchment Manager, and any 
other identified stakeholders. 
 
                                                          
5
 Chimhowu et al (2009) 
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The key functions of CCs include, preparing catchment outline plans for their respective 
area, determining applications and granting water permits, regulating and supervising the 
use of water, and supervising the performance of functions of sub-catchment councils 
(Water Act, 1998). Further, CCs serve as a forum for participation and decision making for 
water users represented by elected sub-catchment council officials. 
 
Below the CC, there are sub-catchment councils, which are constituted by elected 
representatives from diverse water user groups, which include commercial, communal, 
small-scale and resettlement farming sectors, local authorities, traditional leaders, and 
mining and manufacturing sectors. The main functions of a sub-catchment council include, 
inter alia; 
 
 Regulating and supervising the exercise of permits for the use of water within their 
area of jurisdiction. 
 Collecting sub-catchment rates, fees and levies. 
 Reporting as required to the Catchment Council on exercise of water permits in 
their area, and  
 Participating in the planning on water. 
 
Sub-catchment councils also serve as a platform for local level participation in water 
management 
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2.2.4 The Water Act of 1998 
 
The first step towards reviewing the 1976 Water Act was the setting up of an inter-
ministerial review committee headed by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water 
Development in mid-1993. The committee recommended that a new Water Act be put in 
place. In the short-term, smallholder farmers were allocated 10% of all water in 
government dams. This was the origin of the 1998 Water and Zimbabwe National Water 
Authority Acts. 
 
The new Water Act had the following provisions: 
 
 Water permits, valid for a limited time sufficient to earn back money invested to 
develop facilities, were to be issued instead of water rights in perpetuity.  
 Priority would be given to efficient irrigation systems 
 The priority date system was replaced with proportional water allocation. 
 The polluter pays principle was evoked where people who cause pollution of water 
pay for expenses for removing the pollution. 
 The environment was regarded as a legitimate ‘user’ of water competing with other 
users such as industrial, agricultural, mining and domestic users. 
 The state owned all surface and underground water. Except for primary purposes 
(mainly for domestic uses such as drinking, cooking and washing) any use of water 
would need approval by the state 
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 Water would be managed by catchment areas, as rivers do not match political or 
administrative boundaries. All people with an interest in the use of water would be 
involved in making decisions about its use and management. Identified groups 
included representatives from communal, small-scale commercial and large farms 
and mines, as well as urban representatives from industry, manufacturing and 
municipalities. These would replace the River Boards (which used to supervise day-
to-day management) and the Advisory Councils (which used to assist in water 
planning) and would have the responsibility of granting water permits, a function 
previously carried out by the Administrative Court. 
 Water was recognized as an economic good. People who use water would pay for it 
 A national water authority, ZINWA, would operate as a commercial enterprise. 
However, Government would ensure that the poor and disadvantaged would 
continue to have fair access to water. 
 
While the water reforms could have had a local trigger in the form of the 1991/92 drought it 
was very much shaped by international donors (Manzungu, 2002; 2004). This is echoed 
by Campbell (2003) who asserts that the independent government of Zimbabwe 
predicated its policies on the colonial as well as neo-liberal concept of modern over 
subsistence farming. Campbell (2003) concluded that the old settler-dominated River 
Boards were somewhat reincarnated (with some black faces) as Catchment Councils that 
continued to wield power over water issues to the disempowerment of smallholder 
farmers. It should be added that the situation has changed since the fast track land reform 
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programme. White commercial farmers who were active in the early stages (Kujinga & 
Manzungu, 2004; Kujinga, 2002) have been replaced by a black elite.  
 
A research based critique of the current water reforms in relation to how they affect rural 
livelihoods seems to converge on the consensus that the reforms did not facilitate the 
development of irrigation in the smallholder sector in general (Manzungu, 2001; Mtisi, 
2002). This is ironic given that the post-colonial state, led by people professing indigenous 
roots, has failed to capitalize on indigenous water and irrigation management experiences. 
This has rendered the water reforms somewhat cosmetic. 
 
While water allocation was the responsibility of the Water Court before the 1998 Water 
Act, this function has been delegated to the catchment councils. Catchment councils have 
had to try and allocate water with no guidelines on how to balance what are sometimes 
contradictory objectives. Research indicates that decentralisation to catchment and sub-
catchment levels has in some cases resulted in a concentration of influence to a few 
already powerful individuals (Kujinga & Manzungu, 2004). With regards to popular 
participation in water management, the state allocated itself disproportionately huge 
powers somewhat in contradiction to the democratic claims showing a lack of appetite for 
strong local institutions with sufficient political clout to complement the positive aspects of 
the water reform (Manzungu, 2001). 
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2.2.5 The Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) Act  
 
The ZINWA Act of 1998, created the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA), a 
‘parastatal’ tasked with the responsibility for providing a coordinated framework for 
planning, development and management of water resources. Additionally, ZINWA took 
over the commercial functions associated with water provision which were previously 
performed by the Department of Water Development. The functions of ZINWA vary 
depending on the level at which it is operating. At national level, ZINWA advises the 
Minister responsible for water on formulation of national policies, water pricing, water 
resource development and management. At catchment level, ZINWA’s role include, inter 
alia, ensuring the catchment council discharge its functions in accordance with the Water 
Act, and assisting catchment councils in planning and coordinating water development 
and management within a catchment area. Also, ZINWA has exclusive responsibility for 
selling, supplying and management of ‘agreement water6’. 
 
Of significance is that the institutional structure of ZINWA is not necessarily tied to 
hydrological boundary of the catchment area, but extends from the sub-catchment area to 
the national level. ZINWA functions include technical assistance, the selling of ‘agreement 
water’, maintenance and management of former government owned dams, and advising 
the Minister responsible for water. Given this background, it is therefore important to 
understand how the reform process affected how water is accessed by the different 
                                                          
6 Agreement water refers to water behind dams which were previously owned by the government. 
 
 47 
 
stakeholders and this is discussed in the subsequent paragraphs, as well as some of the 
emerging bottlenecks. 
 
One of the key aspects of the water reform was to open up access to water for all water 
users, particularly ‘new’ water users (i.e., communal and resettlement farmers). In the 
past, water was accessible to commercial interests, namely agriculture, mining and 
manufacturing industries, and was tied to land. The introduction of water permits for raw 
water, and agreement water contracts for ‘agreement water’, which, are not legally tied to 
land, has provided a basis for broad-based access to water. This represented a significant 
achievement of the water reform as it untied land and water, and devolved the 
responsibility for water application from the Water Court in Harare to local sub-offices. 
 
However, despite the achievements as mentioned above, lack of coordination between the 
water institutions has affected water reforms, and management. Recent work (Mtisi, 2008) 
suggests that some water users were not aware of the institutions to consult over their 
water needs. This, for some means, the classification of water into raw and agreement 
water, and the establishment of two distinct institutions for water management has created 
a complex institutional environment for water access. Consequently, water users were 
finding it ‘confusing’ to gain access to water as they were referred from one institution to 
another. This is made worse in cases where there is lack of coordination between ZINWA 
and the Catchment Councils in performing their respective functions. As often ZINWA 
officials fail to attend Catchment Council Meetings. Underlying the lack of coordination 
between the two decentralised institutions of water management is the parallel lines of 
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institutional responsibility and accountability in water management. Since ZINWA officials 
report to the Irrigation Officer at catchment level, and are accountable to the Irrigation 
Office and not the Catchment Council, there consequently exists little or no coordination in 
local level water management as suggested by the water policy. 
 
2.2.6 Water and land resources: Access and Management Post-FTLRP 
 
The Fast Track Land Reform Programme of 2000 marked the emergence of A1 and A2 
farmers as a new group of water users, undoubtedly increasing the number of people with 
access to land, therefore had potential to provide a basis for improved access to water for 
some ‘new’ farmers.  
 
Around this coveted access to irrigable land emerged some powerful political interest 
groups. For example, in the Middle Sabi, A2 irrigators formed the Middle Save Farmers’ 
Syndicate to represent their broad political, land and water interests. Given the political 
strength of A2 irrigators, which stemmed from their political links, water issues pertaining 
to the Syndicate were channelled through the local structures of war veterans, and the 
institutional nodes that linked war veterans to district and provincial administration. At 
provincial level, water issues were further transmitted through the office of the Provincial 
Governor to the Minister of Lands, Rural Resettlement for Special Affairs in the President’s 
office, who ultimately aired the Syndicate’s water grievances directly to the Minister of 
Water. 
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2.2.7 Water resources management: Participation, issues and challenges 
 
The water reform introduced radical changes regarding the participation and 
representation of water users in the management of and decision making on water. By 
identifying a broad range of water users as stakeholders in water management, the 1998 
Water Act provided a legal basis for the representation and participation of previously 
excluded water users, namely communal, resettlement and small-scale commercial 
farmers. The new politics of inclusiveness and participation, at least stated formally, has 
encouraged local level participation in water management at the sub-catchment council 
level. 
 
Hitherto, the participation and representation of new water users has been fraught with 
problems. Participation at sub-catchment level is often stacked against new water users 
who lack financial resources to travel to attend sub-catchment council meetings. 
Identification and classification of water user groups from which representatives are 
elected to the sub-catchment council is problematic, in spite of what the Water Act of 1998 
provides for. For example, the act provides for inclusion of ‘communal farmers’ as a 
disparate group of water users, even the local level water committees in communal areas 
barely function and most are formed around ground water resources that barely get 
mentioned at catchment council meetings. 
 
In cases where communal areas have irrigation schemes, representation at catchment 
level is organized under the aegis of the Irrigation Management Committees (IMCs). 
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However, these do not extend beyond the irrigation schemes which they are established 
for. Therefore, there is no sub-catchment wide organisation of, and for, communal 
irrigators to provide a basis for electing a representative of communal irrigators to the sub-
catchment council. In reality ‘representatives’ of the communal irrigation sector who sit on 
the sub-catchment council are elected representatives of their particular schemes and not 
of the sector as a whole. By extension, they represent the interests and concerns of the 
particular irrigation scheme to which they belong. 
 
Genuine participation in water management can only occur when water users and their 
representatives are informed and knowledgeable about the water reform. Yet, new water 
users have little knowledge about the reforms and the legislation that set the parameters 
for their participation. As such, a lack of knowledge about the water reform makes it 
difficult for new water users to effectively participate and make informed decisions on 
water management processes at sub-catchment level. 
 
Moreover, while the framework for a perfect water management system exists, the 
situation on the ground does not reflect this common belief. The reform process has not 
taken off as expected owing to a combination of factors ranging from conflicting policies 
and weak institutional linkages, to insufficient funding. The reasons given in the following 
subsections help to explain why a properly developed legal framework can only function 
with the support of other critical pillars, such as technical and institutional support. 
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2.2.7.1 Donor withdrawal 
 
The water sector reforms in Zimbabwe were largely donor-driven. Several donors pledged 
to support the reform process. This was very positive, considering that a particular donor 
would be supporting at most two catchments. There was therefore an opportunity for 
maximum interaction between the donor organizations and the beneficiary catchments. 
However, by the time the CCs were to be fully launched, donors started withdrawing their 
support, leading to a number of stakeholders losing confidence in the whole water reform 
process, and they too began to pull out. CCs were not yet financially self-sufficient, and 
this sudden withdrawal of donor support in both financial and technical areas was 
unexpected. 
 
Without a good financial base, CC activities were doomed to fail, with participation 
restricted to voluntary work. Volunteers tended to be those who had already established 
themselves in water management, and therefore had interests to protect. Representation 
therefore continued to be skewed. 
 
2.2.7.2 Other national programmes 
 
The launching of the water reform process coincided with the land reform process in 
Zimbabwe. The water sector reforms were aimed at promoting equitable and sustainable 
utilization with more participation of stakeholders and the introduction of the user pays 
principle. The land reform programme aimed to redistribute land and to encourage greater 
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utilization of the national land resource. On paper, these two policies complemented each 
other. There was a great amount of movement, especially in the commercial sector, with 
established farmers moving away and new farmers coming in.  
 
However, this process happened so quickly that the water sector lost track of who was 
utilizing water. The problems were more complex in cases where there were more settlers 
on a property for which a permit had previously been issued to one user. The reallocation 
of such a permit to more users resulted in many conflicts. Moreover, new settlers were 
more interested in consolidating their claim to the new properties than in attending water 
management meetings. Water issues were therefore thrown aside as the land reform 
exercise attracted greater attention. 
 
2.2.7.3 Financial stability 
 
The water sector reforms intended to implement the user pays and polluter pays 
principles. In this respect, permit holders would pay a fee, which was to contribute to water 
services provision. The Water Fund was created through the Water Act (1998) to facilitate 
the collection of levies, fees, government contributions and any other support towards 
water service provision. This was to be deposited into a common pool from where the 
minister would identify areas of greatest need for the benefit of the water sector. The 
government would also contribute to the Water Fund, using public funds allocated from the 
main government budget.  
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The Water Fund had a potential to realize substantial revenue to be used to improve the 
provision of water services, as directed by the minister responsible for the provision and 
management of water. Inflows into the Water Fund have been minimal, with a contributing 
factor being the cessation of donor contributions. Unease ensued, resulting in many 
established farmers not paying for their permits, as they were uncertain as to their 
continuing occupancy on their land with respect to the new land reforms. Increased 
government responsibilities meant that less and less money was allocated to the Water 
Fund from the national budget.  
 
Similarly, new farmers were reluctant to pay for water use, as water rights had not been 
paid for previously. Most of the new commercial water users believed that water is a God-
given resource, and therefore there is no need to pay for access to it. The diminishing 
sources of contributions into the Water Fund therefore meant that there was very little 
money available to support water service provision and management. 
 
2.2.7.4 Weak institutional linkages  
 
The new Water Act provided a better framework for stronger institutional linkages. It is now 
a requirement that a number of institutions be consulted before permits for water use can 
be issued. However, there is little evidence to prove that this is bearing fruit. Not all 
institutions give priority to water issues. Some continue with their previous approach to 
water management where their support cannot be fully guaranteed unless they are certain 
of deriving substantial and direct benefits from their participation. 
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2.2.7.5 Lack of capacity within key institutions  
 
Key institutions, especially ZINWA, are not adequately staffed to cope with the sudden 
demands for the provision of expert services. The staffing levels of ZINWA fall short of 
expected levels, as does the level of expertise. The result is that ZINWA cannot provide 
sufficient personnel to provide commercial services, nor can it provide statutory functions 
with funding sourced from the Water Fund. With staffing levels inadequate and depth of 
expertise questionable, it is uncertain if sufficient funds from the Water Fund would have 
made much difference to this situation. 
 
Other key institutions, such as the Department of Natural Resources, Agricultural 
Research and Extension Services (AREX), the Ministry of Water and Rural Development 
and the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement, are also experiencing inadequate staffing 
levels that have a negative impact on the whole process. 
 
2.2.7.6 Remuneration for participants  
 
CC and SCC representatives have not been paid directly for their input into water affairs. 
They were only compensated for travel and subsistence. When finances became scarce, 
the frequency of meetings was reduced, and user groups were merged to cut down on 
expenses. This meant that stakeholders could not meet as often as was desirable to 
discuss water management issues. This new approach was designed to cut down costs; 
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however, consideration was not given to the main objective of providing more efficient 
water management at the catchment level. 
 
2.2.7.7 Lack of enforcement of legislation  
 
The new Water Act has been described as technically sound with a solid base for 
sustainable and efficient utilisation of water resources. However, some vital sections of the 
act have not been fully enforced; hence, its founding principles cannot be supported. The 
Water Fund is collecting insufficient revenue adequately to support statutory functions. 
ZINWA is not financially viable, as the four main accounts that were created (raw water 
account, clear water account, engineering services account and water levy account) are 
not self-sustaining; hence the new institution has to rely on the government for financial 
support. In the process, key and experienced staff has left the organization owing to the 
working environment. 
 
Similarly, Catchment Outline Plans (COPs) have not been developed in accordance with 
Section 12 of the Water Act (1998). COPs are to be developed by stakeholders, and 
should serve as a guide on water management within their catchment areas, as well as on 
the interventions to take in the event of scarcity, and therefore excess demand. Water 
quality issues and environmental aspects are also covered in the COPs. The reasons for 
non-development of the COPs range from a lack of capacity for their development, 
financial constraints and general lack of coordination among stakeholders.  
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2.2.7.8 Different levels of appreciation of water  
 
Water management representatives are from local authorities, industry, commercial 
farmers, communal farmers and other interested parties. While all representatives were 
expected to sit at the same table to discuss water affairs, it was clear that the priority of 
each group was to protect its own interests. Communal farmers were the weakest and 
most disadvantaged sector, with the least appreciation of water for commercial use. They 
were not given equal access to the resource, despite management being conducted 
through SCCs, which were believed to involve such vulnerable user groups. 
 
2.2.7.9 Political interference 
 
Politics always plays a role in the success or failure of any process. In this case, there was 
a marked political influence in the pricing of water. In a bid to retain popularity, politicians 
aimed to keep the price of water as low as possible. Politicians frustrated the 
implementation of the pricing policy, which cannot afford to subsidise water service 
provision to maintain standards in good water service 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 
Of crucial importance to note in Zimbabwe’s water reform is that, while the water reform 
was built around neo-liberal principles couched within the concept of integrated water 
resources management, the implementation coincided with a radical transformation in 
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state governance and partly because of the implementation of the fast track land reform 
programme. Such developments from 2000 onwards provided a challenging context for 
the water reform, not least because the transformation of the state and the narratives that 
informed the fast track land reform, were anachronistic to the neo-liberal approaches 
embedded in the water reform.  
 
The water reform was mainly driven by the global IWRM discourse, which has principally 
shaped the water reform policy in Zimbabwe. This was achieved at the expense of local 
historical grievances of past denial of access to water. Broadly, the historical construction 
of communal areas (the then ‘native reserves’) and communal irrigation schemes in 
marginal agro-ecological areas, characterised by limited water resources, poor soils, 
drought proneness, high population densities and degraded environmental conditions, 
features acquired during the colonial period, are what still define rural areas, and their 
access to water for productive agriculture. 
 
Within this context, the water reform was implemented and overlaid on top of an 
underlying maze of inequality of water access and skewed distribution of land to the extent 
that the reform continued to provide privileged access to water to water users who already 
enjoyed better access to water and land. As such, the water reform provided limited 
possibilities for increased productive uses of water for new water users residing in 
communal and resettlement areas. 
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However, one of the key aspects of the water reform has been the creation of parallel 
institutional processes of water management, which are often contradictory to each other. 
ZINWA institutions provide technical assistance and advice to catchment and sub-
catchment council. On the other hand, catchment and sub-catchment councils are 
constituted by popularly elected representatives and represent the democratic aspect of 
the water management. Yet, ZINWA undermines decision making at catchment level, and 
the viability of sub-catchment councils in sub-catchment areas that predominantly rely on 
agreement water. Further, the separation between technical and participatory aspects of 
water management, which lie at the heart of the parallel institutional process, have 
resulted in the compartmentalization of water services, which does not augur well with 
livelihood enhancement goals. 
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CHAPTER 3 - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
Water resources management encompasses a range of issues such as water allocation, 
property rights, water markets, regulation, jurisdictional responsibility and social attitudes 
and behaviours. Such follows also for irrigation water resources management. And for us 
to be able to study and understand these issues holistically, and how they are related to 
irrigation water management, the theoretical approach needs to be broad and analytically 
flexible. Institutions economics, as an approach, is a broad and dynamic analytical 
framework suitable for such a study. The institutional economics school of thought is 
comprised of two distinct traditions; the old and the new. However, the justification for 
using the new economics approach is provided in this chapter. 
 
3.1 Institutions and organisations 
 
There is a range of literature that attempts to define institutions, for example, Searle 
(2005), Hodgson (2006) and North (1991). Different scholars have derived different 
definitions and therefore slightly different results when analysing similar problems. This 
has created problems when trying to compare results that are achieved using a similar 
methodological and analytical framework. However, North (1991)’s definition7 seems to be 
                                                          
7
 Institutions are humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction (North, 1991) 
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the basis of definitions by other scholars. Ostrom (2008)’s definition8 is also important 
within the context of the research on institutions and the environment. 
 
This study will adopt a definition of institutions that encompasses both North (1991) and 
Ostrom (2008). By omission, North (1991)’s definition implies that interactions with the 
environment are secondary to political, economic and social interactions whereas Ostrom 
(2008) notes that institutions are rules that can be used at multiple levels of analysis and 
such a definition does not seem to place priority of one factor over another.   
 
North (1993)’s definition makes evident the embeddedness of economic processes within 
social and political processes and more importantly, it indicates that a necessary condition 
for economic change is the successful interaction between institutions and organisations. 
Political factors need to be considered alongside economic factors whenever analysing 
any economic phenomenon. Such a point is reiterated by North (1993), who argues that it 
is politics that shape economic performance because they define and enforce economic 
rules of the game.  
 
Furthermore, North (1993) also claims that his analysis of the characteristics of institutions 
implies that it is essential to change both the institutions and the belief systems for 
successful reform since it is the mental models of the actors that will shape choices. 
Although North (1993) is specifically referring to economic change and economic 
                                                          
8
 Institutions refer to the rules that humans use when interacting within a wide variety of repetitive and structured 
situations at multiple levels of analysis. 
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performance as a whole, his analytical framework can be adapted to a micro-level and this 
forms the basis of the analysis of irrigation water management in Zimbabwe in this study.  
 
3.2 The neo-classical economic theory 
 
The neo-classical economic theory played a central role in the public policy shift from the 
monopoly paradigm with strong government intervention to the liberalization of utility 
sectors in the early 1980s (Groenewegen, 2005; Geradin, 2006; Guthrie, 2006). However, 
the removal of governmental interferences and the devolvement of public sector activities 
to private contractors have not produced consistently successful results (Williamson, 2000; 
Schouten & Pieter van Dijk, 2007).  
 
Institutional economists argue that this lack of achievement is in part due to the reliance on 
neo-classical economic theory, which focused on economic coordination via the price 
mechanism and production efficiency while ignoring considerations such as rules, 
behaviours and social norms (Coase, 2000; North, 2000; Joskow, 2008). Their argument 
suggests that since lessons learnt from new institutional economics (NIE) can provide 
valuable insights into public policy-making (specifically the process of restructuring); NIE 
should therefore have more clout in public policy-making (Joskow, 2008).  
 
NIE is indeed gaining widespread attention in social science literature as it is becoming a 
more mainstream subject (Joskow, 2008). Particularly with respect to liberalization of utility 
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sectors, NIE is increasingly used to analyse modes of economic coordination 
(Rothenberger & Truffer, 2003). 
 
3.3 The Traditional Approach 
 
The conventional economic analysis, based on neo-classical theory, generally does not 
provide an adequate explanation of the role institutions play in influencing economic 
phenomenon (Sharma, 2012). Markets play a central role in neo-classical economics and 
it is here that institutions enter. Sharma (2012) argues that relegating the role of 
institutions to ensure the smooth functioning of markets is a narrow and simplistic 
approach. Similarly, relegating the role of government to that of a non-interfering facilitator 
of market interaction also neglects other roles that governments may play. 
 
Two fundamental assumptions based on the neo-classical theory include (North, 1993): 
 Assumption of scarcity and hence competition 
 Instrumental rationality9 
 
The first assumption is typically also adopted in new institutional economics (Sharma, 
2012). However, the analytical approach to dealing with scarcity and examining 
competition is different. The new institutional economics tradition recognises that 
                                                          
9
 Rationality is instrumental when it treats things and other persons as means and not ends in themselves. Caporaso 
et al, 2002) states that economists working within this framework assume that individuals have an instrumental 
attitude. 
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competition is not necessarily the best option when dealing with all types of economic 
goods.  
 
The second assumption is discarded in new institutional economics as it implies that ideas 
and ideologies do not matter, and efficient markets; both economic and political, 
characterise economies (North, 1993). The second assumption considerably impairs the 
ability of neo-classical economics to be significantly useful as a methodological framework 
for analysing economic phenomena (Sharma, 2012). One of the main reasons for this 
deficiency is the relegation of ‘ideas and ideologies’ despite the fact that these factors play 
a key role in economic interactions. According to Sharma (2012), neo-classical has a 
tendency to isolate the economic from social factors and polity, so are institutions being 
relegated to a secondary role in the analysis. This scenario presents a challenge because 
institutions need to be at the centre of any meaningful analysis and especially an analysis 
that leads to the formulation of government policies.  
 
Challen (2000) even notes that the role of institutions goes well beyond that of supporting 
markets, given that a vast range of decisions for resource allocation are made under 
institutional arrangements other than those providing for private decisions and market 
trading. Furthermore, a view of economic behaviour that fails to recognise and explain this 
diversity of institutions is incomplete. 
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3.4 The New Institutional Economics Approach 
 
Given the limitations explained above, the New Institutional Economics (NIE) was the 
chosen methodological framework. It is important to appreciate that old and new 
institutional economics have some common features that distinguishes them from the 
orthodox (neo-classical) economics, that is, the integration of institutions and institutional 
arrangements in economic analysis. In addition, both the old and new institutional 
economics have perspective of many of the neo-classical economics assumptions.  
 
For instance, instrumental rationality is completely discarded and is seen as a constraint in 
meaningful analysis. Engle et al. (2007) provides an excellent critique of instrumental 
rationality and provide further support to the idea that institutions do matter. The argument 
is that the human mind is not a general problem-solving machine. Instead of deliberately 
and analytically processing all available information to calculate which action will provide 
the greatest expected utility, people can and do rely on routines, rules, and roles or affect 
when deciding what to do in a given situation. They can also bring in information 
technology or experts to provide advice. 
 
The concept of evolution is a fundamental tenet of institutional economics (Sharma, 2012). 
Economic, social and political phenomenon is not static and as such, conceptual 
frameworks must also be evolutionary. The evolutionary nature of institutions is well 
acknowledged by the key proponents of both main streams of institutional economics (new 
and old institutional economics). In order to find how irrigation water management has 
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progressed over time, through the land reform programmes in Zimbabwe, is therefore 
important to understand the crucial impact of institutions on the decision of how to 
formulate a sustainable irrigation water management framework and how such decisions 
have also evolved over time.  
 
However, notwithstanding the commons between the old and new institutional economics, 
these are quite different traditions. The starting point for analysis is one significant 
difference. According to Langlois (1989), the old institutional economics approach is often 
referred to as ‘methodological holism’, implying that it takes the view that individual tastes 
and preferences are not given but instead constrained by a set of evolving institutions 
(Hodgson, 1993). On the other hand, the new institutional approach is often referred to as 
‘methodological individualism’ (Rutherford, 1989), suggesting that it assumes the position 
that there is an institution-free- state of nature (Hodgson, 2003). In addition, the original or 
old institutional economics is critiqued as lacking a systematic theoretical framework, 
empirical analysis and as over emphasizing economic history (Groenewegen, 2005; 
Joskow, 2008). Hence NIE theorists generally relegate this initial approach “to the history 
of economic thought” (Williamson, 2000). 
 
The other difference is based on the fact that while the old institutional economics rejects 
the neo-classical economic theory, the new institutional economics approach actually 
seeks to build upon, modify and extend the neo-classical economic theory (Rutherford, 
1989) in an attempt to take into account a range of factors that are generally ignored by 
neo-classical theory (North, 1993). According to Hodgson, 1989), the link between neo-
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classical and new institutional economic is important as it means that the new institutional 
economics approach accepts some of the propositions of neo-classical economics. For 
instance, markets are central to the neo-classical approach and are considered to be key 
institutional structures, making them an important phenomenon to be analysed in the new 
institutional economics approach. Chavance (2009) supports the linkage between the neo-
classical economics and the new institutional economics approach by stating that 
alongside the acceptance of markets as a means of allocating scarce resources, the neo-
classical emphasis on efficiency is retained in new institutional economics, primarily 
through the new institutional economics emphasis on minimising transaction costs. Table 
3.1 below shows some of the key differences and similarities between the old and new 
institutionalisms.  
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Table 3.1: Comparison between old and new institutional economics 
 Aspects of comparison Old Institutionalism New Institutionalism 
 
1 
 
Generic scope 
 
 
Macro-analysis of complete 
institutions 
 
Macro-analysis of 
incomplete institutions 
 
 
2 
Assumptions  
 
 Interdependence 
 
 
 Information 
 
 
 Rationality 
 
 
 
No  
 
No  
 
 
Complete 
 
Incomplete 
 
 
Comprehensive 
 
Bounded 
 
 
3 
 
Unit of analysis 
 
 
Institutional structures 
 
Institutional structures 
 
4 
 
Causal explanations 
Institutional structures 
determine individual 
behaviour 
Incomplete institutions 
create incentives for 
opportunistic behaviour 
 
5 
 
Focus 
On formulation of 
classification of institutional 
structures  
On opportunities and 
constraints built into 
institutional structures 
 
6 
 
Limitations 
 High level of 
aggregation 
 Ad-hoc 
description 
 Individuals 
do not calculate 
 High level 
of aggregation 
 Ad-hoc 
explanations 
Source: Adapted from Saleth & Dinar (2004) 
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The central unit of analysis in old institutional economics is power (Stilwell, 2005; 
Stanfiled, 1999). The old institutional economics approach seeks to examine the 
institutions that shape and influence power with an economy. However, the central unit of 
analysis in the new institutional economics approach remains the individual and it seeks to 
examine the institutions that shape interactions between individuals (e.g., with regards to 
this thesis, issues that include property rights for water). This aspect of institutional 
economics places the new institutional economics closer to neo-classical economics on 
the methodological spectrum and distinguishes it from old institutional economics.  
 
A new institutional economics approach is thus adopted in this thesis since it goes beyond 
the narrow prescriptions of neo-classical economics and offers a more structured 
approach and relevant approach to the study of irrigation water resource management in 
Zimbabwe.  
 
3.5 The New Institutional Economics (NIE) and its origins 
 
NIE has its origins in what is known today as original or old institutional economics, which 
departed from neo-classical economics in its recognition of institutions’ importance in 
structuring human behaviour and economic exchange (Hodgson, 2000; Menard & Shirley, 
2005). Beyond incorporating institutions into economic analysis, this approach also 
focuses on policy goals, understanding the process of economic change as well as human 
behaviour, learning and beliefs (Hodgson, 2000).  
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Departing from original institutional economics, NIE seeks to merge institutionalism into 
neo-classical economics by analysing institutions with economic theory tools and 
accepting the assumptions of scarcity and competition (Williamson, 2000; Menard & 
Shirley 2005). The variety of methods is a result of NIE being a compilation of different 
theories and traditions such as economics, law, organization theory and industrial 
organization as well as drawing from political science, sociology, anthropology, psychology 
(cognitive science in general) and evolutionary biology (Brousseau & Glachant, 2008). 
 
Despite its varied components and multidisciplinary approach, NIE operates within the 
field of economics; incorporating some principles of neo-classical economics, modifying 
others and adding new dimensions. For instance, by making institutions central to 
comprehending economies and assuming that transactions have positive costs, NIE 
discards neo-classical economics’ notion of a frictionless market with zero transaction 
costs (Menard & Shirley, 2005; North, 2005b; Williamson, 2008a). In fact, as transactions 
and their costs lie at the core of NIE theory, one branch of the theory is referred to as 
transaction cost economics, which employs the lens of contract to assess economic 
organization.  
 
Furthermore, NIE has moved beyond neoclassical economics’ assumption of equilibrium 
where all actors can concurrently maximise their utility, as the theory recognizes the 
disequilibria of market failures that necessitate non-market solutions (i.e. institutions) to 
cope with humans’ limited cognition (Chhotray & Stoker, 2009). 
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In addition, the new institutional economics approach puts attention on the adequacy of 
information and what it means to act rationally. While neo-classical economics typically 
assumes unbounded rationality, the new institutional economics takes the view that the 
rationality is bounded (by time and information) (Sharma, 2012). Again, on one hand, the 
neo-classical theory agents are assumed to have complete or near complete information, 
which then allows the agents to act in a rational manner. On the other hand, with regards 
to the new institutional economics approach, North (1993) notes that individuals have 
incomplete information and limited mental capacity by which to process information. In 
such a world, ideas and ideologies play a major role in choices and transaction costs 
result in imperfect markets. Such asymmetrical information problem characterise many 
economic, social and political processes.  
 
Similarly, Searle (2005) also notes the importance of ideas, ideologies and mental models 
by suggesting that at no point is it ever suggested that the reality described by economic 
theory is dependent on human beliefs and other attitudes. North (1993)’s discussion of 
ideas, ideologies and mental models is particularly pertinent as it highlights the 
inadequateness of the neo-classical analytical framework and can extend to a variety of 
issues in irrigation water management in Zimbabwe.  
 
However, institutions and institutional arrangements are not a panacea for solving 
problems faced by irrigation water management in Zimbabwe. Just as it would be 
fallacious to ignore institutions, it would be fallacious to overestimate the efficacy of 
institutions. As North (1993) notes, institutions are not necessarily or even usually created 
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to be socially efficient, rather they, or at least formal rules, are created to serve interests of 
those with bargaining power to create new rules. Similarly, Ostrom (2007) also warns 
against viewing any particular institutional arrangements as a panacea for solving natural 
resources (especially common-pool resources) problems due to heterogeneity and 
complexity of problems facing different environmental resources.  
 
A balanced view however emphasises the development of institutions as an aid to creating 
more socially acceptable (and also economically acceptable) outcomes (Sharma, 2012). In 
light of this, institutions are therefore necessary in order to create the ‘rules of the game’ 
so that, along with the appropriate enforcement of the rules, acceptable solutions can be 
achieved. Such a point is reiterated by North (1993) in relation to what he calls ‘an 
economic world characterised by impersonal markets’. According to North (1993), in order 
to achieve an acceptable solution in such a world, it entails the creation of institutions that 
structure the rules and their enforcement as to alter the pay-offs to induce the cooperative 
solutions.  
 
Such concepts are relevant as they can be adapted to this study. For instance, the idea of 
altering pay-offs in order to induce cooperative solutions is necessary especially with 
regards to irrigation water allocation disputes that are of increasing importance as water 
supplies diminish and need to be better managed.  
 
 
 
 72 
 
3.6 Objectives of New Institutional Economics 
 
NIE holds that the diverse performance of economies can be explained by understanding 
the process of economic change (North, 1990). In turn, it is possible to comprehend this 
process through assessing institutions that can be defined as rules diminishing uncertainty 
in economic exchanges. Furthermore, the transformation can be understood by analysing 
institutions’ role in economic growth as well as their interface with modes of coordinating 
economic exchange among human actors (Williamson, 2000; Menard, 2004; North, 
2005a).  
 
Moreover, the theory aspires to explain why and how institutions emerge, function and 
evolve (Joskow, 2008; Williamson, 2008b). In addition, NIE seeks to expand the static 
conventional economic theory into a dynamic one by including the dimension of time and 
creating modest hypotheses about economic change to enhance the utility of social theory 
to address human problems (North, 2005b). Simultaneously, the theory is concerned with 
explaining how to improve economic performance, and hence welfare, by comprehending 
human incentives, preferences, perceptions, beliefs and learning (North, 2004). 
 
Under the purview of transaction cost economics, the theory focuses on micro-analytic 
methods looking at institutional arrangements that sustain and safeguard transactions 
(Menard, 2004). In order to comprehend why certain institutional arrangements emerge 
and interact in different institutional settings, NIE utilises a comparative institutional 
analytical framework that is founded on feasible alternatives (not hypothetical 
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benchmarks) that are inherently flawed in comparison to the theoretically optimal solution 
(Klein, 1996; Coase, 2000; Joskow, 2008; Williamson, 2008b).  
 
Furthermore, NIE’s goal is to understand and explain the means of coordination (e.g. 
contracts, institutions and organizations) via the application of rational choice theory, 
which focuses on individual choice. At this level, NIE aims to explain both the internal 
structure of organizations as well as the question of when and why transactions are 
coordinated by hierarchical means instead of the market mechanism; hence alternative 
forms of institutional arrangements such as hybrids between markets and organizations 
are addressed. Additionally, NIE theorists delve into the black box of firms and markets in 
order to understand the process of production, exchange and economic performance as 
well as to comprehend the complex inter-relationships between formal, informal, private 
and public institutions (Coase, 2000; Williamson, 2000). 
 
3.7 Principles of New Institutional Economics 
 
To provide more insight about the main objectives of NIE theory, some of its basic 
premises are described below. NIE operates on the assumption that social structures can 
be explained by individual choices because, in accordance with methodological 
individualism, collective actions can emerge from individual choices (Menard, 1995; North, 
2005b). Therefore, before examining the definitions of institutions and other mechanisms 
of coordination, it is necessary to explicate the theory’s assumptions and characterisations 
of human actors that profoundly affect the process of economic exchange. 
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3.7.1 Behavioural Assumptions and Human Actors 
 
NIE adopts one of the fundamental characteristics of neoclassical economics, namely the 
rational choice model, which assumes that individuals choose the alternative that 
maximizes their personal preferences and thus make decisions that lead to efficient 
outcomes (Eggertsson, 1990; Williamson, 2008a). Hence, NIE adopts the lens of 
individual choice (Williamson, 2008b) that focuses on decision-making based on the 
assumption that individuals have the freedom to choose between alternatives (Peter, 
2004).  
 
In contrast with neoclassical economics, NIE rejects the assumption of instrumental 
rationality as it recognizes that individual choices are influenced by mental models that are 
based in part on values, norms and experiences (North, 1995). In further disparity with 
neoclassical economics, NIE assumes that human actors have bounded rationality 
(Simon, 1957) rather than perfect knowledge. This concept describes human actors as 
lacking complete knowledge to assess their decision alternatives due to their cognitive 
limitations, time and information constraints (Williamson 2000; Brousseau & Glachant 
2002). Therefore, human actors accumulate transaction costs in the process of attaining 
information as they invest time and expend resources (Menard & Shirley 2005).  
 
Furthermore, bounded rationality and self-interestedness lead to opportunistic behaviour 
as information asymmetries arise due to human actors’ differing levels and quality of 
information that enables some to maximize their personal preferences. Furthermore, 
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uncertainty is prevalent because human actors not only have incomplete knowledge but 
they also interact in a world of continuous and unpredictable change (Brousseau & 
Glachant, 2002).  
 
While the above assumptions of human behaviour have negative implications for an 
efficacious transaction process (as they induce transaction costs), NIE also operates on 
the premise of “feasible foresight,” which helps offset costs due to the assumption that 
humans have the capacity to think ahead; enabling actors to mitigate problems before 
they arise (Williamson, 2008a). However, although NIE recognizes human actors’ ability to 
process information and learn from past experiences (which can assist in offsetting 
transaction costs) ultimately, human actors cannot escape their limited cognition. 
 
Human actors in NIE include employers, entrepreneurs, managers, owners 
(shareholders), purchasers, suppliers, and employees (members of organizations), 
contractees (individuals contracted to provide a service), property-rights owners, non-
owners, voters, legislators and policy implementers (North, 2005b). These actors, subject 
to the above premises of self-maximization with bounded rationality, utilize resources and 
play games via decision, use and access rights. They also make choices that are 
coordinated by institutions that evolve through trial and error (Brousseau & Glachant, 
2008).  
 
Since the presence of uncertainty necessitates that individuals anticipate future wants and 
needs, it is argued that a certain class of human actors, namely entrepreneurs, emerges, 
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that has the skills to recognise and implement opportunities by making decisions in the 
face of uncertainty; hence organizing by instructing others and paying wages (Coase, 
1937). Therefore, an entrepreneur must motivate an employee, who may have different 
goals than the entrepreneur, to accomplish the entrepreneur’s objectives.  
 
Conditions of asymmetric and incomplete information create what is called a principal-
agent problem where there are conflicting objectives between a principal (e.g. 
entrepreneur) and an agent (e.g. employee) that affect a collective outcome such as 
making a profit (Chhotray & Stoker, 2009). While there is often no outright controlling in 
contractual arrangements, the principal gives explicit instructions about the desired 
objectives and therefore have implicit control as their prevailing beliefs shape rules and 
norms, which become institutionalised over time as agents adhere (North, 2005a).  
 
In outcome-based arrangements, a certain amount of freedom is implied as the agent can 
decide (i.e. based on the freedom of choice assumption in the rational choice model) not 
to fulfil the duties and forfeit payment (Miller, 2005). In such arrangements, either incentive 
mechanisms (e.g. pay raises, bonuses) or competition among agents, are implemented so 
that they cooperate (Brousseau & Glachant, 2008). In contrast, contracts based on 
monitoring the agent’s behaviour involve more outright control that necessitates more 
rules (Miller, 2005). 
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3.8 Institutions and Institutional Levels 
 
While NIE lacks a single established definition of the concept of an institution, the theory 
generally operates on the foundation that institutions are systems of rules created to offset 
uncertainty and risk by providing a social structure that allows humans to gain certain 
control over their environment (North, 1990; Menard, 1995). On the one hand, institutions 
steer human behaviour by placing constraints on the number of choices available to 
human actors and determining who has rights of access, decision or use (North, 2005b). 
On the other hand, institutions are human actors’ instruments: NIE theorists conceive that 
institutions emerge as a result of cumulative individual choices that are continually 
reshaped by human beliefs and decisions (Williamson, 2000; Groenewegen, 2005; 
Menard & Shirley, 2005). Hence, NIE theorists argue that institutional contexts are the 
collective result of institutions that tend to emerge spontaneously via individual choices 
(Klein, 1996).  
 
Due to this evolution of the institutional context, it is held that institutions are neither fully 
adapted to coordination demands needed to facilitate exchange, nor completely efficient 
as they are imperfect and temporary. Therefore, there is no guarantee that the most 
efficient institutional arrangements will be chosen (Brousseau & Glachant, 2008). 
However, institutions contain an element of predictability as institutionalised rules and 
norms hold a certain level of stability since they have constraints that inhibit rapid change 
(Nabli & Nugent, 1989). 
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As institutions change, societies adjust themselves accordingly to adopt the changes 
(Shah et al, 2001, Williams, 1999). According to Williams (1999), the adaptation is 
captured in a four level phenomena as shown in Figure 3.1 below. 
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Level 1: Embedded, informal institutions 
  Customs, traditions, norms 
                               Level      Rate of change 
 
                                                                                 100 – 1,000 years  
 
 
 
                                                                                            10 – 100 years          
 
 
                                                                               
                                                                              
                                                                                            1 – 10 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                          Continuous                
  
 
Figure 3.1: Levels of economic institutions10 
                                                          
10 Adapted from Williamson, 2000 
 
Level 4: Resource allocation & employment 
  Prices, quantities, incentive alignment                                   
Level 2: Institutional environment 
Formal rules of the game (property rights),          
political, legal, bureaucracy 
Level 3: Governance – Institutional arrangements              
    Play of the game (contracts)                                                                                            
Modes of organisation – aligning governance     
with transactions                                                                
  Customs, traditions, norms 
Neoclassical 
economics 
NIE 
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The first level is described as embedded institutions that are comprised of informal 
institutions such as norms, customs, traditions (based on beliefs), choices and goals of 
individuals (Williamson, 2000; Menard & Shirley, 2005). According to Williamson (2000), 
these fundamental socio-cultural institutions change slowly as adaptation takes at least a 
hundred years because they are difficult to alter.  
 
At the second level lies the institutional environment that delineates the formal rules of the 
game, which includes the political system - with a focus on property rights (Williamson, 
2000; Joskow, 2008). While change at this level is described as occurring faster than at 
the first level, adjustment still takes at least ten years.  
 
At the third level is governance, which is comprised of institutional arrangements that 
define the play of the game. This level refers to contracts, firms and other modes of 
coordinating economic activities that should provide order, offset conflicts and allow actors 
to maximize personal preferences (Williamson, 2000). Change at the level of institutional 
arrangements occurs more rapidly since this level is less path dependent than the first two 
levels.  
 
At the fourth level, the institution of resource allocation and employment, change occurs 
continuously as it involves the daily operation of the economy with constant and 
spontaneous adaptation. This is the purview of neoclassical economics that looks at the 
outcome of the institutional infrastructure (established in the first three levels) (Williamson, 
2000).  
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In contrast to neoclassical economics, which does not aim to explain economic change, 
NIE focuses on levels one to three and hence looks at the institutional processes and 
interactions that help explicate change and sustain a market economy (North, 2005b; 
Joskow, 2008). 
 
Wliiamson (2000)’s framework illustrates a key feature of new institutional economics that 
adds to its usefulness as an analytical framework. The feature is its dynamic or 
evolutionary nature. The different levels of institutions presented above all evolve over 
time. For instance, according to Sharma (2012), changes in governance structures (level 3 
institutions) will, over time, have an impact on level 2 and level 4 institutions and vice-
versa holds. Moreover, treating different levels of institutions as evolutionary allows for any 
analytical propositions to be multi-dimensional, which is quite useful in the study of 
irrigation water resource management, a phenomenon which is complex, with no single 
solution in place.  
 
3.9 A review of theories: an application of NIE principles 
3.9.1 Property rights and water markets 
 
Typically, a market is created in order to facilitate the exchange of goods and services. 
How well a market works is generally determined by its ability to generate efficient 
outcomes. Neoclassical economics traditionally links the definition of market efficiency with 
the concept of Pareto efficiency. Pareto efficiency arises in situations where no one can be 
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made better off without someone being made worse off. This implies that there could be 
institutions where making someone better off at the expense of another is not an indication 
that an economic situation is inefficient or wasteful.  
 
It should therefore be made clear that within the neo-classical school of thought, the 
concept of economic efficiency is quite distinct from achieving an equitable income. 
According to Bannock et al (1998), achieving economic efficiency relies on three different 
types of efficiency;  
 
 Productive efficiency – output is produced at lowest cost 
 Allocative efficiency – resources being allocated to the production of the goods and 
services society most values 
 Distributional efficiency – output is distributed in such a way that consumers would 
not wish, given their disposable income and market prices, to spend these incomes 
in any different way.  
 
In this case, allocative and distributional efficiency potentially need to take precedence 
over productive efficiency with regards to water. In simple terms, the argument is that 
regardless of cost, water needs to be available for survival. It is allocative and 
distributional efficiency that can be impacted significantly through policy reform. 
 
While neo-classical economics focuses heavily on analysing efficiency, it pays scant 
attention to the ‘rules of the game’, that is, the rules governing interaction in markets. As 
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Mantzavinos (2001) notes, neo-classical economics seems to neglect thoroughly the role 
of rules in the market process. And by ignoring the rules of the game, neo-classical 
economics effectively does not provide adequate analysis of the institutional framework in 
which market processes take place. As put forward by Mantzavinos (2001), the market is 
mainly viewed by neoclassical economics as an allocating machine that solves the main 
problem of society of what to produce, how and for whom. It is the neglect of the 
institutional arrangements surrounding market processes that makes a new institutional 
approach a more attractive and viable analytical approach.  
 
The role of institutions and institutional arrangements concerning markets is often 
underestimated. The problems of asymmetric information and barriers to entry that are 
present in most market structures today can to some extent be alleviated by institutions.  
 
3.9.2 Theory of collective action 
 
Collective action approaches are widely used by self-interested individuals to manage 
common property resources such as irrigation water. Collective action and self-
governance help manage common property resources and avoid the “tragedy of the 
commons” (Runge, 1986; Ostrom, 1990; Bromley, 1992). Rules and endogenous authority 
systems can encourage members to co-operate towards a group strategy because the 
rules provide certainty about expected actions of others (Runge, 1981; 1986). Collective 
action is affected by attributes such as group size, similarity of group characteristics and 
goals (Olson, 1982). Ostrom (1990) identifies custom and social conventions as facilitating 
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collective action (Nabli & Nugent, 1989). According to Runge (1986) low incomes, critical 
dependence on a local resource and high uncertainty with respect to those resources can 
lead to collective forms of management. The more homogeneous a community, the more 
likely that the optimal outcome is in communal management since people will share similar 
economic goals and uncertainties as well as socially accepted norms of cooperation. 
Runge (1986) argues that people will cooperate for their common good without provision 
of external (state) coercion if they can be assured that a critical mass of users obey a 
common property arrangement (Moorhead & Lane, 1993). 
 
Institutions can also be considered a form of capital. A society’s institutions can be 
regarded as cultural or social capital (Berkes & Folke, 1992). Social capital is closely 
linked to collective action in irrigation water management in developing countries. Some 
consider social norms, cultural values, trust and reciprocity and social sanctions as social 
capital (Rudd, 2000; Wolcock, 1998). Social capital is productive, self-reinforcing and 
cumulative and can improve economic performance. Social capital enables participants to 
act effectively to pursue shared objectives. There are stronger incentives for cooperative 
action by local groups in cases where exploitation would occur from purely individualistic 
behaviour under ‘common property resource systems’ (Ostrom, 1990). 
 
Property rights are related to collective action and self-management. The absence of 
clearly defined and well-enforced property rights and the prevalence of inefficient and 
corrupt judiciaries and bureaucracies significantly increase risks and costs of transactions 
and in many cases transactions from occurring at all. Coase (1960) believes that 
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government involvement is inefficient if property rights are well established. Demsetz 
(1967) and Coase (1960) argue that, in the absence of transactions costs, private property 
rights is the most efficient system of land use. Property rights lower transactions costs and 
exclusive rights provide sufficient incentives to encourage development and cultivation 
(North & Thomas, 1977). Property rights for water users entail right to access a certain 
amount and quality of water, collective protection against conversion of irrigated lands, use 
of irrigation infrastructure, irrigation services etc. However, if transactions costs are high 
private property rights may not be the best property system.  
 
3.9.3 The economics of institutions and the source of economic growth 
 
According to Matthews (1986), institutional changes have made a positive contribution to 
economics and growth. The idea of institutional change as a source of economic growth 
has taken two distinctly different forms:  
 
 Institutions need continual adaptation in the face of a changing environment of 
technology and taste. Institutional change is a necessary part of economic change 
but not an independent source of it.  
 
 The movement towards Pareto-superior institutions cannot be achieved at once but 
as a very long run, possible permanent process. This process can come about by 
the continual emergence and diffusion of institutional innovation, comparable to 
technological innovations. In other words, it can come about in a manner of a 
 86 
 
repeated game; in which people gradually learn or are selected against if they do 
not.  
 
For the state, it is easier to alter institutions than the private parties do, which implies that 
the state involvement with institutions is inherent. This is because the state is ultimate 
guarantor of property rights. It has to decide what kinds of rights and obligations it is 
prepared to recognize and enforce. 
 
In addition, attention to the institutional environment has become increasingly common in 
economic history and it has deeply enriched an understanding of how economies develop 
through time (North & Thomas, 1973; North, 1990; Drobak & Nye, 1997). Economic 
development is no longer regarded as a gradual, inevitable transformation from local 
autarky to specialization and the division of labour. Instead, development is seen as a 
response to the evolution of institutions that support social and commercial relationships. 
Economic growth thus depends on the degree to which the potential hazards of trade 
(shirking, opportunism and the like) can be controlled by institutions, which reduce 
information costs, encourage capital formation and capital mobility, allow risks to be priced 
and shared and otherwise, facilitate cooperation. 
 
 
 
3.9.4 The Conventional Theory of the Firm 
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What economists usually mean by ‘the theory of the firm’ is the theory of production, but 
not in the sense of the theory of the firm as a legal entity. In economics textbooks, the 
‘firm’ is a production function or production possibilities set, a ‘black box’ that transforms 
inputs into outputs. Given technology, input prices and a demand schedule, the firm 
maximizes money profits subject to the constraint that its production plans must be 
technologically feasible. The firm is modelled as a single actor, facing a series of 
straightforward decisions: what level of output to produce, how much of each factor to hire, 
and so on. Similarly, the firm’s size and product range are usually explained in terms of 
production costs: economies of scale imply larger firms, while economies of scope justify 
the multiproduct firm (Spulber, 1989). Instead, the new institutional economics sees the 
firm as a set of arrangements - as an organization - itself worthy of economic analysis. 
 
3.9.5  Irrigation Water – A Common Pool Resource (CPR) 
 
Historically, water resources around the world have been viewed as common resources 
(Sharma, 2012). One long-term research programme that can help explain how and why 
the boundaries of institutions might affect the implementation of different operational 
resource management techniques, such as conjunctive management, is the study of CPR 
management, developed most notably by Elinor Ostrom and colleagues. CPR 
management theory evaluates how institutions influence the use of CPRs, such as water, 
fisheries, and forests (Ostrom, 1990, 1998, 1999). CPRs exhibit varying degrees of two 
key characteristics:  
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 Difficulty in excluding users and  
 Subtractability of supplies, where each resource user reduces the supply available 
for the welfare of others (Ostrom et al, 1994; Berkes et al, 1989).  
 
The first characteristic can lead to problems of free-riding or insufficient maintenance of 
supplies. The second characteristic can create problems of over-appropriation or 
congestion. Conventional wisdom may presume that the use of CPRs leads to the 
“tragedy of the commons,” or ultimate destruction of the resource, yet CPR management 
studies have shown that CPR users often devise institutional arrangements to resolve 
these dilemmas (Blomquist, 1992; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, et al, 1994; Schlager, 1990; 
Tang, 1992). 
 
Policymakers and public administrators face a host of problems in managing common-pool 
resources (CPRs), such as water, forests, and fisheries, due to their physical 
characteristics. As with public goods, it is often difficult to exclude users from CPRs. Yet, 
unlike public goods, CPRs are highly subtractable, implying that any one appropriator of a 
CPR can deplete the supply of that resource available to others. Because of these 
characteristics, CPR users often face problems of overconsumption or resource depletion. 
The major question therefore is: 
 
“What, then, might facilitate more efficient and sustainable CPR 
management to maintain adequate resources for future generations?”  
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An analysis of the tragedy of the commons is useful in understanding the weakness of 
treating water as an entirely common resource. Many scholars recognize that institutions 
play a key role in shaping how CPR users coordinate their actions to solve supply and 
demand dilemmas (Ingram et al., 1984; Lam, 1998; Lord, 1984; Ostrom, 1990). As shown 
in Table 3.2 below, private goods are characterised by both high excludability and high 
rivalry, while public goods are characterised by low excludability and low rivalry.    
 
Table 3.2: Taxonomy of goods 
  EXCLUDABILITY 
  
              RIVALRY 
 High Low 
High Private goods 
Common-pool 
resources 
Low Club goods 
Public goods  
(Toll goods) 
 
Source: adapted from Ostrom, (1990) 
 
Water falls in the form of rain, and flows and evaporates with no regard to any boundary. 
Water is, however, subject to rivalry in consumption and, thus cannot be categorized as a 
public good. Instead, it is a common pool resource, meaning that there is a finite amount 
that must be shared in common over a variety of uses and over geographic areas 
(Dalhuisen et al., 2000).  
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CPR studies show that effective institutional arrangements for managing resource 
dilemmas vary depending on physical and community conditions (Lam, 1998). Effective 
institutional arrangements may diverge across settings, yet CPR studies have identified 
some general principles of long-enduring, self-governed CPR institutions. The first design 
principle associated with sustainable CPR governance institutions is the establishment of 
clearly delineated boundaries around the resource and resource users (Ostrom, 1990, 
1998).  
 
CPR theory’s boundary principle implies that institutions whose boundaries are congruent 
with the scale of the physical boundaries of a CPR are more likely to be successful and 
sustainable. Ostrom notes (1990):  
 
“Without defining the boundaries of the CPR and closing it to ‘outsiders,’ 
local appropriators face the risk that any benefits they produce by their 
efforts will be reaped by others who have not contributed to those efforts.”  
 
Literature has shown a clear relationship between the successful resolution of CPR 
dilemmas and the organization of institutional arrangements that are clearly defined 
around CPR boundaries. According to the principle, one can assume that in managing 
water supplies using a method such as conjunctive management, then the institutions 
governing the basins where water is stored and recovered would be more effective when 
organized around the boundaries of the groundwater basin. 
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3.10 Conclusion 
 
As a summary, NIE takes into account the profound effect of institutions on economic 
interactions as it acknowledges that legal, political, social and cultural institutions affect the 
performance of an economy (Coase, 2000). Furthermore, NIE employs feasible 
alternatives in its economic analysis instead of relying on hypothetical ideals and abstract 
models (as is the case in neo-classical economics) (Coase, 2000). Similarly, the new 
institutional economics approach, unlike the neo-classical economics theory, broadens the 
scope of analysis by integrating institutions and institutional arrangements. The new 
institutional economics approach is able to deal with a large range of phenomenon, not 
only limited to economic considerations, but also to include social and political 
considerations as well. 
 
In addition, the theory acknowledges transaction costs and regards institutional 
arrangements as imperfect and temporary, which is argued as being a more accurate 
portrayal of economic exchange in the real world than neoclassical assumptions of a 
frictionless market (Menard & Shirley, 2005). Moreover, human actors are depicted 
pragmatically as having bounded rationality; not as having complete knowledge of all 
relevant information (Williamson, 2005). Additionally, NIE’s approach keeps significant 
contact with its focal phenomena (Williamson, 2005). 
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Lastly, the new institutional economics approach draws upon knowledge from a range of 
schools of thought, not only in the economics filed, but across other related disciplines as 
well.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 93 
 
CHAPTER 4 - NATURE AND ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter dwells on understanding the nature and role of institutions. Firstly, the 
chapter attempts to define institutions. The chapter further discusses the management of 
resources under collective approaches, both from a formal and informal point of view, 
using studies from other scholars and their inferences. Such was done so as to examine 
how irrigation water can also be managed under collective approaches using formal and 
informal rules.  
 
4.1 What are institutions? 
 
Institutions embrace a wide diversity of concepts. Institutions in a broad sense govern and 
limit human interaction. Societies’ institutional framework is the set of rules and constraints 
that govern human behaviour which can include legal rules, organisational forms, and 
norms of behaviour and enforcement mechanisms. The most common definition of 
institutions is that they are “rules of a society that facilitates coordination among people by 
helping them to form expectations which each person can reasonably hold in dealing with 
each other” (Ruttan & Hayami, 1984). 
 
Institutions are the rules of the game in society. Formally, they are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction. As a result, they structure incentives in human 
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exchange, whether political, social, or economic (North, 1990). Institutional change shapes 
the way societies evolve through time and it is the key to understand historical changes. In 
addition, institutions have been defined as the laws, policies, and organizational 
arrangements that communities devise to permit, forbid, or require certain human 
behaviour (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995; Ostrom, 1990). Institutional arrangements can 
include enforced formal laws governing individual behaviour, public and private 
organizational arrangements, as well as informal norms and standards shared among 
communities. 
 
The “rules of the game” definition of institutions is particularly important because it 
supports market activity, efficiency, economic growth and development. Markets are 
institutions because they embody rules and regulations, formal and informal which govern 
their operations. Similarly, formal organizations such as labour unions are institutions 
because they provide sets of rules governing the relationship both among their members 
and non-members. Williamson (1985) defined institutions as the “mechanisms which 
govern transactions “and hence institutions are transactions cost minimising 
arrangements. However, the crucial question is not how the definitions differ or not but 
how economic efficiency and distributional features of institutions (Nabli & Nugent, 1989) 
evolve over time and what their efficiency and distributional implications are. 
 
According to North (1990), institutions are the “humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction. North’s definition is broader and encompasses legal and regulatory 
frameworks along with cultural, social and cognitive processes which provide a norm 
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structure to guide interaction. From economics point of view, institutions define and limit 
the set of choices of individuals (North, 1990). They include any form of constraint that 
influences the action of individuals and shape human interaction. Institutions can be formal 
or informal: formal constraints are rules that human beings devise and informal constraints 
are conventions and codes of behaviour. Institutional constraints include both what 
individuals are prohibited from doing and under what conditions some individuals are 
permitted to undertake certain activities. Therefore, they are the framework within which 
human interaction takes place. They are very similar to the rules of the game as in a 
competitive team sport. That is, they consist of formal written codes of conduct that 
underline and supplement informal rules. This means that if the formal rules or the informal 
codes are violated, punishment may be enforced (North, 1990). 
 
Institutions can be both formal and informal. Apart from written laws, rules and procedures, 
informally established procedures, norms, practices and patterns of behaviour form part of 
the institutional framework (Merrey, 1993). After years of tradition, informal practices also 
become “rules” in their own right, when they are accepted by the society. These formal 
and informal institutions define and fashion the behavioural roles of individuals and groups 
in a given context of human interaction, aiming at a specified set of objectives. The key 
characteristics of institutions are that “they are patterns of norms and behaviours which 
persist because they are valued and useful” (Merrey, 1993). 
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4.2 Formal and informal institutions 
 
Informal institutions are not purposively designed but evolve through spontaneous 
interaction, whereas formal institutions can be purposively designed (Hardin, 1968; North 
1990). The difference between formal and informal institutions is one of degree, not of 
kind, and in many cases some informal institutions gradually become part of their formal 
counterparts and some formal institutions take informal forms. Informal institutions are also 
considered extensions and local-level translations of formal institutions.  
 
In reality, however, formal institutions are also derived from and dependent on informal 
institutions, especially for their stability and strength. This is because informal institutions 
remain the foundation on which the formal institutions operate. Thus, any effort to design 
efficient formal institutions has to consider the way new formal institutions interact with 
prevailing informal institutions (Eggertsson, 1996). Therefore, the formal–informal 
categorization of institutions is based more on analytical grounds than on any functional 
reasons. 
 
Although the formal and informal institutions are closely related and linked, analytical 
considerations warrant their differential treatment because of the fundamental differences 
in their sources and rates of change (North, 1990) as well as their amenability for inclusion 
in formal analysis. For instance, changes in formal institutions can be evaluated in either a 
simple or an extended transaction cost framework. But changes in informal institutions 
cannot be explained purely from an economic perspective (Eggertsson, 1996). Formal 
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institutions can be changed through deliberate reform programs, but their informal 
counterparts cannot be changed.  
 
Similarly, unlike the formal institutions created and maintained usually by the state or 
through a political process, informal institutions such as norms, customs, and conventions 
evolve essentially through a socio-cultural process. Informal institutions, unlike their formal 
counterparts, involve self-enforcing arrangements, especially those operating close to the 
point where actual decisions are made. As a result, they function with low or no social 
costs.  
 
In many developing societies, informal rules have a tendency to override formal rules, 
making the enforcement of formal rules very difficult and thereby affecting performance 
(Bandaragoda & Firdousi, 1992). While the coexistence of formal and informal institutions 
is inevitable, situations where some informal rules tend to contradict formal rules are 
obviously dysfunctional. Also, it is possible that, due to lack of proper enforcement or due 
to disregard towards the spirit of the written laws, they become ineffective, and are 
replaced by a set of practices that show a divergence from the declared laws, rules and 
regulations. 
 
4.3 Role of institutions 
 
The major role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a table 
(but not necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction (North, 1990). In light of this 
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study, irrigation water resources management is crucial to agriculture, as such, managing 
the way users behave becomes an essential component. It is also important to note that 
institutions change through time ranges from conventions, codes of conduct, and norms of 
behaviour to state law, common law and contracts between individuals (Ostrom, 1991). 
This further calls for robust structures to manage the human interactions.  
 
Generally, institutions give the structure for exchange that (together with the technology 
employed) determines the cost of transacting and the cost of transformation. How well 
institutions solve the problems of coordination and production is determined by the 
motivation of the players (their utility function), the complexity of the environment, and the 
measurement and enforcement. Transaction cost of transfer constitutes two parts: the 
market costs and the costs of time each party must devote to gather information. The 
greater the uncertainty of the buyer, the lower the value of the asset. The institutional 
structure also determines the risk to the seller that the contract would be violated.  
 
It is very important to note that the uncertainties with respect of security of rights are a 
critical distinction between the relatively efficient markets of high income countries today 
and economics in the past as well as those in the third world today (Ostrom,1986). The 
subsequent section attempts to discuss how institutions can be collectively used in the 
management of Common Pool Resources to achieve optimum output. 
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4.4 Effectiveness of institutions in managing resources: review 
 
Salilih (2007) employed both qualitative and quantitative approach, to assess the 
contribution of irrigation on household food security and irrigation management and 
problems associated with it in the case of Zingni and Fetam small-scale irrigation schemes 
in blue Nile basin of Amahara national regional state. The findings of the study revealed 
that irrigation’s contribution on minimising household’s socio-economic poverty 
significantly vary from one irrigation scheme to another. Its contribution also vary across 
irrigation systems depending on the physical structures of the scheme, amount of irrigation 
water, plot size, availability of agricultural inputs, management qualities and educational 
status of individual farmers to accept new ideas. Management of irrigation water 
resources, as was being studied, could follow the same argument where local settings 
vary and hence, management practices may also vary from one setting to another. 
However, the study will attempt to find the best way in which irrigation water resources will 
be managed for optimal irrigation water productivity.  
 
Checkel & Alamirew (2007) conducted a study on technical and institutional evaluation of 
Geray irrigation scheme in west Gojjam zone, Amhara region, Ethiopia. The technical 
evaluation was made by looking into the selected performance indicators such as 
conveyance efficiency, application efficiency, water delivery performance and 
maintenance indicators. The results of the study indicate that the scheme has been 
managed by Water Users Association for four years, despite the fact that it was 
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constructed 27 years ago. Moreover, the study shows that the overall performance of the 
Water Users Association in terms of managing the schemes was very poor.  
 
Furthermore, support services rendered to the beneficiaries were minimal. There were 
very few indicators that production was market oriented. Ironically, farmers did not 
recognise market as their problem. Conflict resolution has been the duty of the Kebeles 
Council and Water Users Association has no legal authority to enforce its by-laws. Such a 
scenario could suggest that lack of empowerment of WUAs and failure to accept (informal) 
local rules could lead to ineffective and inefficient irrigation water management. This study 
seeks to evaluate the nature of linkages between formal and informal rules and how best, 
at the minimum cost, could be used to manage water resources effectively. 
 
Gebremedhin et al. (2002), in their study, analysed the nature and determinants of 
collective action and its effectiveness in managing woodlots in Tigray, northern Ethiopia. 
The empirical models adopted by the study were Tobit, Probit and OLS. Results of the 
study revealed that despite the community, benefits were limited due to various restrictions 
on use of woodlots, collective action in managing woodlots generally functions well in 
Tigray, which supports the role of community resource management in redressing 
resource degradation. The econometric analysis showed that the factors that significantly 
affect collective action include population density, market access and presence of external 
organisations promoting the woodlot. Given that irrigation water is also a CPR, it is thus 
necessary to find out how best the community (water users) can collectively manage the 
irrigation water resources efficiently.   
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Benin & Pender (2006), using data from 98 villages in the highlands of Amhara region, 
examined the determinants of collective action and its effectiveness in communal grazing 
lands management and the effect of restricting access and use in certain grazing areas on 
the condition of other communal grazing resources. The results of descriptive analysis 
reveal that more than one-half of the communities had at least one restricted grazing area, 
with the total area in each of those communities averaging twenty-two hectares. In 
addition, collective action is more likely to be successful in communities that have large 
areas, are far from markets, and where wealth is more equally distributed. Where there is 
more alternative source of feed and in irrigated areas, collective action is not likely to 
succeed. In addition, increasing the proportion of restricted grazing land has a robust 
negative impact on the quality of other unrestricted grazing resources, although managing 
the restricted grazing land at the lower village level had a robust positive impact. 
Population growth has had negative effect on availability, quality and erosion level of 
grazing lands.  
 
Vandersypen, et al. (2006), using descriptive and qualitative analysis, evaluated farmer 
organizations of water management in Mali focusing on two principal activities of water 
management: water distribution and maintenance in Mali. For both activities, the rules in 
use and their ability to resolve possible collective action problem were assessed and the 
impact of the type of infrastructure on the rules was examined. The results showed that 
rules are devised only on 30% and 24% of the canals for water distribution and 
maintenance, respectively. Moreover, there is often no consensus on rules among 
farmers. Besides, monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms were absent. The study 
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indicates that with water supply being abundant and the infrastructure recently 
rehabilitated, organisation of water management at community level is not always required 
to avoid problems. 
 
In a study in Harayana, India, Kurian & Dietz (2005) employed descriptive analysis to 
argue that participatory watershed management projects need not necessarily safeguard 
the interests of poorer rural households. The study was based on a survey and case study 
evidenced from 28 watershed management groups. They demonstrated that given a 
particular institutional contract, irrigation service provision by contractors proved to be 
more effective than provision by a community organisation. It ensures that water 
allocation, collection of irrigation service fees and routine maintenance of irrigation 
infrastructure by contractors was more effective than the community. The analysis of 
benefit distribution reveals that wealthier landholding households benefited more from 
management of irrigation and forest resources as compared to relatively poorer 
households. With regard to the distribution of costs arising from watershed management, 
the researchers found that the workload for women was greater than that of men as a 
result of the doubling of agricultural yields under irrigation conditions. 
 
In their study in Phillipines, Fujile et al. (2005) examined factors affecting the success and 
failure of collective action for management of local commons in developing economies. 
They used a case of an irrigation project, based on cross-section survey of irrigators’ 
associations in 25 national irrigation systems under the command of the National Irrigation 
Administration. They used the Probit and OLS regressions as their analytical tools. The 
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results were consistent with the hypothesis that collective action by water users for the 
operation and maintenance of irrigation system is difficult to organise where: 
 
 Water shortage rarely occurs  
 The difference in water supply is large between upstream and downstream farmers 
 Irrigators’ association is large in terms of service area and the number of farmer 
beneficiaries within its territory 
 The local community is sparsely populated, involving low social interactions 
 Farm households have the option of ready exit from farm to non-farm economic 
activities 
 Farmers had traditionally practiced rain-fed farming with no previous experience in 
managing communal irrigation systems.  
 
Another study analysing constraints was carried out by Theesfeld (2000) in Bulgaria’s 
irrigation sector in three different regions, Veliko Tamowo, Pavel Banja and Haskowo. The 
results of the study reflected that most of the people living in the selected areas were too 
old and were no more active in agricultural production, with most of them producing at 
subsistence level. The study also showed that only a few young families wanted to live on 
agriculture and they had to rely on irrigation for their farm activities. As such, only a small 
actor group was concerned when discussing changes in operational irrigation rules 
towards collective action. The attitude towards collective action was pessimistic and there 
seemed to be no trust among the villagers. Moreover, individualistic behaviour prevailed. 
The actor’s characteristics and the information asymmetry pave way for opportunistic 
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behaviour. Theesfeld (2000) attempted to show the effect of the following factors on 
collective action: 
 
 Resource system characteristics 
 The resource characteristics 
 The actor group characteristics 
 The evolving local rules in use 
 The effective institutional settings and 
 The formal political settings 
 
Meinzen-Dick et al. (2000) identified factors that affect organization of water users’ 
associations and collective action by farmers in major canal irrigation system in India.  A 
stratified sample of 48 irrigation outlets in four irrigation systems were used based on 
qualitative and econometric analysis. The study first examined the conditions under which 
farmers are likely to form formal or informal associations at the outlet level (serving several 
watercourses and one or more villages). The results of the study indicate that 
organizations are more likely to be formed in larger commands, closer to market towns 
and in sites with religious centres and potential leadership from college graduates and 
influential persons. Lobbying activities are not more likely where there are organizations, 
but organizations do increase the likelihood of collective maintenance work. 
 
An investigation in Honduras by Pender & Sherre (1999) on the determinants of local 
organisational density and the impact of local and external organisations on collective 
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action and private natural resource management decisions employed an econometric 
analysis. The survey was based on 48 villagers. The main findings of the study, with 
regards to the determinants of local organisational development, were that population 
growth contributes to organisational development at low level of growth. It has, however, 
diminishing and possibly negative effect at high growth rate. The results also showed that 
local organisational development was reduced with proximity to urban centres.  
 
The result also indicates that local organizations contribute to collective investment in 
natural resource management and assist in regulating use of common property resources 
and dealing with externalities. Local organizations have mixed impact on farmers’ private 
decisions to adopt resource conservation measures, such as no burn practices and 
ploughing in crop residues. External governmental organizations seem to displace 
collective investment in natural resource management, though they promote other kinds of 
collective investment such as construction and maintenance of water systems and roads. 
External organizations have a stronger impact on promoting adoption of labour-intensive 
conservation measures (such as no-burn, ploughing in crop residues and terracing) on 
private cropland. 
 
Bastidas (1999) examined gender issues and women’s participation in irrigated agriculture 
in Carchi, Ecuador, using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods of 
analyses. The findings showed that women’s participation in water user associations is 
low, and culture plays a strong role in terms of their decision-making power. In addition, 
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women tried to solve their irrigation-related problems through informal ways where they 
had more decision making power. 
 
Makombe et al. (1998) evaluated the performance of smallholder irrigation systems in 
Zimbabwe. They took three smallholder irrigation systems; two from government managed 
system and one from the community or farmer managed irrigation system. The authors 
used Production Function Analysis (to evaluate production efficiency), Theil Information 
Theoretic measure (to evaluate inequality in the distribution of benefits from irrigation) and 
Theil Forecast Error method (to evaluate management performance). The results showed 
that the farmer managed irrigation system performed better consistently than the 
government managed irrigation system in production, distribution and management 
performance. 
 
A study by Shimelis (2006) evaluated the institutional and management practices of small 
scale irrigation systems in Ethiopia. The result shows that the irrigation systems were 
poorly managed in terms of water allocation and distribution, conflict management and 
system maintenance, because of lack of well-established organizational and institutional 
conditions. The water user associations are not well organized and found to be weak to 
run the irrigation systems. Users have problematic social relation. Clearly defined and 
well-enforced land and water rights are non-existent at the operational level. Regarding 
technical resources such as improved seed that is adaptive to the situation of irrigation, 
labour and knowledge of irrigated agriculture (extension service and capacity building for 
irrigators) have not been met in the two irrigation systems. 
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A qualitative approach research by Zalake (2006) to examine water rights and the process 
of negotiations among irrigators was carried out along Indris modern scheme in Toke 
Kutaye district, West Shoa zone, Ethiopia. The findings of the research depicted that Indris 
scheme marked three different significant phases in its historical development. In these 
phases, exploration pertaining to water rights and processes of negotiations were found to 
be at their immature ground. Multiple water right rules emanating both from the customary 
and formal water acts have co-existed to direct the actions of users.  
 
In this regard, the theoretical orientations of pluralism in water right paradigms proved to 
coincide with the programmatic context of water users from the scheme. Furthermore, the 
main reasons for conflict occurrence in connection to irrigation water use and rights are 
decline in the volume of water resource, institutional failures to address the causes 
adequately, week observance on governing water right rules and increasing demands of 
users. As a result, negotiation process aiming to settle disputes was repeatedly initiated 
either by users, committee members (elder) or courts. Given the above past studies, the 
following sections therefore presents a methodological review on past methods that other 
authors have used in an attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of institutions in the 
management of resources. 
 
In Sri Lanka, a study by Gulati (2002) revealed that there were many problems in agency 
managed irrigation. Poor maintenance of irrigation facilities under public provision is a 
salient feature in many countries. Sri Lanka spent less than 10 percent of total expenditure 
on maintenance during 1950-88 (Aluvihare & Kikuchi, 1991). China lost almost 1 million 
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hectares due to poor maintenance since the 1980s. Some 36.6 percent of the irrigated 
areas in Pakistan are waterlogged. The decline in the availability of suitable land for 
irrigated agriculture, extremely high costs of developing irrigation infrastructure, increased 
operation and maintenance costs, poor cost recovery are the major features of the early 
period of irrigation development which are run mostly by government (Gulati et al., 1995, 
Rosegrant, 2002). There was heavy subsidisation of the irrigation management in Sri 
Lanka which had a poor record of cost recovery. Less than 50 percent of the maintenance 
costs have been collected from farmers at any time (Herath, 2002). In India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Philippines, and Indonesia, irrigation user fees are 10-90 percent less than 
the cost of operation and maintenance. The cost to the farmers varied between 5-15 
percent of the operating costs. The World Bank found that in seventeen irrigation schemes 
it examined, less than 30 percent of the total costs were recovered through pricing or other 
fees (Sampath, 1992). There has been a several fold increase in the irrigation subsidies. 
This suggests a situation where water resources will not be effectively managed and this 
study seeks to evaluate how institutions can be effective in the management of water 
resources. 
 
In addition, as observed by Rosegrant et al. (1995), another major deficiency has been the 
wrong pricing policies in irrigation. Pricing is not related to the scarcity or the cost of 
delivery. The charges were fixed in nominal terms and hence the real price of irrigation is 
very low. A flat rate pricing means the marginal cost is zero which created inefficiency in 
water use. Efficiency in developing country projects is typically 25 to 30 percent, compared 
with 40 to 45 percent under best practice (World Development, 1994). It is therefore the 
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objective of this study to understand how favourable policies can be formulated and 
effectively implemented to allow for effective irrigation water resources management. 
 
In India and Pakistan, (Shah, 1993 & Meinzen-Dick, 1998) identified that there can be 
monopoly elements in the water market, especially for groundwater. However, Sri Lanka’s 
ground water development differs from those of India and Pakistan in two significant ways, 
with implications for water market development (Kikuchi et al., 2003). In Sri Lanka, ground 
water developed spontaneously and had only informal social institutions with little legal 
environment or regulation. There is no sale of ground water from wells by Sri Lankan 
farmers. This research study seeks to evaluate the effectiveness on informal institutions 
and how they can be used in harmony for effective irrigation water management. 
 
A study of the Ban Vuen-Tonhen WUA in Savannakhet Province of Laos provides useful 
results on the equity impact and the ability to pay the irrigation fee after IMT (Rasphone et 
al., 2006). This is one of the nine pilot IMT programs in Laos. The study shows that after 
IMT, farmers who switched over to more lucrative crops such as chillies, peanuts and 
tobacco obtained significant increase in incomes and were able to pay the irrigation fee. 
But rice cultivation has been found to be unprofitable. In two WUAs where subsistence 
farmers dominated, rice was a main crop and many farmers failed to pay the irrigation fee. 
Overall, the performance of these WUAs has been rated outstanding. They had a long 
history of farmer-managed irrigation using water from the Mekong River where electric 
pumps supply water to the command area. The study also seeks to evaluate the 
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effectiveness on water institutions to allow for users paying for water use for effective 
water management. 
 
4.5 A methodological review 
 
A methodological review is crucial as it provides a background and set contrast for the 
research methodology to be used in the current study. As such, it is therefore critical to 
start by reviewing existing studies in the institutional literature that attempt to empirically 
evaluate the issues of institutional interaction in a given situation. The focus of this review 
will be mainly based on three aspects; 
 
 The dimensions or scope of the institutional performance, both from a formal and 
informal institution point of view 
 The nature of variables developed to capture institutional aspects, and  
 The methodological framework and evaluation context used by existing studies 
 
Wallis & North (1986 & 1988) employed a temporal analysis to study the size, structure 
and implications of the “transaction sector” (i.e. the institutional structures and facilitate, 
enforce and maintain economic exchanges within the market setting) in the US during the 
1870-1970 period. Further to that, Adelman & Morris (1974), combined both temporal and 
cross-section analysis to study the impact of political structures and economic institutions 
on economic growth in the context of 23 countries during 1850-1914.  
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However, the study by Adelman & Lohmoller (1994) evaluated the institution-performance 
interaction within a quantitative framework using a latent variable regression model or 
unobservable institutional variables captured by their relationship with observable 
variables. In the analysis, most of the latent variables (e.g. the character of the national 
political leadership, favourableness of land institutions to improvements and the spread of 
technology in different sectors) have also been formulated as categorical variables with 
categories based either on actual evidence or on a priori reasoning. 
 
A combination of temporal and cross-sectional analysis has also been used for studying 
both general as well as specific aspects of institution-performance interaction. One such 
analysis was done in a study by Remmer (1988) who used this hybrid approach to 
evaluate the relationship between democracy and international cooperation in the 
Mercosur region (comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) during 1947-1985. 
While the observed economic and international treaty, data are combined to quantitatively 
evaluate the democracy-cooperation linkages within a logit regression framework, the 
main dichotomous variable, i.e. democracy, has been created using secondary information 
from a comparative research on Latin American democracy.  
 
Both the general and specific aspects of the linkages between water institutions and water 
sector performance have been recognised widely, either within a theoretical, subjective, or 
case study framework (e.g. Hartman & Seastone, 1970; Dinar & Latey, 1991; Frederiksen, 
1992; Guggenheim, 1992, Le Moigne, et al, 1992 & 1994); Gazmuri & Rosegrant, 1994; 
Hearne & Easter, 1997; Howitt, 1998). The scope, purpose and methodologies of these 
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differed; however, their common element binding them was their focus on the performance 
implications of one or more aspects of water allocation and management institutions.  
 
However, there is hardly any study attempting to evaluate the issues of irrigation 
institution-performance interactions or linkages (formal and informal), within the irrigation 
water sector and the present research study attempts to evaluate institutional 
effectiveness for such a perspective. Some studies have attempted to evaluate some of 
the aspects of institution-performance interactions within the water sector using different 
evaluation contexts and methodologies.  
 
A study by Wade (1982) compared the yield and employment performances of irrigation 
water control institutions (i.e. water distribution system and allocation procedure) in 
Southern India with that in Korea within an essentially descriptive and non-quantitative 
framework. The better performance of Korea is explained in terms of a better water supply, 
small, decentralised and demand-controlled system and good management structure. 
Another study by Lo & Tang (1994) in China utilised a case study framework of descriptive 
nature to explain the differential performance of institutional arrangements (governance 
and management structures) in controlling water pollution from different sources (industrial 
and domestic). Their main findings were that; since no one set of institutional 
arrangements can solve all types of collective problems, a better institutional performance 
can be ensured only by designing them to be compatible with the type of problem they 
confront.  
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There are also some studies (Rausser & Zusman, 1991; Yang, 1997) that specifically 
consider the role of the context within which the institution-performance interaction occurs. 
Rausser & Zusman (1991) provides a theoretical model that considers the political, 
economic and physical aspects of the water systems as parts of a co-evolutionary 
process. Similarly, Yang (1997), describes the way water institution, resource system and 
competing economic and social interests interact and co-evolve over time. 
 
4.6 Analytical and empirical frameworks for the study 
4.6.1 Evaluating institutional effectiveness 
 
The use of resources in common and the negative consequences on the environment are 
widely addressed in the literature. From Hardin’s (1968) famous article, this problem has 
become well-known as the “tragedy of the commons”. Ostrom (1990) underlines the 
existence of the free-rider problem with respect to the commonly used resources. In order 
to solve these problems, some researchers have put forward some arguments for state 
intervention, while others favoured the introduction of private property rights.  
 
However, institutional effectiveness cannot be simply attributed to the existence of private 
or public institutions, neither to those of formal or informal institutional arrangements. 
Rather, the institutions should find the state where they can function with the lowest 
transaction costs, by combining both the formal institutions with the informal ones. As 
such, they should adapt to the already existent institutional setting, and improve it by 
finding the most efficient-lowest cost equilibrium.  
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Measuring the institutional performance is in itself questionable, since it refers to the 
quantification of the performance of rules, norms of behaviour and traditions. And the 
question that arises is how rules or norms of behaviour can perform. Moreover, it is not the 
institutions that perform, but their presence influences the performance and efficiency of 
natural resource management. Thus institutions can be evaluated only in an indirect way, 
by analysing their impact on the state of the water sector, on water management and thus 
on the well-being of the target groups. In addition, the presence of some characteristics in 
an institutional setting, which, in other examples brought about successful water 
management, could be considered as an indicator of performance. This study therefore 
seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of both the formal and informal institutions on water 
management and their overall well-being. This is also based on the fact that the water 
reforms in Zimbabwe also addressed the well-being of the colonially oppressed with 
regards to access to water resources. The question that the thesis attempts to answer is 
whether irrigation institutions are really effective in water resources management, 
especially for enhanced welfare of the water users and the nation at large.  
 
However, Balint, et al (2002) argues that the latter approach is again questionable, since, 
however, some institutional arrangements perform well in one country or region; there are 
several factors that are not counted for, which influence the efficiency of these institutions 
in the respective setting. The uncounted factors are the overall socio-economic and 
political environment as well as the informal institutions. Thus one institutional setting 
successful in one case may fail in the other.  
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On this basis, the analytical framework of the research study will involve three steps. 
Firstly, the concepts of irrigation water sector, irrigation water institution and irrigation 
water sector performance are defined to set a broad contour of analysis. Secondly, water 
institution and water sector performance are conceptually decomposed to identify some of 
their major components and sub-components (or aspects or facets). Finally, the 
decomposition exercise will be used as a basis to analytically highlight various layers of 
institutional inter-linkages and institution-performance linkages. The research study will 
focus on both the indicators of formal and those of non-formal institutional performance. 
 
4.6.2 Water sector and water institution: Conceptual basis 
 
Consistent with the institutional economics literature, (Bromley, 1992; North, 1990) in 
Saleth & Dinar (1999) state that institution is conceived in a much broader sense than a 
mere organisation. Their argument is that since institutions set the rules of the game and 
define, thereby, what individuals can and cannot do in given scenario, they, in effect, 
delineate the action sets for both individual and collective decision-making. They go on to 
highlight that institutions are influenced by a variety of factors such as historical 
precedents, constitutional provisions, political arrangements, demographic conditions, 
resource endowment and economic development. Such an analytical framework will be 
applicable for this study within the Zimbabwean context, given that the country has gone 
through a series of socio-economic and political transformations (land reforms 
programmes, water reforms (Chapter 2), political page, among other reforms). As such, 
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applying such an analytical framework will expose how the formal and informal institutions 
have oriented themselves to these reforms and the extent to which they are effective. 
 
Since the influence of these factors is formalised into three inter-related aspects; legal 
frameworks, policy issues and administrative arrangements, institutions can be 
conceptualised as an entity defined interactively by three main components; law, policy 
and administration. Specialising such a general notion of institution to the particular 
context of irrigation water sector, irrigation water institution can be characterised in terms 
of irrigation water law, irrigation water policy and irrigation water administration (Figure 6.2 
below). However, this study seeks to include informal counterparts (e.g. conventions, 
customs and administrative traditions) to try and establish how these can be used together 
in a given context (in this case, irrigation water management) to enhance their mandate in 
line with the intended water management objectives. In addition, the study seeks to 
explore the effectiveness and nature of linkages that exists between these types of 
institutions.  
 
In this study, the IDA for measuring the effectiveness of irrigation water management 
institutions was done in two stages as has been employed by Saleth & Dinar (1999). 
Firstly, the irrigation water institution was decomposed not into three (as by Saleth & 
Dinar), but into four broad institutional components; irrigation water law, irrigation water 
policy irrigation water administration (formal), and the informal institutions. Each of these 
institutional facets was decomposed further to identify its institutional aspects. From a 
policy perspective, the institutional aspects that will be under consideration in the research 
 117 
 
study, under each major component are presented in the conceptual framework in Figure 
4.2 below: 
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Effectiveness (appropriateness & adequacy) of irrigation water management institutions 
Irrigation Water law Irrigation Water policy Irrigation Water administration 
 Access to water rights 
 Irrigation water rights format 
 Existence of water law 
 Effective provisions for conflict-solving 
 Water law relevant for current & future 
situation 
 Relationship between irrigation water 
law and other laws 
 Scope for private sector participation 
 Irrigation project selection criteria 
 Payment of irrigation water 
 Form in which irrigation water is paid  
 Private sector participation 
 Extent of private sector participation 
 Organised into WUAs 
 Extent of WUAs participation  
 User participation policies 
 Linkages with other economic policies 
 Linkages between irrigation water law 
and irrigation water policy 
 
 Administration capacity 
 Effectiveness of user groups, e.g. WUAs 
 Impact of private sector participation  
 Updates & maintenance data 
 Adequacy, relevancy & reliability of 
data 
 Capacity to administer water through 
water law and policy 
 Clearly defined boundaries  to withdraw from CPRs 
 Local  appropriation rules related to local conditions 
 Mechanisms to assist in irrigation water management, e.g. constitutions 
 Effectiveness of management mechanisms 
 Effectiveness of monitoring of CPR conditions and the behaviour of appropriators 
 Regulation sanctions for users who fail to behave accordingly  
 Existence of rapid conflict solving in a low-cost local setting 
 Users challenging the rights of appropriators to create own local rules 
 Extent of challenge of the rights of appropriators  
 Effectiveness of informal institution to influence the water law, policy and water admin 
Figure 4.2: Conceptual framework 
Informal Irrigation Water 
Institution 
 119 
 
4.6.3 The Institutional Decomposition Analysis (IDA) 
 
Saleth and Dinar (1999) have a quite comprehensive and applicable approach to 
evaluating institutional performance. They attempt to quantify institutional performance 
through effectiveness of the elements of institutions, the inter-linkages between these 
components and the inter-linkage between institutions and water sector performance. 
However, in their exercise, they focussed mainly on formal institutions, yet the informal 
institutions like conventions, customs and norms of behaviour were left out of their 
analysis (a gap that this study seeks to close).  
 
To analyse the effectiveness of the institutions, Saleth and Dinar (1999) decomposed 
them into their constituent components and the constituent components further into the 
aspects of the components. They approached the indicators through individual and 
interactive effect of the components of institutions on institutional performance, as well as 
through the impact of the socio-economic, political and resource related environment in 
which they function.  
 
In Saleth and Dinar (1999) analysis, the following components of institutions were 
considered: law, policy and administration. Applying this approach on the specific case of 
water management institutions, they defined them in terms of water law, water policy and 
water administration. To enable them to evaluate the effectiveness of each component, 
they took into consideration the aspects that are within each and the strength of linkages 
to other components. They developed the indicators not only on the basis of their ability to 
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reflect the “performance” of given component or aspect, but also depending on the 
possibility to translate it into a numerical way.  
 
4.6.4 Evaluation indicators of informal institutions 
 
Ostrom (2008) discussed about the conditions the common-pool resource (CPR) 
institutions have to fulfil in order to exist for a long time and to be efficient. These 
conditions can be valid for formal institutions as well. But because of their self-governance 
characteristic, they were considered under the informal institutional indicators. Moreover 
there is one condition that underlines the informal nature of these institutions, that of the 
recognition of the right of self-organisation by external governmental authorities. According 
to Ostrom (2008), the conditions presented below are indicators in a sense that their 
existence shows a viable institution, while their absence underlines non-performance. 
 
The conditions of Ostrom are listed below. 
 
 Clearly defined boundaries for both the individuals / households to withdraw 
resource units from CPR and the CPR itself. 
 The appropriation rules should be related to local conditions: they can restrict the 
time, technology, place or quantity of resource units based on the local aspects.  
 Most individuals influenced by the rules of operation can participate in modifying 
these rules.  
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 The monitoring, the auditing of CPR conditions and that of the behaviour of 
appropriators, should be accountable to the appropriators, and even appropriators 
can perform them. This is a low cost exercise, since observing the behaviour of the 
other appropriators in a small community is relatively easy and at the same time it 
leads also to information transparency, by obtaining information on compliance rate. 
 Those appropriators who violate the operational rules receive graduate sanctions 
from the appropriators and/or from the officials accountable to the appropriators. 
 Appropriators and officials have rapid access to conflict solving in the low-cost, local 
setting. 
 External governmental authorities do not challenge the rights of appropriators to 
create their own institutions. 
 
It was therefore believed that if these preconditions existed, the CPR institutions would 
contribute to the lowering of the transaction costs, since the time and costs allocated to 
monitoring, enforcement, and to obtaining information are all lower than in a formal 
institutional setting. Therefore the formal institutions should rely on the informal 
arrangements, provide them the framework to function and only interfere when necessary. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, water is regarded as a CPR, as such; this study adopts the 
above discussed conditions as they, in one way or the other, can determine how water 
users can decide to manage irrigation water within their given setting.  
 
A more applicable, more operational method than the conditions presented above is the 
empirical evaluation of small-town water supply management done by Deutsche 
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Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) (1996) for the assessment of water 
supply systems in the Volta Region of Ghana. This method used the following indicators: 
water supply situation, sustainability and external factors. Each indicator had scores for 
evaluation of institutional performance. 
 
The water supply situation indicator assesses the extent to which the community needs an 
improved water supply, and how much preparation and capacity it has to improve the 
water supply by itself. Therefore the indicator was composed of aspects like: need; 
responsibility; sense of ownership of the water supply facility; willingness to pay for an 
improved water supply; ability to pay on the basis of the average income; and extent of 
participation in the past in initiation and implementation of water supply projects. This 
indicator had a weight of 45% of the total score. 
 
The sustainability indicator comprised those indicators which showed the community’s 
capacity of planning, organising and managing the activities in a sustainable manner. This 
indicator represented 40% of the score grid. The indicator measured the following aspects: 
the number, variety and effectiveness of community organisations; the extent of 
community leadership, unity and coherence; the extent of independent organisation of 
women groups and their planning development efforts; the extent to which the community 
had already developed experience in any sector, those without outside assistance and 
those initiated from outside the community; development potential, measured by the extent 
and variety of commercial activities, and the existence and variety of skills within a 
community. 
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Finally, the external factors indicator considered the external factors that could increase or 
diminish the importance of a community. This indicator represented 15% of the score. It 
comprised: the political status, evaluated based on aspects of being a district capital or 
otherwise, home town of an important politician or not and the communities’ interest in 
having a state agency, therefore a formal organization for water supply. 
 
The above GTZ methodology could indirectly assess the level of satisfaction of the 
population. This aspect is important in order to analyse efficiently the institutional 
performance in the transition process of the water system towards the water market.  
 
Based on the above review, the research methodology for the study will be, to a larger 
extent, benchmarked on the above approaches. While the above approaches were limited 
to evaluation approaches based on the formal institutional methods of analysis, this 
research study seeks to evaluate both the formal and informal irrigation water 
management institutions and explore the effectiveness, relationship and the existing inter-
linkages between them. Also important is how they can both contribute to developing 
effective irrigation water management institutions that would manage water resources at 
the lowest possible transaction costs. In this light, both the formal and informal institutions 
will be decomposed into their respective components that will define them and will be 
evaluated upon to assess their effectiveness in water management.  
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4.6.5 Evaluation of irrigation water sector performance  
 
Besides the institutional aspects as outlined above, there is also a need for a set of 
performance aspects that will capture the overall effectiveness or performance of not only 
each of the four institutional components, but also irrigation water institution as whole. 
These aspects to be considered are as follows: 
 
 Overall effectiveness of the irrigation water law 
 Overall effectiveness of irrigation water policy 
 Overall effectiveness of irrigation water administration,  
 Overall effectiveness of the irrigation informal institutions, and  
 Overall effectiveness of the irrigation informal institution on formal institutions 
 
It is also important to take note that each institutional component depends not only on the 
effectiveness of its institutional aspects, but also on the strength of its linkages with the 
other institutional components. Moreover, the direct impact of the institutional components 
and their underlying institutional aspects, the performance of the irrigation water institution 
is also influenced by the general socio-economic, political and resource related 
environment within which it operates.  
 
Saleth & Dinar (1999), however, noted that although it is relatively difficult to conceive and 
measure the overall performance of the water institution compared with that of its 
components, it is possible to capture it indirectly in terms of the progressiveness of water 
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institution. In this analysis, Saleth & Dinar (1999) used the indicator of progressiveness or 
the overall adaptive capacity of water institution as a whole. Aspects considered included; 
adaptive capacity, scope for innovation, openness for change and the ability of the 
institutions to handle/tackle emerging or future water challenges.  
 
Adaptive capacity is taken to be indicative of the flexible nature of water institution to 
change with time and space, while the scope for innovation allows the institution to acquire 
new and more appropriate institutional structure and get itself updated constantly. 
Similarly, openness for change suggests the absence of institutional rigidity within the 
water institution and the ability to tackle emerging problems indicates its performance 
efficiency even with changing resource realities within water sector.  
 
Given the political, socio-economic transformations and reforms in Zimbabwe over time, 
the above approach was also be employed within this context and attempt to see how 
irrigation institutions have also evolved with time and how they have aligned themselves to 
a changing environment. Given the decomposition of irrigation water institutions and its 
performance as outlined and proposed above, it is therefore possible to link, both 
analytically and functionally, the performance of each institutional component with their 
constituent aspects. Similarly, the overall performance of irrigation water institution can 
also be linked with the performance of institutional components and also with the 
institutional aspects themselves. In this way, the analytical decomposition outlined above 
provided a framework for evaluating both the institutional inter-linkages as well as irrigation 
institution-performance linkages within the irrigation water sector. 
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In addition, Bandaragoda (2000) offered a slightly modified approach to institutional 
analysis. The analysis focused on institutional change, the possibilities of improvement of 
institutions in a river basin context and suggested that institutions of water management 
should be evaluated in the historical context, comparing them with the physical 
development of the basin. Furthermore those aspects of current policies, laws, 
organisational arrangements should be identified, which are to be improved. The 
adequacy and appropriateness of the key components is to be assessed. 
 
The current research study focuses on irrigation institutions and these will also be 
evaluated based in the historical context as the conditions that existed then have changed 
over time, with new settings under new water users in the form of A1, A2 and small-scale 
indigenous farmers. As such, formal and informal conditions that need to be improved 
and/or changed should therefore be identified, their appropriateness and adequacy 
assessed within a given context, e.g. in this case, in a now ‘independent’ Zimbabwe that 
has been under oppression historically.  
 
The components and aspects Bandaragoda (2000) considered are those defined above 
by Saleth & Dinar (1999). According to this consideration, the adequacy and 
appropriateness of the institutions can be evaluated on the basis of the following questions 
(within the study context): 
 
 To what extent is the institutional aspect adequate for the current system?  
 Does it match the water availability and quality aspects?  
 127 
 
 Is it adequate and appropriate for the physical infrastructure, for the existent socio-
economic situation, for the current technology and for the current performance 
level? 
 
Furthermore, another possibility of institutional evaluation could be based on arguments by 
North (1990). The argument North (1990) put forward was that; together with technology, 
institutions determine the production and transformation costs. Therefore, institutional 
performance could be approached in a way that lower transaction costs and show a better 
institutional performance. And in order to achieve lower transaction costs, it is essential 
that the formal institutions build on the informal institutions existent already with respect to 
the management of natural resources. This way, the monitoring, enforcement and other 
costs can be significantly reduced. As such, an evaluation methodology, based on the 
above arguments is discussed in the subsequent section. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
Institutions in a broad sense are a set of humanly devised constraints and rules that 
govern and limit human behaviour and interaction and these can include legal rules, 
organisational forms, and norms of behaviour and enforcement mechanisms. Institutional 
change shapes the way societies evolve through time and it is the key to understand 
historical changes. The major role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by 
establishing a table structure to human interaction. 
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Various studies have shown that institutions can be used in the management of common 
pool resources. However, management practices can vary from one societal setting to 
another. The studies reviewed have shown that collective action in the management of 
resources functions well, but however, in some cases, Water Users Associations have 
managed water resources poorly and this was attributed to support services being 
minimal, lack of market-oriented production, conflict resolution was not done at local level 
(by-laws were not enforced), lack of consensus among farmers resulting in lack of 
monitoring and sanctioning at some irrigation schemes.  
 
In addition to the above challenges, collective action has been found to be difficult to 
organise where there is; lack of defined and well-enforced property rights, large difference 
in water supply between upstream and downstream farmers, large irrigators’ association in 
terms of service area and the number of farmer beneficiaries within its territory, the local 
community is sparsely populated, involving low social interactions, farm households have 
the option of ready exit from farm to non-farm economic activities and where farmers had 
traditionally practiced rain-fed farming with no previous experience in managing communal 
irrigation systems. 
 
In addition, the discussion has revealed the importance of the following factors as either 
constraints or enabling situations affecting overall irrigation water resources management; 
the political system, national policies, legal framework and the socio-economic 
environment. A number of studies have attempted to review the effectiveness of 
institutions in the management of resources, including water resources. In addition, some 
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of these studies have also explored the institution-performance interactions between the 
institutions in the management of natural resources. However, hardly any study has 
attempted to employ a methodological framework in trying to evaluate the issues of 
institution-performance linkages between the formal and informal institutions in the 
management of resources, particularly water resources.  
 
It is against the above that the research study seeks to find ways of integrating the formal 
and informal institutions for the best water management practices at the lowest cost 
possible.  
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CHAPTER 5 – METHODOLOGY  
 
5.0 Introduction  
 
This chapter describes study area. The discussion is presented at both national and 
provincial level. At national level, the description includes a presentation on the climate 
and geography of Zimbabwe, water bodies, tenure and water management issues. The 
legal and institutional environment for water resources development and management is 
also discussed in the chapter. The discussion also includes water reforms and trends in 
water use and management. At provincial level, the description centres on the population 
of the province. The distribution of the irrigated area before and after the FTLRP, both 
nationally and provincially is also presented in this chapter. This chapter also discusses 
the methodology that was used in the research study, based on the review of the 
analytical framework from various studies and the proposed analytical framework for the 
study (chapter 4). Also discussed are methods of data collection, data analysis and the 
limitations of the research study. 
 
5.1 Description of study area 
5.1.1 Zimbabwe: Climate and geography  
 
The research study is proposed to be carried-out in Mashonaland East Province, 
Zimbabwe. Located in South-Eastern Africa, the Republic of Zimbabwe is a landlocked 
country bordered by Botswana to the South-West, Mozambique to the East, Zambia to the 
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North-West, and South Africa to the South. Along the border with Mozambique are the 
East African Highlands, a mountain range that features a cool, wet climate. The Zambezi 
River is found along the border with Zambia and contains the majestic Victoria Falls, the 
world’s largest waterfall. A high, rocky plateau traverses much of the centre of the country, 
while lower plateaus and grasslands can be found in the west. The country’s natural 
resources include coal, gold, nickel, copper, iron ore, lithium, tin, and platinum.  
 
Zimbabwe is divided into five broad Natural Regions (NR) in which the dominant natural 
factor conditioning agricultural production is climate; mainly rainfall. They are also based 
on soil types. The five agro-ecological zones; regions I to V reflect the range from high-to-
low quality land. The rainfall patterns and crop production progressively deteriorate from 
Region I to Region V. The map below shows the 8 provinces of Zimbabwe. 
 
Administratively the country is divided into ten provinces (FAO, 2001), including Harare 
and Bulawayo as shown in Figures 5.1. Harare and Bulawayo provinces are made up of 
an urban population only. A high plateau dominates the country with a ridge forming a 
central backbone. Harare is the capital city and other major urban areas are Bulawayo, 
Chitungwiza, Gweru and Mutare. 
 
The country enjoys a subtropical climate with four overlapping seasons, but according to 
FAO (2001), Zimbabwe’s climate is more on the temperate side due to the high altitude of 
the central plateau. The average daily temperature in winter ranges from 130C to 230C and 
in the summer from 250C to 300C. Rainfall is highest in the Eastern Highlands 
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(Manicaland) and on the plateau, which receives about 1000 mm per year, while annual 
rainfall in the Lowveld region is often below 400 mm per annum (FAO, 2001).  
 
Figure 5.1: Provinces of Zimbabwe 
Source: Mushunje (2006) 
 
5.1.2 Water Bodies and Resources  
 
Zimbabwe is bordered by the Zambezi River to the North and by the Limpopo River to the 
South. Both rivers flow into Mozambique and are fed by Zimbabwe’s internal river 
systems. Zimbabwe’s seven major rivers flow into seven river catchments: the Save, 
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Runde, Mzingwane, Gwayi, Sanyati, Manyame, and Mazowe. Reservoirs have been and 
are being developed to better exploit the country’s water resources. Zimbabwe’s major 
reservoir capacity comes from Lake Kariba, which the country shares with Zambia. The 
country’s irrigation potential draws primarily on these surface water resources.  
 
Zimbabwe has total annual internal renewable water resources of 12.26 cubic kilometres: 
11.26 cubic kilometres are surface water resources and 6 cubic kilometres are 
groundwater, with an estimated 5 cubic kilometre overlap between the two sources (FAO, 
2008). The country has an average annual rainfall of 657 millimetres, but rainfall can range 
from over 1000 to only 300 to 450 millimetres, depending on location. Rainfall figures 
decrease steadily across the country from north to south and also from east to west. 
Thirty-seven percent of the country can sustain rain-fed agriculture, while the remainder is 
dependent on supplemental or full-time irrigation.  
 
In 2002, total water withdrawal in Zimbabwe was approximately 4.2 cubic kilometres (FAO, 
2008). Seventy-nine percent of this water was used for agriculture, including irrigation, 
fish-farming and livestock. Zimbabwe has an estimated 550,000 hectares that are 
irrigable, but irrigation systems have been developed for only 200,000 hectares. Of the 
developed systems, many have deteriorated or been destroyed in the years of conflict 
related to land reform efforts (Utete, 2003).  
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5.1.3 Tenure Issues  
 
Under formal law, the state owns all surface and groundwater in Zimbabwe. All 
Zimbabweans have the right to water for primary (domestic) use while other uses require 
state approval. Water rights are managed by Catchment Councils, which can issue 
permits for water use for agriculture and industry. Permits are typically valid for 12 years 
and are renewable. Payments are made based on the volume of water used, and permits 
transfer with the sale of land.  
 
Under customary law, the population has the right to use water for all traditional purposes, 
without obtaining a permit or making any payment. Zimbabweans have a long history of 
managing water resources at local levels, including establishing practices governing hand-
dug wells, springs, and boreholes. In some areas, a water source on private homesteads 
may be considered a public resource.  
 
5.1.4 Legal and Institutional Environment  
5.1.4.1 Legal Framework  
 
The Environment Management Act (2002) provides the legal foundation for the 
sustainable management of natural resources (including water), prevention of pollution 
and environmental degradation, preparation of national and other environmental 
management plans, and custodianship of the country’s environmental impact assessment 
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policy. The Act provides for an Environmental Management Agency that has the power to 
advise on, plan, and regulate matters of environment.  
 
Under customary law, Zimbabwe’s water belongs to the land. All residents have the right 
to use water resources for domestic needs, irrigation, watering livestock, and for use in 
activities such as brick-making. Under customary law, water use is governed by local 
water-point committees, or, in their absence, chiefs, headmen, or village assemblies. 
These traditional bodies continue to exercise authority over water resources in many 
areas.  
 
Zimbabwe does not have a national irrigation policy. National objectives for agriculture, 
including irrigation, are captured in Zimbabwe’s Agricultural Policy Framework (ZAPF), 
which is effective for the 1995 – 2020 period. Policy objectives include: increases in 
irrigated areas, primarily targeting smallholders; equitable and efficient allocation of water 
resources; creation of water-pricing structures based on cost and “social efficiency;” 
establishment of improved institutional structures; and implementation of drought 
mitigation plans.  
 
5.1.4.2 Institutional Framework  
 
The Ministry of Water Resources and Development (MWRD), establishes policies on 
water resource development. Several departments and parastatal agencies under MWRD 
are involved in irrigation and water: the Department of Water Development, ZINWA, and 
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the District Development Fund. ZINWA advises the Minister on the formulation of national 
water policies and standards and, in conjunction with Catchment Councils, is responsible 
for the planning, coordination and management of national water resources and delivery. 
There are seven Catchment Councils, which represent all stakeholders in their catchment 
areas including both smallholders and large commercial operators. Catchment Councils 
and Sub-Councils prepare plans for the development and utilization of the water resources 
in their areas, create inventories, and develop water-development proposals in line with 
the inventory of resources.  
 
The Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Mechanisation (MAIM), is responsible for 
agriculture and irrigation policy- development and implementation. Departments and 
parastatal agencies involved in irrigation under the control of MAIM include the 
Department of Agricultural Research and Extension (AREX), the Agricultural and Rural 
Development Authority (ARDA), the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), and the Department of 
Irrigation (DoI).  
 
The Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing oversees 
smallholder irrigation development. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
manages financial resources for irrigation development.  
 
Customary law provides that local bodies such as water-point committees and village 
councils, or traditional leaders such as chiefs and headmen, have authority to 
manage the community’s water resources. Community sanctions ensure compliance with 
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established rules. In many areas, the traditional bodies continue to govern issues of day-
to-day water access and use, with water-point committees reporting in some cases to 
Catchment Councils or sub-Councils.  
 
5.1.5 Government Reforms and Interventions  
 
The Water Act and the Zimbabwe National Water Authority Act are the culmination of 
Zimbabwe’s overhaul of the legislative framework for the water sector. In the last decades, 
the government has indicated its support for large- and medium-scale dam projects and 
irrigation development designed to support small farmers, although it has often relied 
almost entirely on donor funding for execution of projects.  
 
The Zimbabwe’s Agricultural Policy Framework (1995–2020) includes the following 
objectives:  
 
 Growth in the irrigated area (particularly in the smallholder sector) with minimal 
negative impacts on the environment and human health;  
 Equitable allocation and efficient use of scarce water resources;  
 Establishment of a water- pricing structure that is consistent with cost and social 
efficiency;  
 Establishment of an effective institutional structure; and  
 Implementation of drought-mitigating strategies. 
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The Government of Zimbabwe’s 2003 National Economic Recovery Programme (NERP) 
singles out irrigation as the most important and necessary requirement for agricultural 
development given the country’s vulnerability to drought and the high risks associated with 
rain-fed agriculture. The broad strategy and policy objectives in the irrigation subsector 
aim to:  
 
 Contribute to poverty alleviation by targeting resource-poor smallholder farmers 
with an aim to increasing farm incomes;  
 Increase agricultural production and enhance food security at the household level 
by ensuring some crop production during droughts and dry seasons;  
 Extend cropping opportunities and provide a wider variety of crops in both wet and 
dry seasons to improve nutritional status;  
 Create an enabling environment for irrigated agriculture by facilitating and 
encouraging the private sector to invest in irrigation development;  
 Enhance human capacity for irrigated agriculture in the public, parastatal and 
private sector; and  
 Create a spirit of business culture in the smallholder farmers  
 
5.1.6 Trends in Water Use, Management and Sanitation  
 
In recent years, drought has strained farmers and pastoralists, and the land reform and 
resettlement program has created an increased need for the development of irrigation 
systems for smallholders. Zimbabwe has well-developed dams, but they have not been 
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fully exploited. Beginning in the 1990’s the government recognized the need for a new 
framework governing water resources, and the importance of providing irrigation for 
smallholders in order to increase agricultural productivity.  
 
5.1.7 Challenges and Opportunities  
 
Industry, human waste, and agriculture practices have polluted Zimbabwe’s water 
sources. Deep wells and boreholes are often subjected to chemical contamination, while 
shallow wells are vulnerable to bacteriological and physical contamination. People living 
downstream are particularly affected. The crisis in Zimbabwe has also resulted in the 
deterioration of urban water and sanitation systems, leading to serious cholera outbreaks. 
 
Donors providing water and sanitation support to Zimbabwe include USAID in conjunction 
with the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the European Commission 
(EC), the United Nations Childrens’ Fund (UNICEF), the Department for International 
Development (DFID), New Zealand Aid, the Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the German Government and others. The FAO, the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD), the European Union (EU), the Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA) and other partners have joined in a 5-year (2010–2015), US$ 900-million 
project to develop and rehabilitate Zimbabwe’s irrigation systems and institutions. The 
project follows on and expands and deepens the FAO’s US$ 5.9 million project providing 
agricultural inputs, including irrigation to smallholders, which ended in 2009.  
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The United Nations Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) cluster focuses on 
coordinating efforts in water sanitation and hygiene with the goal of halting and containing 
cholera outbreaks. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
(IFRC) and the Zimbabwean Red Cross Society have undertaken projects to rehabilitate 
water points, assist in the formation of water-point committees, and provide community 
training on sanitation.  
 
5.2 Mashonaland East Province: description 
 
This research study, as discussed in Chapter 1, is confined to Mashonaland East province 
in Zimbabwe. In light of this, it is important to present a brief description of the province as 
highlighted in section 5.0 of this chapter.  
 
The population of Mashonaland East province was 1,125,35511 in 2002 and a population 
density of 34.9 people/km2. Marondera is the capital of the province. Mashonaland East 
has a total land area of 3,222,300 hectares which comprise of four Natural Regions – IIa, 
IIb, III and IV and is suitable for intensive crop farming, dairy, horticulture and the 
production of small grains. The province has nine administrative districts viz: Chikomba, 
Goromonzi, Marondera, Mudzi, Murewa, Mutoko, Uzumba-Maramba-Pfungwe (UMP), 
Seke and Wedza (Figure 5.2). Three of the districts (Mutoko, Mudzi and UMP) had no 
commercial farms. 
                                                          
11
 Central statistical office (2002) 
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Figure 5.2: Mashonaland East province12 and its 9 districts 
 
The Government of Zimbabwe launched a national Fast Track Land Resettlement 
Programme (FTLRP) on 15th July 2000 (Utete, 2003), and the programme was also 
implemented in Mashonaland East Province. The programme was designed to be 
undertaken in an accelerated manner and with reliance on local resources with the 
following objectives as stated in policy documents:  
 
                                                          
12 (http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6f/Mashonaland_East_districts.png)  
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 The immediate identification for compulsory acquisition of not less than 5 million 
hectares for Phase II of the Resettlement Programme, for the benefit of the landless 
peasant households  
 The planning, demarcation and settler emplacement on all acquired farms  
 Provision of limited basic infrastructure (such as boreholes, dip tanks and scheme 
roads) and farmer support services (such as tillage and crop packs) (Utete, 2003) 
 
The FTLRP program comprises two models: 13Model A1 intended to decongest communal 
areas and is targeted at land-constrained farmers in communal areas. This model was 
based on existing communal area organisation, whereby peasants produce mainly for 
subsistence. 14Model A2, on the other hand, is a commercial settlement scheme 
comprising small-, medium-, and large-scale commercial settlements, intended to create a 
cadre of black commercial farmers. This model is, in principle, targeted at any 
Zimbabwean citizen who can prove farming experience and/or resource availability and is 
based on the concept of full cost recovery from the beneficiary (GoZ, 2000). The 
distribution of the irrigated area by category, pre- and after the FTLRP is as shown in 
Table 5.1 below. Such a distribution is crucial to the study as it determine the selection of 
the target population based on the category of the scheme. 
 
 
                                                          
13 Model A1 Model A1 was for the generality of landless people, with a villagised and self-contained variant. 
14 Model A2 on the other hand was a commercial settlement scheme comprising Small, Medium and Large-Scale Commercial 
settlement. 
 
 143 
 
Table 5.1: National distribution of the irrigated area (ha) pre and after FTLRP  
 
Category 
Size of irrigated area 
 
Before FTLRP 
After FTLRP 
 
Area 
% total 
area 
Area 
% total 
area 
A1 
 
- - 7,620 6.3 
A2 
 
- - 12,450 10.3 
Communal & resettlement 
 
10,000 6 11,860 9.8 
Indigenous large scale 
commercial  
- - 9,250 7.7 
Traditional large-scale 
commercial 
139,500 73 8,140 6.8 
ARDA 
 
13,500 8 7,620 6.3 
Settler 
 
3,600 2 3600 - 
Others 
 
- - 63,470 52.7 
Informal 
 
20,000 11 20,000 - 
Total 
 
186,600 100 120,410 100 
 
Source15: Cited in Utete (2003) 
The distribution in Table 5.1 above shows an increase in the number of A1, A2 and 
indigenous large scale farmers (ILSCF), new categories in the irrigation sector in 
Zimbabwe. The A2 and ILSCF categories are mostly made up of individual farmers. The 
statistics in Table 5.1 were broken down into provincial distribution and the statistics per 
province are as shown in Table 5.2 below. 
                                                          
15
 IFAD (1997) 
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Table 5.2: Provincial distribution of formal irrigated area (ha) after FTLRP 
Province A1 A2 C & R
16
 Indig 
LSCF 
Trad 
LSCF 
ARDA Other Total 
Mashonaland 
East 
650 1,790 1,000 590 500 580 10 5,120 
Midlands 
 
540 640 1,040 110 640 400 510 3,880 
Manicaland 
 
2,980 3,950 4,180 890 1,920 4,090 28,890
17
 43,900 
Mashonaland 
Central 
2,000 2,450 760 6,220 3,050 100 320 14,900 
Matebeleland 
South 
70 1,200 1,400 - 100 940 - 3,710 
Matebeleland 
North 
340 70 200 170 270 400 - 1,450 
Mashonaland 
West 
500 1,830 1,400 1,070 1,320 1,110 3,160 10,390 
Masvingo 
 
540 520 1,880 200 340 - 33,580 37,060 
Total 
 
7,620 12,450 11,860 9,250 8,140 7,620
18
 63,470 120,410 
% irrigated 
area 
6.3 10.3 9.8 7.7 6.8 6.3 2.7 100 
Source: Cited in Utete (2003) 
                                                          
16
 Communal and resettled farmers 
17
 The basis of the figure was not known 
18
 The figure was said to be way below the most cited of 13,500ha 
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Table 5.2 shows that in Mashonaland East province, most of the irrigated land lied in the 
hands of the A2 and communal and resettled farmers, with a total irrigable area of 
5,120ha. For purposes of this study, the thesis targeted mainly the A1s (especially A1 
group farmers in the province) and communal and resettled farmers based on the 
communal or collective management of irrigation water resources. The A2s, indigenous 
and traditional large scale farmers, who mainly work as individuals were targeted as part 
of key informants.  
 
5.3 Research methodology 
5.3.1 Institutional effectiveness evaluation framework 
 
In efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of irrigation water management institutions with 
respect to agricultural water management objectives, an evaluation framework for the 
research study has been designed and presented in Figure 5.3 below.  
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Develop and implement strategies 
to establish a new institutional 
framework 
 
Effectiveness of existing irrigation water management institutions to 
cope with agricultural water management objectives 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Are the existing irrigation water management 
institutions appropriate? 
No Yes 
Identify requirements to 
develop appropriate 
irrigation institutions 
Are the existing 
institutions adequate? 
Identify requirements to develop 
adequate institutions 
Evaluate management 
functions and apply adjusted 
management strategies to 
improve performance 
Design a modified institutional framework 
to match with present objectives: 
 policies 
 laws and procedures 
 organizational structures 
 operational plans 
Is the required 
institutional framework 
in place? 
Modify management objectives to match 
with possible institutional change 
Apply strategies for new adjusted physical and 
organizational structures, training, and establishment of 
new laws and procedures 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Extraneous factors affecting irrigation 
water management institutions 
 
 Political system 
 National economic policies 
 Legal framework 
 Social conditions   
o culture  
o traditions and  
o practices 
 Physical resource base 
Figure 5.3: Institutional effectiveness evaluation 
framework interesting point. You can position the text box 
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Figure 5.3 shows some of the main external factors which can be identified as either 
constraints or enabling situations that affect the irrigation water management institutions in 
the country. The overall political system, national economic policies, legal framework, 
socio-economic environment and the physical resource base are some of the external 
influences. For instance, the overall national policies play a significant role in fashioning 
the institutional framework for any given social context and in this case, irrigation water 
management. 
 
In addition, the legal framework situation in a country, and in particular, the social 
conditions, can determine how the laws and rules are applied and adjudicated. 
Consequently, this has a significant effect on water management institutions. In some 
instances, the culture, traditions and practices inhibit the effective functioning of irrigation 
water management institutions, whereas, in some other instances, they tend to promote 
them. For example, this has been supported by Sokile & van Koppen (2004) who argued 
that in some cases, customary local practices and structures can also contain or help 
avoid conflicts.  
 
Similarly, North (1993) notes that institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to 
be socially efficient, rather, they, or at least formal rules, are created to serve interests of 
those with bargaining power to create new rules. In this case, institutions can either 
promote management or inhibit if they tend to serve self-interests. In order to assess the 
actual impact of these external influences, it is useful to have an understanding about the 
social conditions, traditions and practices in the given context. It is thus expected that at 
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the end of the research, this thesis will highlight some of these conditions, applicable to 
the Zimbabwean context and thus will assist in the formulation of a sustainable and 
effective institutional framework for agricultural water management in Zimbabwe.   
 
5.4 Evaluation methodology 
 
The effectiveness framework outlined above provides a basis for developing a 
methodology for quantitative evaluation of both the institutional linkages as well as the 
institution performance linkages. The section below provides the definition of variables that 
were collected for data analysis.  
 
5.4.1  Definition of variables 
 
The definition of both the institutional and performance variables flows directly from the 
analytical decomposition of irrigation water institutions and irrigation water sector 
performance. To facilitate a better interpretation of these variables, their nature and 
format, including the range of values they can take has also been presented and 
described. The institutional and performance variables and the values they take are 
defined in Tables 5.3 – 5.6 below. 
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Table 5.3 Irrigation water law component and explanatory variable evaluation criteria  
Dependent 
component  
 
Explanatory Variable 
 
Acronym 
 
Data type 
 
Variable evaluation criteria 
Expected 
relationship 
 
IR
R
IG
A
T
IO
N
 W
A
T
E
R
 
L
A
W
  
 
(L
O
IW
L
) 
  
 
Access to water rights 
 
LAWR Dummy 
 
1 = yes; 0 = otherwise + 
Format of water rights LFWR Dummy 
 
0 = no rights;  
1 = unclear/scattered rights 
2 = common state property 
3 = riparian system 
4 = correlative (proportional) 
sharing 
5 = licenses/permits 
 
+ 
 
Aware of the existence of irrigation 
water law 
 
LEWL Dummy 
 
1 = yes; 0 = otherwise 
+ 
 
Provisions effective for conflict 
resolution
19
 mechanisms  
 
LCRM Scale 
0  
1 Captured in terms of judgemental 
perception on a scale of 0 – 10 
2  
+ 
 
Water law relevant for irrigation water 
users under current and future situation  
 
 
LRCF 
 
Scale 
3  
4 Captured in terms of judgemental 
perception on a scale of 0 - 10 
+ 
 
Relationship of water law with other 
laws to promote irrigation water 
management 
 
LLOL Scale 
 
Captured in terms of judgemental 
perception on a scale of 0 - 10 + 
 
Water law provisions to promote 
private sector participation 
 
LPPS Scale 
 
Captured in terms of judgemental 
perception on a scale of 0 – 10 
 
+ 
                                                          
19
 The conflict resolution mechanisms considered for evaluation include bureaucratic systems, tribunals, judicial/legislative mechanisms, WUAs, etc 
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Table 5.4: Irrigation water policy component and variable evaluation criteria 
Dependent 
Component 
 
Explanatory variable 
 
Acronym 
 
Data type 
 
Variable evaluation criteria 
Expected  
relationship 
IR
R
IG
A
T
IO
N
 W
A
T
E
R
 P
O
L
IC
Y
 
 
(P
O
IW
P
) 
Irrigation project selection criterion is 
economic-oriented PPSC Dummy 
1 = yes 
0 = otherwise + 
Pay for use of irrigation water 
PUIW Dummy 
1 = yes 
0 = otherwise + 
Form in which irrigation water if paid for 
PFIP Dummy  
0 = full subsidy (no payment) 
1 = partial recovery 
2 = full-cost recovery 
 
+ 
Impact of the policy for promoting private 
sector participation PGPP Scale 
Captured in terms of judgemental 
perception on a scale of 0 – 10 + 
Extensiveness of private sector 
participation in irrigation water 
management 
 
PEPP Scale 
Captured in terms of judgemental 
perception on a scale of 0 – 10 + 
Organised into Water Users Associations 
(WUAs) PWUA Dummy 
1 = yes 
0 = otherwise + 
Extensiveness of WUAs’ participation in 
irrigation water management PEWA Scale 
Captured in terms of judgemental 
perception on a scale of 0 – 10 + 
Impact of the policy for promoting users’ 
participation  PIUP Scale 
Captured in terms of judgemental 
perception on a scale of 0 – 10 + 
Extent of influence of other policies
20
 on 
irrigation water policy PEOP Scale 
Captured in terms of judgemental 
perception on a scale of 0 - 10 + 
Extent of linkages between irrigation water 
law and irrigation water policy  PWPL Scale 
Captured in terms of judgemental 
perception on a scale of 0 - 10 + 
                                                          
20
 Some of these policies to be considered include: fiscal policies, economic policies, investment policies, etc 
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Table 5.5: Irrigation water administration component and variable evaluation criteria 
Dependent 
Component 
 
Explanatory variable 
 
Acronym 
 
Data type 
 
Variable evaluation criteria 
Expected  
relationship 
IR
R
IG
A
T
IO
N
 W
A
T
E
R
 A
D
M
IN
IS
T
R
A
T
IO
N
 
 
(A
O
IW
A
) 
Capacity of the administration of irrigation 
water at scheme level ACIW Scale 
Captured in terms of judgemental 
perception on a scale of 0 – 10 
+ 
Effectiveness of user groups or WUAs in 
administration of irrigation water AEWA Scale 
Captured in terms of judgemental 
perception on a scale of 0 – 10 
+ 
Private sector participation reduces 
burden on irrigation water administration 
and management 
APPA Scale  
Captured in terms of judgemental 
perception on a scale of 0 – 10 
+ 
Mechanisms of collecting updates and do 
maintenance of irrigation water at scheme 
level 
AMUM Dummy 
1 = yes 
0 = otherwise 
+ 
Adequacy, relevant and reliability of water 
data in irrigation water management at 
scheme level 
AARR Scale 
Captured in terms of judgemental 
perception on a scale of 0 – 10 
+ 
Capacity to effectively administer 
irrigation water through use of the 
irrigation water law and policy 
ACLP Scale  
Captured in terms of judgemental 
perception on a scale of 0 – 10 
+ 
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Table 5.6: Informal irrigation water management component and variable evaluation criteria 
Dependent 
Component 
 
Explanatory variable 
 
Acronym 
 
Data type 
 
Variable evaluation criteria 
Expected  
relationship 
IN
F
O
R
M
A
L
 W
A
T
E
R
 M
A
N
A
G
E
M
E
N
T
 I
N
S
T
IT
U
T
IO
N
 
 
(I
N
F
W
I)
  
Clearly defined boundaries to withdraw 
irrigation water CPRs 
ICPR Dummy 1 = existing;  
0 = otherwise + 
Existing appropriation rules
21
 related to 
the local conditions 
IARL Dummy 1 = existing;  
0 = otherwise + 
Mechanisms, e.g. constitutions to assist 
in irrigation water management  
IMSL Dummy 1 = existing;  
0 = otherwise + 
Effectiveness of management 
mechanisms in water management 
IEMM Scale Captured in terms of judgemental 
perception on a scale of 0 – 10 + 
Effectiveness of monitoring, conditions 
and the behaviour of appropriators  
IEMA Scale Captured in terms of judgemental 
perception on a scale of 0 – 10 + 
Existence of regulation sanctions for 
users who fail to act accordingly 
IERS Dummy 1 = existing;  
0 = otherwise + 
Existence of rapid access to conflict 
solving in the low-cost, local setting  
IECS Dummy 1 = existing;  
0 = otherwise + 
Users challenging rights of appropriators 
to create own local-based institutions  
ICRA Dummy Captured in terms of judgemental 
perception on a scale of 0 – 10 + 
Extent of challenge of the rights of 
appropriators to create own institutions 
IECA Scale Captured in terms of judgemental 
perception on a scale of 0 – 10 + 
Effectiveness of informal institutions to 
influence law, policy and administration 
IOEI Scale Captured in terms of judgemental 
perception on a scale of 0 – 10 + 
 
                                                          
 21 Evaluated in terms of their restriction to the time, technology, place or quantity of resource units based on the local aspects.  
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The variables defined in the Tables 5.3 – 5.6 above are self-explanatory and present 
general characteristics. Both the institutional and performance variables are grouped into 
two broad categories; the factual and perceptional variables. Factual variable are 
observable while perceptional variables involve judgemental considerations and cannot be 
observed.  
 
The variables have also been categorised into three categories;  
 
 Dummy variables where 1 indicates the existence or otherwise of a given 
institutional aspect.  
 Categorical variable attempts to place a given institutional aspect into a fixed 
number of feasible categories. The numerical value for each category is assigned 
consciously to obtain an ascending order in terms of their values. The bounded 
nature of the scale variables within 0-10 range has important implications; zero 
meaning the worst situation and 10 meaning an ideal situation.  
 The intermediate values taken by the scale variables can be interpreted as the 
extent the actual situation deviates from either the worst or the ideal situation.  
 
5.4.2 Model specification 
 
Given the set of institutional and performance variables, it is therefore important to 
characterise the institution-performance interaction within the water sector. The following 
set of equations describes the functional relationships of the evaluation of both irrigation 
 154 
 
water institution and irrigation water sector performance. The dependents variables 
(effectiveness of institutions) will be assessed based on their presence (effectiveness) or 
otherwise. This therefore leads to formulation of the following working requations: 
 
LOIWL =   ƒ1(LAWR;LFWR;LEWL,LCRM;LRCF;LLOL;LPPS).......................................equation 1 
POIWP =   ƒ2(PPSC;PUIW;PFIP;PGPP;PEPP;PWUA;PEWA;PIUP;PEOP;PWLP)........equation 2 
AOIWA =  ƒ3(ACIW;AEWA;APPA;AMUM;AARR;ACLP)………………….…………….....equation 3 
INFWI =   ƒ4(ICPR;IARL;IMSL;IEMM;IEMA;IERS;IECS;ICRA;IECA;IOEI)......................equation 4 
 
INFWI =  ƒ5(LOIWL, POIWP, AOIWA)...........................................................................equation 5 
 
INFWI=ƒ6(LAWR;LFWR;LEWL,LCRM;LRCF;LLOL;LPPS;PPSC;PUIW;PFIP;PGPP;PEPP;PWUA;PEW
A;PIUP;PEOP;PWLP; ACIW;AEWA;APPA;AMUM;AARR;ACLP)……equation 6 
 
Equation 1, 2, 3 and 4 are central and crucial as they depict structural linkages between 
the water institutions and their constituents. Equation 1 shows that the overall performance 
of their irrigation water law is a function of 7 irrigation water law constituents. These legal 
constituents are shown in Table 5.3 above. Similarly, equation 2 and equation 3 presents 
the overall performance of the irrigation water policy as a function of 10 irrigation water 
policy constituents and the overall performance of irrigation water administration as a 
function of 6 aspects respectively as also depicted in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 above. 
Equation 4 shows the overall performance of the informal institution component and is a 
function of 10 constituents. The constituent variables are also shown in Table 5.6 above. 
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While the first four equations are designed to capture the functional linkages within each of 
the four irrigation water institution components, equations 5 and 6 show performance of 
informal water institution and formal water institutions. 
 
Thus, when these equations are estimated within an appropriate empirical context, the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), the sign and size of their coefficients could provide 
valuable insights into the relative role that various institutional aspects play in influencing 
the performance of both formal and informal irrigation water institutions. It is the first time 
that the above analytical approach has been formulated to enable the study of the 
effectiveness of irrigation water institutions in water resources management.    
 
5.5 Data Collection 
5.5.1 Analysis approach  
 
Institutional analysis of irrigation systems is very complex. Usually, some of these 
resources are characterised by multiple users. In addition, there is need for arrangement 
for negotiation and mechanisms for conflict resolution among different stakeholders. Rules 
for sharing the resources comprise property rights, which are useful in resolving conflicts 
and creating incentives for investment for the development of the resource. At the same 
time, there is need to have institutions for collective action, either in the form of formal 
organisations or informal forms of cooperation, to abide by the property rights as well as 
act collectively for betterment of the community.  
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However, Bamberger (2000) argues that qualitative approaches are increasingly used in 
conjunction with quantitative approaches and such combinations can enhance validity and 
reliability of analysis and evaluation. Given the nature of this study, this thesis used both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches to ensure reliability and validity of data collected. 
 
5.5.2 Sampling and questionnaire administration 
 
According to Bless & Smith (2000), there are advantages associated with interviewing the 
whole population. Data obtained from the whole population is more reliable, when 
compared to sample data. However, in this research study, a sample is going to be used 
because of the limiting time and financial resources.  
 
Generally, irrigation schemes display a heterogeneity nature with regards to composition, 
type, and their operation and maintenance, and above all, irrigation water resources 
management. As such, the target sample population for the study is depicted in Table 5.7 
below. 
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Table 5.7: Stratification of the study population  
Type of ownership  Number of schemes targeted  
A122 irrigation schemes 36 
A2 irrigation schemes 43 
Communal & resettled irrigation schemes 41 
Total questionnaires 120 
 
Stratified sampling was done to categorise irrigation schemes into the three strata; A1s, 
A2s and communal/resettled farmers. From each stratum, simple random sampling was 
done to select the target irrigation schemes23 in the province. A total of 120 questionnaires 
were administered for the research study. From both the A1 and communal/resettled 
irrigation schemes, the researcher targeted the working committee of the group for key 
respondent interviews while for A2 farmers, the person in charge of the farm was targeted 
for interviews. 
  
The key instrument for data collection was a structured questionnaire. The questionnaire 
was designed in such a way that it solicited both qualitative and quantitative data. The 
questionnaire captured variables on formal irrigation institutions defined by irrigation water 
law, policy, administration and variables on the informal institutions, and their respective 
aspects and overall performance of the water sector and its subsequent constituents as 
outlined in Figure 4.2 and Tables 5.3 to 5.6. 
                                                          
22
 Schemes under A1 category and collectively operated 
23
 For a scheme to be selected for the study, it should have been functional for at least the past 5 years and 
at the time of the interview. 
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Enumerators were recruited for the questionnaire administration process. The 
enumerators were selected from the province for two major reasons; their ability to speak 
in vernacular language and secondly, to cut on the research costs. These enumerators 
were trained on the whole process of questionnaire administration (introductions until the 
interview is completed) to acquainted themselves with the requirements of the 
questionnaire before getting into the field. Pre-testing of the study questionnaire was also 
done to ensure that unnecessary questions were removed from the questionnaire, in case 
of repetitions and to ensure that unforeseen problems were detected early. 
 
5.5.3 Data analysis 
 
Data collected were coded and entered and ran in the Statistical Package for Social 
Scientists (SPSS Version 20) software and Microsoft Excel program for analyses. 
Descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviations), institutional decomposition analysis 
(IDA) approach and a OLS regression model were used as the main analytical tools. The 
main descriptive indicators that were employed are mean values for all the variables. 
These are useful in analysing the relationship between dependent variables (overall 
irrigation water institutions) and explanatory variables (irrigation water institution aspects 
as outlined above in this chapter). 
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5.6 Limitations of the study 
 
 The budgetary constraints restricted the research to only one province of 
Zimbabwe. 
 The information could have errors that resulted from respondent bias. Potential 
prejudices of the data could include those of recall of data.  
 Respondents’ willingness to report information as accurately as possible could have 
biased data due to difficulties in recalling information  
 
However, greatest precaution was taken to ensure that the study obtained reasonable and 
more accurate data, e.g. probing further in cases where a respondent could have given 
conflicting responses.  
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
Zimbabwe is a landlocked country divided into ten administrative provinces and five broad 
Natural Regions based on rainfall distribution and soil types. Rainfall patterns and crop 
production deteriorate from NR 1 to NR 5. Zimbabwe’s climate is more on the temperate 
side due to the high altitude of the central plateau.  
 
The country has seven major rivers that flow into seven river catchments and reservoirs 
are being developed to better exploit the country’s water resources. The irrigation potential 
of the country draws primarily from the surface water resources. On this note, it is 
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important to acknowledge that only 37% of the country can sustain rain-fed agriculture, 
while the remainder depends on supplemental or full-time irrigation. The irrigation potential 
of the country stands at 500,000ha, while the developed irrigation area 200,000ha. 
However, many systems have deteriorated or dilapidated during the land reform 
programmes.    
 
Under the formal law, the state owns all the surface and ground water resources and all 
the citizens have the rights to water for primary uses, while secondary uses need state 
approval.  
 
Mashonaland East province overlaps into NR IIa, IIb, III and IV and is suitable for intensive 
crop farming, dairy, horticulture and production of small grains. The province also had 
irrigated farms targeted redistribution under the land reform programme where new 
farmers were introduced into the irrigation sector, with most of the land given to A2 
farmers. The other categories that benefited during the land reform programme included 
A1s, communal and resettled farmers, indigenous large-scale commercial farmers (LSCF), 
traditional LSCF, ARDA and others. The next chapter outlines the methodology used to 
collect data on a number of formal and informal institutional variables and the methods of 
analysis.  
 
In light of this, the study therefore attempted to employ a methodology that evaluates the 
effectiveness of institutions from this angle to formulate an effective irrigation water 
management framework in Zimbabwe. Therefore, data was collected from the study 
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population based on the formal and informal institutions used in the management of 
irrigation water resources. The following chapter discusses the descriptive results of the 
study based on the methodology used to solicit data.   
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CHAPTER 6 – DESCRIPTIVE STUDY FINDINGS 
 
6.0 Introduction   
 
This chapter presents the descriptive statistics for the study. Mainly, it employs the mean 
and standard deviation values on the main variables that have been studied in this 
research. The main objective of this chapter is to provide a preliminary background on the 
effectiveness and nature of water management institutions (formal and informal) in the 
management of irrigation water resources.  
 
It is important to understand the need to evaluate the formal and informal irrigation water 
institutions that are used to manage irrigation water, and the nature of relationship existing 
between an institution and its facets. This is based on the fact that water management 
does not only depend on appropriate technologies and efficient market prices 
(Gebremedhin et al. 2002), but also on local level institutions and organisations that 
enforce them. The sections below describe the nature and effectiveness of the formal and 
informal institutions on irrigation water management.   
 
6.1 Legal variables 
 
The IFAD report (1997) states that productive water use by smallholder farmers cannot be 
achieved by merely changing water legislation. This has been evidenced by the fact that 
changes in the water legislation in the post-colonial era failed to bring about the much-
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needed increase in productive water use. In light of this, Manzungu & Machiridza (2005) 
state that water laws are likely to succeed if underpinned by a sound economic ideology. 
As such, the study evaluated the effectiveness of the irrigation water law in managing 
water resources and how it can work in harmony with other institutions to manage 
irrigation water resources. Table 6.1 presents the analysed descriptive statistics for the 
legal institutional variables under study. 
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Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics: perceptional-based legal institutional and performance variables 
Source: survey data (2012) 
Irrigation water law variables Acronyms Type of data Mean 
values 
Standard 
Deviation 
Range 
Min Max 
Access to water rights 
 
 
LAWR Dummy 0.371 0.236 0 1 
Format of water rights 
 
 
LFWR Dummy 1.340 0.117 0 5 
Existence of irrigation water law 
 
 
LEWL Dummy 0.313 0.461 0 1 
Provisions effective for solving 
conflicts among irrigation water 
users 
 
LCRM Scale 3.641 3.314 0 10 
Water law relevant for irrigation 
water users under current and 
future situation 
LRCF Scale 2.414 1.423 0 10 
Irrigation water law relationship 
with other laws to promote water 
management 
LLOL Scale 4.341 2.532 0 10 
Water law provisions to promote 
private sector participation 
 
LSPS Scale 5.266 2.160 0 10 
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Water rights are mechanisms through which a user can access water for a particular use 
without jeopardising another user’s right (Sokile & van Koppen, 2004). Water rights can be 
local or customary, i.e., means by which users may access water and establish allocation 
mechanisms among themselves without necessarily having a written document to define 
volumes and times for abstraction. Water rights are, however, mostly thought to be 
statutory, i.e., a blueprint document issued by the government, defining volumetric 
allocation of water and, sometimes, period for that particular allocation, and to whom it is 
provided for (Sokile & van Koppen, 2004). 
 
Property rights for water users entail right to access a certain amount and quality of water, 
collective protection against conversion of irrigated lands, use of irrigation infrastructure, 
irrigation services, etc. (North & Thomas, 1977). An analysis on whether the users had 
access to water rights was done. The variable on access to irrigation water rights was 
treated as a dummy variable, where 1 = access to water rights and 0 = otherwise.  
 
The mean value for the variable was 0.371. Such a distribution is oriented towards 0, 
implying that most users have indicated they did not have or had little access to water 
rights. The results could be explained by the colonial history of Zimbabwe, where the black 
indigenous farmers were disadvantaged because they had not applied for water rights 
(Manzungu, 2001) and when they wanted to apply for water rights, most of the water was 
committed to water rights held by white farmers, which were issued in perpetuity and could 
not be revoked.  
 
 166 
 
Furthermore, this could be explained by the neglect of indigenous water and irrigation 
management, where state intervention tended to disenfranchise smallholder farmers 
because of introduced legal systems (Rukuni, 1993). For example, smallholder irrigators 
lost their rights over land, water and other resources. Rukuni (1993) further notes that 
failure by the colonial and post-colonial states to acknowledge traditional water 
management practices, despite contributing to rural food security, failed to offer a platform 
where smallholder farmers will be presented with water rights. In addition, Manzungu & 
Senzanje (1996) also report that the water rights of the indigenous population which 
predated the settler claims were disregarded, thus leaving most farmers without water 
rights.  
  
Such a trend suggests that farmers will not have any meaningful development and 
management of water resources at their schemes. This could also result in 
mismanagement of irrigation water resources as the farmers will not have a sense of 
ownership to the water resources. According to Demsetz (1967) and Coase (1960), well 
established private property rights represent the most efficient system of land use. Using 
the same argument, water rights also represent the most efficient and effective system of 
water use and management.  
  
While users may have access to water rights, what counts also is the nature of these 
property rights. Absence of clearly defined and well-enforced property rights significantly 
increase risks (Coase, 1960). The same argument can be followed with regards to 
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irrigation water management, where unclear/scattered water rights increase the risks of 
mismanagement of water resources.  
 
The analysis for format of water rights was treated as a dummy type of data, with 0 = no 
water rights; and 1 – 5 represented formats of water rights. The mean value of 1.340 is 
skewed towards a situation where most farmers had no water rights or had 
unclear/scattered rights. The results concur to a study by Zaleke (2006) in Ethiopia, which 
found out that farmers had multiple water rights emanating from both the customary and 
formal water acts and have co-existed to direct the actions of users. Such a trend, where 
users either do not have rights or have unclear rights can increase risks of farmers 
mismanaging water resources as they would not any sense of ownership.  
 
Being aware of the existence of the irrigation water law can be an effective tool for 
promoting the efficient management of water resources. This is because users will have 
more information available to them within the water law, and also how they are expected 
to treat irrigation water resources with regard to mainly development and management. As 
such, users were asked if they were aware of the existence of the water law, in which case 
the variable was treated as a dummy variable, 1 = aware of the existence of the water law, 
while 0 = otherwise.  
 
The mean value of 0.313 is again inclined towards 0, the worst situation, suggesting that 
most users were either not aware or were not fully aware of the existence of the water law 
to regulate and govern how they should use water resources. Such a pattern suggests the 
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users may not be acquainted with the laws and principles of how water resources 
development and management should be focussed. This could also be explained by the 
fact that the “Fast-Track Land Reform Programme” (FTLRP) of 2000 in Zimbabwe brought 
in new cadres in the irrigation water sector, who may not have been aware of the 
existence of the water law. This negatively jeopardises the principles of irrigation water 
resources development and management as may be stated within the irrigation water law.  
 
Lack of knowledge on the existence of the irrigation law could be explained by the 
behavioural assumptions and human actors’ theories discussed in Section 3.8, where 
human actors have bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) rather than perfect knowledge. 
Human actors lack complete knowledge to assess their decision alternatives due to their 
cognitive limitations, time and information constraints (Williamson, 2000; Brousseau & 
Glachant, 2002). As such, they lack that mentality to make informed decisions on how 
water use should be directed. This leads to poor management of water resources.  
 
The respondents who, however, acknowledged the existence of the water law were 
probed on whether the water law had provisions to solve conflicts at scheme level. Their 
responses were based on perceptional judgement, on a scale of 0 – 10. Their responses 
yielded a mean value of 3.641, a figure more skewed towards the worst situation 
suggesting that users indicated that there are either no provisions or little provisions for 
conflict-solving within the water law. In a case where conflict-solving provisions lack, it may 
mean users end up seeking arbitration from the legal courts.  
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However, the challenge facing informal conflict mediation arrangements is that the formal 
courts of law tend to nullify the rulings of the former (Sokile & van Koppen, 2004). This 
encourages those who are somewhat knowledgeable to run to the courts of law, although 
the formal ‘winner-takes-all’ ruling reached is likely to propel the issue toward new 
dimensions of conflict. This may mean perpetuation of the conflict, eventually leading to 
poor irrigation water management.  
 
The users who acknowledge the existence of the water law were also asked whether the 
water law was relevant for the users under the current and future situation, based on a 
perceptional judgment on a scale of 0 – 10.  
 
The results of such an analysis depicted a mean value of 2.414, which suggests that most 
users who responded moistly indicated a lower score, skewed towards the worst situation 
of 0. Irrelevancy of the irrigation water law for current and future users could be based on 
the lack of enforcement of the 1998 Water Act, despite it being regarded as technically 
sound, with a solid base for sustainable and efficient utilisation of water resources (Section 
2.2.7.7). This is because vital sections of the act have not been fully enforced; hence, its 
founding principles could not be supported. For example, the Water Fund has collected 
insufficient revenue adequately to support statutory functions.  
 
As such, mechanisms should be put in place to allow for the water law provisions to be 
enforced so that its objectives of effectively managing irrigation water resources are 
achieved. In the theory of economics of institutions and economic growth, Matthews 
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(1986) argued that institutions need continual adaptation in the face of changing 
environment of technology and taste to promote economic growth. In light of this, the 
irrigation water law should thus consider the radical changes in the water sector, 
particularly the emergence of new irrigation farmers of the land reform programmes and 
thus align it to the needs and conditions of these new farmers.      
 
For the water law to be an effective irrigation water management institution, its relationship 
with other economic laws is crucial. Farmers were asked, on a scale of 0 – 10, their 
perceptional judgment on the nature of relationship between the irrigation water law and 
other laws they know.  
 
The results depict a mean value of 4.341. The mean value is below the average ideal 
situation and inclined towards the worst situation, suggesting a situation where farmers are 
of the opinion that the irrigation water law does not have a favourable relationship with 
other economic laws. Lack of a workable relationship between the water law and other 
laws, e.g. environmental law, energy laws implies poor coordination, hence, can lead to 
poor irrigation water development and management.  
 
Water law provisions that will promote private sector participation in irrigation water 
resources development and management, by default, will promote efficient irrigation water 
management. The advantage of participation by the private sector would be the facility in 
identifying appropriate institutional measures for effectively attending to a number of 
resource management needs: arresting free-rider behaviour among the members, 
mobilising the needed financial and labour resources, imposing sanctions on individual 
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members for resource degradation, providing incentives for resource saving, interacting 
with the government and other individuals and organizations such as suppliers, 
contractors and purchasers of produce, and developing and implementing group decisions 
for equitable resource distribution and environmental protection. Farmers were asked on 
whether the irrigation water law had some provisions of promoting private sector 
participation, based on a scale of 0 – 10.  
 
The mean value of 5.266 inclined towards the ideal situation, implying farmers have 
indicated a fair existence of water law provisions that cater for private sector participation. 
This could be explained by the fact that water reforms (Section 2.2.7) introduced radical 
changes regarding the participation and representation of water users in the management 
of and decision making on water. The 1998 Water Act provided a legal basis for the 
representation and participation of previously excluded water users, namely communal, 
resettlement and small-scale commercial farmers. This inclusiveness and participation has 
encouraged local level participation in water management at sub-catchment council levels. 
This creates a conducive environment where private sector participation would result in 
sustainable irrigation water development and management activities. 
 
6.2 Policy variables 
 
Effective management of agricultural water requires continuous back-up policies and 
institutional frameworks (FAO, 2008). As such, farmers were asked their perceptional 
judgements on policy variables to evaluate irrigation water policy as an institution of 
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managing irrigation water resources. The descriptive results of policy variables are shown 
in Table 6.2 below.  
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Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics: perceptional-based policy institutional and performance variables 
Source: survey data (October, 2012)
Irrigation water policy variables Acronyms Type of data Mean values Standard 
Deviation 
Range 
Min Max 
Project selection criterion is economic- 
orientated 
 
PPSC Dummy 0.214 0.428 0 1 
 
Pay for use of irrigation water 
 
PUIW Dummy  0.384 
 
0.413 
 
0 1 
 
Form in which irrigation water is paid for 
 
PFIP Dummy 1.361 0.381 0 2 
Policies favourable for promoting private 
sector participation 
 
PGPP Scale 3.148 3.861 0 10 
Extensiveness of private sector 
participation in irrigation water 
management 
PEPP Scale 3.266 2.184 0 10 
Organised into Water Users’ 
Associations (WUAs) 
 
PWUA Dummy 0.318 0.426 0 1 
Extensiveness of Water Users 
Association ‘participation in irrigation 
water management 
PEWA Scale 2.048 0.176 0 10 
Policies favourable for users’ 
participation in irrigation water 
management 
PGUP Scale 3.648 2.481 0 10 
Effect of other policies like fiscal, 
economic policies in irrigation water 
management 
PEOP Scale 6.516 2.662 0 10 
Water policy links well with water law 
 
PWPL Scale 2.018 0.748 0 10 
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The results in Table 6.2 depict the perceptional-based policy variables descriptive 
statistics. A water policy that clearly defines project selection criteria can promote efficient 
irrigation management, especially if the objectives of the irrigation are clear. In a case 
where project selection is economic-oriented, then it is most likely that it encourages 
efficient irrigation water management. Economic-oriented projects seek to meet economic 
growth and development objectives, and usually are monitored and implemented under 
supervision. Such a scenario presents a case where irrigation water management is 
promoted. Farmers were probed their opinion on whether project selection was economic-
oriented, and the variable was treated as a dummy, where 1 = yes and 0 = otherwise.  
 
A mean value of 0.214 is inclined towards the worst situation, implying that farmers were 
mostly of the opinion that project selection was not or was less economic-orientated. This 
was also noted by Utete (2003), where challenges existed in prioritisation of the 
development of water/irrigation projects according to well defined criteria. Utete (2003) 
further notes the challenges in carrying-out proper assessments of irrigation investments 
and projects, including their financial feasibility, without ignoring social and political 
objectives.  
 
On the other hand, inappropriate conventional budgeting technique, which has ignored the 
smallholder irrigation sector’s unique history (Rukuni, 1993), could also explain why 
irrigation project selection is not economic-oriented. A situation of this nature negatively 
affects irrigation water management as irrigation schemes that are implemented without 
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expected objectives may lack supervision and effective monitoring mechanisms, hence, 
poor irrigation water management.   
 
An irrigation water policy that clearly defines how and why users should pay for irrigation 
water will promote and encourage sustainable irrigation water management. On one hand, 
if irrigation water users are aware that they are supposed to pay for use of irrigation water, 
they will ensure they use irrigation water in an efficient way. On the other hand, the money 
that is paid by the water users will ensure that repairs, operation and maintenance of 
dilapidated irrigation water equipment are carried-out. Generally, there is a belief that the 
purpose of paying for water use is to ensure sustainability of services, water conservation 
and mitigation of damages (Gorriz et al., 1995). Whether farmers pay for irrigation water or 
otherwise was treated as a dummy variable, where 1 = yes and 0 = otherwise.  
 
The results analysed show a mean value of 0.384, which is skewed towards the worst 
situation representing less commitment or non-payment of user fees for irrigation water. 
Even the creation of the Water Fund (Section 2.2.7.3) embedded in the 1998 Water Act 
with the objectives of collecting levies, fees, government contributions and any other 
support towards water service provision did not help as inflows have been minimal. 
Unease ensured, which resulted in many farmers not paying for their permits as they were 
uncertain as to their continuing occupancy on their land with respect to the new land 
reforms. Similarly, new users were reluctant to pay for water use as water rights had not 
been paid for previously. This has left little money to support water service provision and 
such contributes to poor irrigation water management as repairs and maintenance 
activities are not attended to. 
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These results could also be explained by the challenges that Utete (2003) noted, after the 
FTLRP of inculcating a culture of paying for commercial use of water by water users. 
Moreover, most farmers also stopped paying for irrigation water after their farms were 
invaded during the FTLRP (Kujinga, 2002). In addition, most farmers in Zimbabwe have 
refused to pay for water use, arguing that water is a natural resource that comes from 
“God”, and even if they pay, the revenue is not re-invested back into their schemes. 
Machingambi & Manzungu (2002), in their study, state that most farmers have considered 
water as a free good; hence, they do not pay for it.  
 
Similarly, Samad (2005) also reports that many governments have moved away from 
imposing the full costs upon water users of irrigation for political reasons because farmers 
resist charges. In support of the political role in water payments, Abu-Zeid (2001) 
highlighted that in many parts of the world, charging users for irrigation water services is a 
sensitive issue and water beneficiaries believe that low or zero charges are justified and 
this belief is usually justified in their political system. Such could also be the situation from 
the Zimbabwean point of view. This suggests that efficient water irrigation management 
objectives could be jeopardised. As such, the irrigation water policy could be an effective 
tool of managing water resources if it clearly specifies and promotes user-pay principles.  
 
However, it is also important to note that even though farmers pay for use of irrigation 
water, the form in which they pay for water use is also crucial. Farmers who indicated they 
pay for irrigation water were probed on the format in which they pay, based on the 
following dummies; 0 = fully subsidy payment; 1 = partial recovery or 2 = full-cost 
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recovery. The base, 0 was taken to represent a situation where farmers do not pay any 
fees, while 1 and 2 represent a situation where farmers pay for water use at different 
scales (partial or full cost recovery) 
 
A mean value of 1.361 was depicted, which is inclined towards payment based on partial 
recovery. The results could be emanating from marked political interference in pricing of 
water (Section 2.2.7.9), where politicians, in a bid to retain popularity, aimed to keep the 
price of water as low as possible. Politicians frustrated the implementation of the pricing 
policy, which cannot afford to subsidise water service provision to maintain standards in 
good water service.  However, while this could be the case, the most important fact is that 
farmers have to pay for use of irrigation water based on that water is treated as an 
economic good, as such, it has to have a price attached to it irrespective of the format in 
which farmers pay for irrigation water. Even if the users pay for irrigation water, the 
challenge, as Utete (2003) notes, also lie on ensuring that (part of) the water revenue is 
invested in water development and management so as to improve and make the irrigation 
water policy an effective tool in irrigation water management.  
 
Private participation in irrigation water resources development and management can 
contribute to effective and efficient water management. However, this is highly achieved if 
the environment and conditions are favourable for private sector participation. In this light, 
a policy that clearly defines conditions that promote private sector irrigation water 
development and management is almost bound to be an effective institution in managing 
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water resources. Farmers were asked based on their perceptional judgement (on a scale 
of 0 – 10), whether the policy promotes private sector participation.  
 
The analysed results depicted a mean value of 3.148, inclined towards the worst situation, 
suggesting that farmers feel the water policy does not fully provide for private sector 
participation. As noted by the Utete (2003), after the FTLRP, challenges prevailed in 
determining respective roles of private and public sector in irrigation. The existing gap in 
various roles played by the private and public sector negatively affects irrigation water 
management objectives. As such, the policy should have policies oriented towards private 
sector participation and also delineate the roles played by the private and public sectors in 
irrigation water management.   
 
In addition to the above, even if the water policy conditions allow for private sector 
participation, the extent to which the policy allows private sector participation is crucial. 
Based on a scale of 0 – 10, farmers were asked the extent to which private sector 
participates in activities related to irrigation water management. The results yielded a 
mean value of 3.266. Such a distribution suggests that farmers are of the opinion that 
although private sector participates in irrigation water management, the extent of 
participation is low. As such, the irrigation water policy should ensure that it also provide 
clauses on how they make private sector visible in irrigation water management related 
issue thus making it an effective tool in managing water resources.  
 
User groups, for example, Water Users Associations (WUAs) can play a crucial role in the 
management of irrigation water resources. This is based on the fact that these user groups 
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can act and implement activities on behalf of the formal rules and the informal rules at 
grass roots levels. In addition, manageable user groups within the irrigation communities 
helps not only in bringing about capacity building measures, but also in developing 
capability for collective action through effective participation.  
 
Local informal groups are often amorphous, temporary, and difficult to appreciate by 
outsiders and they do not have written constitutions, registration numbers and vocal 
committees (Sokile & van Koppen, 2004). However, daily resource use interactions are 
widely determined by these relations. On the other hand, formal associations are often 
rigid, isolated, and difficult to enter into or, once in, to withdraw from. As a result, many 
water users choose the informal routes to address their resource use challenges. Local 
informal associations are influential, powerful and attractive to the local communities 
(Sokile & van Koppen, 2004). Moreover, most people feel stronger senses of identity and 
belongingness than in the formal WUAs. Hence, a policy that clearly supports and 
encourages organisation of users into local groups/associations can become an efficient 
and effective tool in water management related issues. The variable on whether farmers 
were organised into user groups was treated as dummy variable, 1 = yes and 0 = 
otherwise.  
 
The results yielded a mean value of 0.318. Such a pattern suggests that fewer farmers 
were organised into user groups since the mean value is inclined towards 0, which 
represents non-organisation into user groups. The results could be based on lack of 
knowledge on water reforms (Section 2.2.7), especially for new users who may not know 
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the parameters within which they should participate and as such, fail to make informed 
decisions on water management processes. In addition, as explained in the earlier 
discussion in Section 2.2.7, identification and classification of water user groups from 
which representatives are elected to the sub-catchment council was a problem, in spite of 
what the 1998 Water Act provided for. A good example is where the act provided for 
inclusion of ‘communal farmers’ as a disparate group of water users, yet, even the local 
level water committees barely function and most are formed around ground water 
resources that barely get recognition at catchment council meetings.  
 
Further to the above, in cases where communal areas have irrigation schemes, Irrigation 
Management Committees (IMCs) represent them at catchment level. However, these do 
not extend beyond the irrigation schemes which they are established for, rather, they 
seem to represent the interests and concerns of a particular irrigation scheme to which 
they belong. 
 
In light of this, it is important that an irrigation water policy should clearly state the 
conditions that encourage and promote organisation of farmers into effective and 
recognised user groups. In addition, genuine participation in water management also 
occurs when water users and their representatives are informed and knowledgeable about 
the water reforms, especially with new water users who have little knowledge about the 
water reforms and policies that set the parameters for their participation.  
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However, a good example where farmers have organised themselves, as has been 
discussed in Section 2.2.6, is where A2 irrigation farmers in the Middle Sabi formed the 
Middle Save Farmers’ Syndicate to represent their broad political, land and water 
interests. In this syndicate, political links and water issues were channelled through local 
structures until their grievances reached the Minister of Water. If users can follow such an 
example, where they would air their grievances through an official and local user group, 
issues that have to do with irrigation water would be of much help, hence, can lead to 
sustainable irrigation water management.   
 
In a situation where farmers have organised themselves into user groups, the extent to 
which they participate and administer irrigation water management becomes crucial. 
Hence, a water policy that ensures extensive participation of WUAs can become an 
effective tool that can efficiently and effectively manage irrigation water resources. 
Farmers were asked the extent of WUAs participation in irrigation development based on 
perceptional judgment on a scale of 0 – 10.  
 
An analysis on the extent to which the WUAs participate in irrigation water management 
revealed a mean value of 2.048. The trend suggests farmers are of the opinion that WUAs 
are not extensively participating in irrigation water management issues. This could be 
based on the fact that some of the farmers are new to the irrigation sector because of the 
FTLRP of 2000, which ushered in new cadres in the irrigation sector, who were more 
interested in consolidating their claim to the new properties than in attending water 
management meetings (Section 2.2.7.2). Poor WUAs participation in irrigation water 
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management leads to, for example, poor administration at scheme level, thus jeopardising 
irrigation water management objectives.    
 
However, it is important to note that even if farmers organise themselves into WUAs, they 
can only be effective and extensive if policies are favourable for users’ participation in 
irrigation water management. Effective user participation leads to an adjustment in the 
existing power relationships both within and outside the community. Participation brings 
about empowerment of the users, enabling them to take their own decisions in an agreed 
framework of rules. A policy that addresses user participation increases its capacity to 
manage irrigation water management. As such, farmers were asked, based on a scale of 0 
– 10, their judgmental perception on the provisions of government policies in the policy 
that are favourable for users’ participation.  
 
The results depict an average of 3.648, suggesting that farmers are of the opinion that the 
water policy does not clearly provide for users’ participation in irrigation water 
management, thus compromising irrigation water management objectives. The results 
concur to Tafesse (2003) who argues that government policies on, for example, land 
tenure and water allocation do not create conducive environment for successful operation 
of irrigation schemes by farmers. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 2.2.7, the 1998 
Water Act provided for participation and representation of water users. However, this has 
been fraught with problems. For example, participation at sub-catchment level has often 
been stacked against new water users who lack financial resources to travel and attend 
sub-catchment council meetings. In addition,   
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There are other policies that complement the irrigation water policy in the management of 
irrigation water resources development and management, for example, fiscal and other 
economic policies. In light of this, the farmers were asked whether the other policies have 
an effect on the way irrigation water resources are managed. The probe was based on a 
judgemental perception, on a scale of 0 – 10 and the results yielded a mean value of 
6.516. Such a trend suggests that farmers are of the opinion that other policies that relate 
to irrigation water resources have an impact on the irrigation water policy as an irrigation 
water management tool. As such, the water policy should clearly define how other policies 
are related to with regards to how water management objectives should be focused.  
 
The relationship between the irrigation water policy and the water law cannot be 
underestimated. For example, there are laws that can define how private sector should be 
aligned, yet if the water policies in place do not accommodate private sector participation, 
it can lead to poor private sector participation, thus jeopardising how irrigation water is 
managed. Secondly, conflict-solving provisions can come as laws, but there is need for 
policy provisions on how to implement these provisions to solve the water conflicts 
effectively.  
 
With regards to the above, farmers were probed on whether the irrigation water policy links 
well with the water law. Their perceptional judgement, based on scale of 0 – 10, depicted a 
mean value of 2.018. Such an inference could be based on the fact that after the FTLRP, 
no water law and/or policy reforms were put in place to address the needs of the new 
farmers introduced by the FTLRP. In this light, it is therefore important that the irrigation 
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water policy should link well with the irrigation water law, so that the two can work together 
in the management of irrigation water resources.    
 
6.3 Administration variables 
 
Water administration at scheme level should be treated as part of the rules of the game 
rather than as part of the players since it is concerned with implementing the legal and 
policy provisions at ground level. Some of these facets include conflict resolution, water 
rights, accountability, cost recovery mechanisms, project selection to mention a few.  
 
In this regard, respondents were probed on irrigation water administration and the 
descriptive statistics are as presented in Table 6.3 below. 
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Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics: perceptional-based administration institutional and performance variables 
Source: survey data (2012) 
Irrigation water administration 
variables 
Acronyms Type of data Mean values Standard 
Deviation 
Range 
Min Max 
Capacity of the administration of 
irrigation water at scheme level 
 
ACIW Scale 6.162 2.242 0 10 
Effectiveness of user groups or 
WUAs in administration of irrigation 
water 
 
AEWA Scale 4.733 2.149 0 10 
Private sector participation reduces 
burden on irrigation water 
administration and management 
APPA Scale  5.147 1.240 0 10 
Mechanisms of collecting updates 
and do maintenance of irrigation 
water at scheme level 
AMUM Dummy 0.234 0.108 0 1 
Adequacy, relevance and reliability 
of water data in irrigation water 
management at scheme level 
AARR Scale 3.624 2.813 0 10 
Capacity to effectively administer 
irrigation water through use of the 
irrigation water law and policy 
ACLP Scale  3.162 2.198 0 10 
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Capacity to manage irrigation water resources management is a function of many factors, 
including the irrigation water law and water policy and the informal societal institutions. It 
can also be in form of water user groups’ capacity, like WUAs to manage irrigation water. 
As such, farmers were asked if they feel there was capacity for the administration of 
irrigation water at scheme level. This was based on the perceptional judgement on a scale 
of 0 – 10. The results revealed an average of 6.162, suggesting that most farmers were of 
the opinion that capacity to administer irrigation water management at scheme level 
existed in form of users’ associations, constitutions among other issues.  
 
However, what is important is whether such capacity is made use of, rather than just lying 
idle. In light of this, effective and efficient water management at scheme level can be 
achieved. Administrative issues should therefore ensure that administrative capacity of 
irrigation water is promoted and encouraged at scheme level, through the water law and 
water policies, taking into consideration the informal rules that users formulate for 
themselves on grassroots level.  
 
In line with the above, capacity to manage water resources at scheme level also depends 
on how effective such capacity is. Farmers were asked their judgemental perception, on a 
scale of 0 – 10, how effective were the user groups or WUAs in irrigation water 
management to achieve efficient water management.  
 
A mean value of 4.733 implies that farmers were of the opinion that water users groups or 
WUAs were fairly effective in managing water resources at scheme level. The results 
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concur to a study by Checkel & Alamirew (2007) that showed the overall performance of 
the WUAs in terms of managing the schemes was very poor and the WUAs did not have 
the capacity to enforce its by-laws. Similarly, a study by Shimels (2006) revealed that 
irrigation schemes were poorly managed in terms of water allocation and distribution and 
conflict management due to a lack of well-established organisational and institutional 
conditions. The WUAs were not well organised and found to be weak to run irrigation 
schemes due to lack of social relations.  
 
In addition, as noted by Manzungu (1999), Irrigation Management Committees (IMCs) 
formed in 1983 to improve coordination between irrigators and water management but 
have not been able to take over the management of schemes because of state-applied 
technical measures. Furthermore, water management was also located in various 
ministries, hence, duplicating efforts that presented problems of responsibilities and 
coordination. This could have resulted in ineffectiveness of user groups to manage water 
resources.  
 
However, such effectiveness can be achieved if supported by administrative issues that 
accommodate water user groups. Private sector participation in the administration of 
irrigation water resources can significantly contribute to irrigation water management. For 
example, private sector, like Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) can be actively 
involved in irrigation planning, development and management of water resources, in their 
bid to improve achieve economic development in communities. As such, they can employ 
their own staff to effectively monitor and supervise some of these initiatives and assist 
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water users to manage water resources efficiently. In light of this, it can reduce the burden 
of water administration and management, either on users themselves or the government 
at large. Thus, it was important to seek farmers’ opinion on the participation of the private 
sector in water administration and management, on a scale of 0 – 10. 
 
The results showed a mean value of 5.147, inclined towards the ideal situation of 10. The 
distribution suggests that users were of the opinion that private sector participation 
reduces burden on irrigation water development. However, what is important to note is the 
fact that private participation can only be active and visible in a conducive environment 
and protected with the relevant irrigation water laws. Failure to achieve such conditions 
may result in poor private sector participation; hence, its effect on reducing the burden on 
irrigation water management may not be significant. As such, water administration has to 
ensure active participation of private sector in irrigation water resources, thereby creating 
an active role for the private sector players and assist in reducing the burden on irrigation 
water management. 
 
When irrigation systems dilapidate, it can significantly lead to poor irrigation water 
management, for example, through water loss in case of burst pipes. As such, constant 
and regular monitoring of irrigation systems to ensure they are functioning well. In light of 
this, it is therefore important for irrigation schemes to have own mechanisms of collecting 
irrigation water updates and doing maintenance of irrigation water. It was thus important to 
probe the farmers on whether they have such mechanisms scheme level. The variable 
was treated as a dummy, with 0 = yes and 0 otherwise.  
 189 
 
The results of such analysis revealed a mean value of 0.234, skewed towards 0 
(otherwise), suggesting that most farmers indicated that they did not have or have little of 
such updates and maintenance mechanisms at scheme level. Such a trend negatively 
impacts on irrigation water resources management some irrigation systems may dilapidate 
further if gone unnoticed. In addition, users may not be able to ensure an efficient water 
management system at scheme level due to lack of updates on how they will be using 
irrigation water. As such, water administration can become an    effective water resources 
management institution if it is favourable for updates and maintenance of irrigation 
systems.  
 
While existence of water updates and maintenance data is existent at scheme level, if it is 
not adequate, relevant and reliable, then it can jeopardise the objectives of efficient water 
resources management. Hence, in light of this, farmers who revealed they had such 
mechanisms in place were probed on whether such water updates and maintenance data 
were adequate, relevant and reliable. The probe was based on a perceptional judgement 
on a scale of 0 – 10.  
 
The results indicated a mean value of 3.624, inclined towards the worst situation. Such a 
distribution suggests that farmers were of the opinion that the water updates and 
maintenance data were not adequate, relevant and reliable. In light of this, water 
administrators may not be able to know what intervention mechanisms or strategies are to 
be implemented in cases of need. In addition, funds may be used for purposes which they 
are not meant for due to lack of reliable and adequate data. Again, some users may be left 
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in the cold when it comes to interventions as data on the table may be irrelevant, thus 
negatively affecting irrigation water resources management. 
 
Overall, farmers were asked their perceptional judgement on the capacity of water 
administration to effectively manage irrigation water resources through use of the irrigation 
water law and policy. Their judgement was based on a scale of 0 – 10. A mean value of 
3.162 suggests a situation where farmers were of the opinion that the irrigation water 
administration had inadequate or capacity to manage irrigation water in conjunction with 
the irrigation water law and water policy. Such a pattern adversely affects irrigation water 
management objectives if the formal institutions do not complement each other with 
regards to irrigation water resources development and management. In light of this, it is 
therefore crucial to ensure that issues that overlap into any of the informal institutions 
under study (irrigation water law, policy and administration) are structured in such a way 
that they effectively complement each other to manage irrigation water resources.  
 
6.4 Informal Water Management Institutions 
 
The evolution of institutions and their performance implications are affected strongly by 
their path-dependency24 nature. Because of their path-dependent characteristics, 
institutions are the ‘carriers of history,’ reproducing themselves well beyond the time of 
their usefulness (David, 1994; Coriat & Dosi, 1998). The idea of institutional change as a 
                                                          
24
 Path dependency means that history does matter: the direction and scope of institutional change cannot be divorced 
from its early course or past history. 
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process of ‘cumulative causation’ (Veblen, 1919) suggests not only path dependence, but 
also the linkages among institutions in a temporal sense. 
 
Since informal institutions play an important role in the incremental way in which 
institutions evolve, they remain a major source of path dependence (North, 1990). In 
addition to informal institutions, there are such self-reinforcing mechanisms as network 
externalities, learning effects, and the historically derived subjective modelling of issues. 
Since all these mechanisms reinforce the current course of the development path, 
reversing the course of that path becomes extremely difficult or costly (North, 1990). This 
is also reiterated in the utility of social theory to address human problems (North, 2005b), 
and is concerned with explaining how to improve economic performance, and hence 
welfare, by comprehending human incentives, preferences, perceptions, beliefs and 
learning (North, 2004), especially in this study, irrigation water sector.    
 
Informal institutions change more slowly than formal institutions. As a result, there is 
always tension between altered formal rules and persisting informal rules (North 1990). 
Informal water markets in many parts of the world lack formal water laws and policies 
(Easter et, al 1998). It is therefore important to evaluate informal irrigation water 
management institutions in managing water resources and the nature of relationship with 
the formal institutions. The objective of such an evaluation is to attempt to uncover how 
the two types of institutions can work to efficiently and effectively manage irrigation water 
resources. 
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Respondents were probed on the level of organisation at scheme level. Their responses 
were analysed and presented as shown in the Table 6.4 below. 
 193 
 
Table 6.4: Descriptive statistics: perceptional-based informal irrigation water institutions and performance variables 
Source: survey data (October, 2012)
Informal irrigation water institutions variables Acronyms Type of data Mean values Standard 
Deviation 
Range 
Min Max 
Clearly defined boundaries to withdraw irrigation 
water from Common Pool Resources (CPRs) ICPR Dummy  0.314 0.238 0 1 
Existing appropriation rules related to the local 
conditions with regards to irrigation water 
management 
IARL Dummy  0.421 0.162 0 1 
Mechanisms, e.g. constitutions to assist in irrigation 
water management at scheme level IMSL Dummy  0.204 0.191 0 1 
Effectiveness of management mechanisms in the 
management of irrigation water resources  IEMM Scale  4.184 3.005 0 10 
Effectiveness of monitoring conditions and the 
behaviour of appropriators at scheme level IEMA Scale 3.881 2.748 0 10 
Existence of regulation sanctions at scheme level 
for users who fail to act accordingly IERS Dummy 0.508 0.263 0 1 
Existence of rapid access to conflict solving in the 
low-cost, local setting with regards to irrigation water 
management 
IECS Dummy 0.381 0.024 0 1 
Users challenging the rights of appropriators to 
create own local-based institutions suited to own 
local set-up 
ICRA Dummy  0.215 0.138 0 1 
Extent of challenge of the rights of appropriators to 
create own institution based on diverse local set-ups IECA Scale  3.587 2.782 0 10 
Effectiveness of informal institutions to influence the 
irrigation water law, policy and administration IOEI Scale  4.499 1.033 0 10 
 194 
 
CPR studies show that effective institutional arrangements for managing resource 
dilemmas vary depending on physical and community conditions (Lam, 1998). Effective 
institutional arrangements may diverge across settings, yet CPR studies have identified 
some general principles of long-enduring, self-governed CPR institutions. According to 
(Ostrom, 1990 & 1998), the first design principle associated with sustainable CPR 
governance institutions is the establishment of clearly delineated boundaries around the 
resource and resource users. Moreover, CPR theory’s boundary principle implies that 
institutions whose boundaries are congruent with the scale of the physical boundaries of a 
CPR are more likely to be successful and sustainable (Ostrom, 1990).  
 
With regards to clearly defined boundaries to withdraw water from Common Pool 
Resources (CPRs), a mean value of 0.314 was revealed and is skewed towards the worst 
situation where clear boundaries did not exist. As noted by Ostrom (1990), lack of clear 
boundaries of the CPR and closing it to ‘outsiders’, local appropriators face the risk that 
any benefits they produce by their efforts will be reaped by others who have not 
contributed to those efforts. However, Dalhuisen et al. (2000) argues that there is a finite 
amount of water that must be shared in common over a variety of uses and over 
geographic areas, based on the fact that water falls in the form of rain, flows and 
evaporates with no regard to any boundary. In addition, some CPR studies have identified 
general principles of long-enduring, self-governed CPR institutions by establishment of 
clearly delineated boundaries around the resource and resource users (Ostrom, 1990, 
1998).  It is therefore important that informal institutions be structured in a way that will 
ensure CPRs users coordinate their actions to solve supply and demand dilemmas 
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(Ingram et al., 1984; Lam, 1998; Lord, 1984; Ostrom, 1990). However, (Ostrom, 1990, 
1998, 1999) highlights that CPRs exhibit varying degrees of two key characteristics, one of 
which is the difficulty in excluding users, as such; it will be difficult to exclude other users 
from accessing water resources, thus leading to free-riding problems or insufficient 
maintenance of water resources. Nonetheless, there should be effective conditions in 
place to ensure that water, as a CPR is effectively managed through the use of informal 
rules.  
 
Local rules are participatory in operation; all users in the area must normally consent to 
the rules. They are also self-regulatory in the sense that there are low or no extra costs, so 
no external resources are needed to enforce and monitor them (Sokile & van Koppen, 
2004). In some cases, local rights could also be sensitive to the vulnerable, e.g. widows 
and the poor. Customary local practices and structures can also contain or help avoid 
conflict. Farmers were probed whether local appropriation rules related to local set-up 
existed. The variable was based treated as a dummy variable, where 1 = yes and 0 = 
otherwise.  
 
The results depicted a mean value of 0.421, skewed towards the worst situation where 
farmers indicated a lack of such- or fewer local rules. Such a trend could also be based on 
the fact that the irrigation sector was overwhelmed by new ‘cadres’ in the form of mainly 
A1s, A2 and other categories of the FTLRP of 2000 in Zimbabwe. Lack of local rules 
based on local conditions can result in users wasting irrigation water as there are no 
mechanisms that control, govern and regulate how they use water at local level. At the 
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same time, violations of rules and water use may go unnoticed and unpunished. Existence 
of informal rules based on local condition means that if the informal codes are violated, 
punishment may be enforced (North, 1990). 
 
On the other hand however, Ostrom (2007) also warns on viewing any particular 
institutional arrangement as a panacea for solving natural resources (especially CPRs) 
problems due to heterogeneity and complexity of problems facing different resources, 
hence, the need for local-based institutions specially crafted for a given community set-up 
in managing irrigation water. The rules and regulations in use by a local community 
determine who has access to the common pool resources (CPR), what resource units 
authorised participants can use, at what times and who will monitor and enforce the rules 
(Ostrom 1999). This promotes and encourages efficient and sustainable irrigation water 
management. 
 
Regulation and governing mechanisms, e.g. constitutions at scheme level can assist in the 
management of irrigation water resources through certain rules that users have to follow at 
their irrigation systems. The variable on whether management mechanisms were existent 
was treated as a dummy variable, where 1 = yes and 0 = otherwise.  
 
The results showed a mean value of 0.204, skewed towards a situation where farmers 
indicate a lack of management mechanisms. The results concur to a study by 
Vandersypen et al. (2006) in Mali who found out that often, there was no consensus on 
rules among farmers and monitoring and management mechanisms were absent. The 
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trend could also be explained with regards to new farmers who ventured into irrigation 
sector during the FTLRP, where they may not have been aware of the need to create 
informal management mechanisms in their new set-ups. Lack of such mechanisms 
suggests a case where users may fail to achieve irrigation water management objectives 
as they do not have proper management strategies. In light of this, it is thus important to 
note and understand the need for informal management mechanisms at scheme levels to 
allow proper irrigation water management.  
 
At the irrigation schemes where informal management mechanisms existed, it is important 
to also note their effectiveness to ensure efficient management of water resources at 
scheme level. Based on perceptional judgement, on a scale of 0 – 10, farmers were asked 
to offer their opinion on the effectiveness of these institutions.  
 
The mean value of 4.184 was revealed, suggesting that most farmers were of the opinion 
that these mechanisms were fairly not effective. Such a pattern could be based on the 
FTLRP which ushered in ‘new cadres’ into the irrigation sector who may not be aware of 
the mechanisms behind irrigation water use and what principles to follow. It could also be 
explained by the lack of users organising themselves into user groups, where they would 
then put, in black and white, principles and rules that should be followed and how 
defaulters will be punished if ever they exist. In light of this, it is important to make users 
aware of the need of implementing effective irrigation water management mechanisms for 
efficient water management.  
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Effectiveness of management mechanisms is a factor of many variables, e.g. 
effectiveness of monitoring conditions and the behaviour of appropriators, regulation 
sanctions, among other variables. A probe, based on perceptional judgement on a scale of 
0 – 10 on the effectiveness of monitoring, conditions and the behaviour of appropriators 
revealed a mean value of 3.881. This trend suggests that most farmers were of the opinion 
that the monitoring conditions and behaviour of appropriators were not effective enough to 
manage the irrigation water management. Such a trend could also explain why, as noted 
in the previous paragraph, the informal management mechanisms were not effective in 
managing water resources. Therefore, there is need to ensure the effective monitoring 
conditions and the behaviours of the appropriators to ensure all users behave accordingly 
and promote sustainable water management.  
 
Existence of regulation sanctions to manage irrigation water resources can be an effective 
mechanism of irrigation water management. Such regulation mechanisms can be applied 
on users who default and fail to behave accordingly. Such a scenario can assist in 
achieving the irrigation water management objectives. In light of this, farmers were asked 
if regulation sanctions existed at scheme level, and the variable was treated as a dummy 
variable.  
 
The results revealed a mean value of 0.508, slightly skewed towards the ideal situation. 
This suggests that most farmers indicated a fair existence of regulation sanctions at 
scheme level. However, it is also important to note that the existence of regulation 
sanctions does not imply effective irrigation water management, unless they are effective. 
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As such, it is therefore important to ensure that users create regulation sanctions that suit 
their conditions and also ensure these sanctions are effective enough to deal with 
irrigation water management issues.  
 
In addition to existence of regulation sanctions, rapid access mechanisms to conflict 
solving without following long procedures or protocols can be an effective tool in the 
management of irrigation water resources. Thus, farmers were probed if such rapid 
conflict-solving mechanisms exist at scheme level. The variable was treated as a dummy, 
where 1 = yes and 0 = otherwise.  
 
A mean value of 0.381 implies that most farmers indicated that rapid conflict conflict-
solving mechanisms did not exist at scheme level. Lack of rapid conflict-solving 
mechanisms in a low-cost and local setting could have an adverse effect as far as 
irrigation water management is concerned. This encourages local users to bypass 
traditional mechanisms in hope of achieving a winner-takes-all decision (Sokile & van 
Koppen, 2004). However, formal courts seem to have tendencies to overturn informal 
court decisions, in turn, may exacerbate conflict at local level rather than resolve it. In 
addition, these channels maybe costly and users may not be able to afford the expensive 
and lengthy procedures to solve conflicts, as such, may leave some of the conflicts 
unsolved and this negatively impacts on irrigation water management objectives. As such, 
it is thus crucial to structure rapid conflict-solving mechanisms in the low-cost, local setting 
with regards to irrigation water management.  
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It is also important to understand that users need to create their own set of rules that 
governs how they behave and what principles they should follow with regards to 
management of water resources. As such, empowering users in formulating their own, 
localised set of rules is crucial in managing water resources as farmers will have 
confidence in their own rules and as such, their implementation may be effective enough 
to ensure users behave accordingly. In addition, informal rules also differ from community 
to community, hence, the need of local, low-cost set of rules for water users.  
 
In light of the above, farmers were probed on whether users are in a position to come out 
and challenge the rights of the appropriators to create their own, local-based set of rules. 
Ability to challenges these rights was represented by 1 and 0 for otherwise. A mean value 
of 0.215 was revealed. Such a distribution is skewed towards the worst situation; implying 
farmers revealed that users were not in a position to challenge the issue of creating their 
own set of rules to govern water management. This is supported by North (1993), who 
notes that institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient, 
rather, they, or at least formal rules, are created to serve interests of those with bargaining 
power to create new rules. As such, farmers should therefore be able to challenge the 
rights if the appropriators and create their own rules that are of low-cost and locally-based. 
This is supported by Sharma (2012) who reiterates the development and creation of 
institutions or rules as an aid to creating more socially acceptable (and so economically 
acceptable) outcomes. North (1993) further notes the creation of institutions that so 
structure the rules and their enforcement as to alter pay-offs to induce the cooperative 
solutions.    
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Failure to create own rules also mean that farmers may not have an option but to go for 
the more expensive rules as they do not have the ability to challenge a set of rules in 
favour of their own rules. According to the transaction cost theory, the functioning of 
institutions depends on the costliness of enforcement (North 1990). Such a trend may 
result in farmers lacking confidence in the available appropriator rules and as such, may 
lead to using water resources wastefully as there will not be effective mechanisms that 
they believe in to manage irrigation water. 
 
While ability to challenge the rights of appropriators to create own institution based on 
local set-ups exists, its effectiveness depends on the extent of challenge. The farmers who 
had revealed that they had the ability to challenge the appropriators’ right to create their 
own set of local rules were further probed on the extent of the challenge. The perceptional 
judgement was based on a scale of 0 – 10.   
 
The results revealed a mean value of 3.587, skewed towards the worst situation. Such a 
trend implies that farmers were of the opinion that extent of challenging the appropriators’ 
rights was low. This suggests that farmers were weak in challenging the rights of 
appropriators. As such, it would thus be difficult for the farmers to create their own 
effective set of rapid, low cost and locally-based informal institutions to assist in the 
management of irrigation water resources. In this regard, it is therefore crucial that users 
be empowered in creating their own set of rules, especially if they could organise 
themselves into user groups. As user groups, they are able to at least sit down and 
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formulate own official informal set of rules based on their physical, social and local set-
ups.  
 
Overall, what is important is whether the informal institutions described above are effective 
enough to influence the formal irrigation institutions (irrigation water law, policy and 
administration) in the management of irrigation water resources. If the informal institutions 
can influence how the formal institutions work, it can lead to efficient irrigation water 
resources management. For example, informal irrigation institutions work effectively if it is 
accommodated within the formal irrigation institutions. Even if the formal irrigation 
institutions come in to manage water resources, it is important that farmers still have their 
own set of rules which determine how they behave and how they accept a given situation. 
In other words, formal rules may fail in a given set-up if it does not accommodate the 
informal rules in that given set-up. In light of this, the informal rules thus play a bigger role 
in influencing how formal rules are used to manage irrigation water resources.  
 
In light of the above, the study sought farmers’ perceptional judgement (on a scale of 0 – 
10) on the effectiveness of informal institutions to influence the formal institutions. The 
results depicted a mean value of 4.499, inclined towards the worst situation. This implies 
that farmers were of the opinion that the informal institutions were not effective enough to 
influence how the formal institutions manage irrigation water management. While this is 
the case, it is important to understand that for the formal institutions to work, they draw 
heavily from the informal institution. 
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Given the relationship between the informal and formal rules as explained in the 
paragraph above, lack of coherence between the two set of rules would lead poor 
irrigation water resources development and management. A good example is where the 
formal rules present a set of procedures/protocol to follow in solving, say, conflicts, but this 
can only be effective if they also take into cognisant that farmers also have their own set of 
rules that guides and control how they behave. In addition, farmers also emanate from 
diverse social communities where a set of rules vary, as such, the formal rules structures 
should thus consider such discrepancies to achieve irrigation water management 
objectives.     
 
6.5  Conclusion 
6.5.1  Formal institutions  
 
The preliminary findings have revealed that the formal institutions (water law, policy and 
administration) have not been effective in the management of irrigation water resources. 
This could be explained by the history of Zimbabwe where there were discrepancies and 
colonial injustices in the water sector. Further to this, the state seems to be using the 
same principles of water management that have been used in the past and were not 
aligned to the new system that prevailed in the independent Zimbabwe. Notably, the state 
has embarked on the land reform programmes which have ushered in new farmers in the 
irrigation sector. As such, the water management institutions have not been aligned to this 
new dispensation, which could have resulted in ineffective water management institutions.   
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6.5.2  Informal institutions 
 
Despite their importance in the management of irrigation water resources, the informal 
rules have also been found to be ineffective in the management of irrigation water 
resources. This is revealed by most responses as highlighted by the farmers, as some of 
the regulation mechanisms at scheme level were non-existent. This could be based on the 
fact that most of the respondents were drawn from a pool of ‘new farmers’ who benefited 
mainly from the FTLRP and lacked some of these mechanisms that governed the use of 
irrigation water resources. Furthermore, failure to acknowledge the importance of informal 
rules in the management of water resources could also have resulted in ineffective water 
management institutions.  However, it is important to acknowledge the crucial role that 
informal institutions play in the management of water resources.  
 
The next chapter focuses on the nature of relationship between the water institutions and 
their variables and how significant these variables affect the effectiveness of water 
management institutions in governing the use of irrigation water. 
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CHAPTER 7 – RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
7.0 Introduction 
 
According to Merrey et al., (2007), a series of institutional arrangements have been 
presented as panaceas to improve water management: strong government agencies, user 
organisations, and water markets. Seemingly, some of these approaches have failed to 
live up to expectations, largely because the variability of local situations and the difficulty 
of transplanting institutions from one context to another. As such, this study also analysed 
how significant some of these arrangements are with regards to irrigation water 
management.  
 
This chapter therefore presents the regression results of the study to ascertain the nature 
of relationship between the irrigation water institutions and their constituent variables. In 
this study, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is a single equation presenting the 
conventional conception of institution-performance interactions by postulating irrigation 
water management as a simple and direct function of a set of 33 variables representing 
the formal (irrigation water law, policy, and administration) and the informal institutional 
aspects.  
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7.1 Empirical analysis results 
 
The relative statistical significance of the estimated coefficients of the variables is 
evaluated based on their regression coefficients at the 1%, 5% and 10%. The R2 
evaluates the explanatory power of the OLS equations and ranges between 0 (no fit) and 
1 (perfect fit). However, the problems of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation may have 
arisen; in which case, the Breusch-Pagan test statistic was used, having a Chi-square (2) 
distribution. Table 7.1 shows the empirical results giving the adjusted R2 values to explain 
the variation in explanatory variables. The results of the Breusch-Pagan test show whether 
the model captures the institution-performance linkages fits the data well and whether 
there is consistency with empirical reality.  
 
The regression results for the study are as depicted in Table 7.1 below; 
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Table 7.1: Empirical analysis results on the nature of institution–performance linkages  
Source: survey data (October, 2012) 
*Significant at 1%  **Significant at 5%   ***Significant at 10% 
Dependent  
Variable 
Independent / explanatory variables Acronyms   Range 
Coefficient t-ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IRRIGATION WATER 
LAW 
 
(LIWL) 
Access to water rights             
 
LAWR 0.151** 2.177 
Format of water rights 
                                                             
LFWR 0.083*** 1.843 
Existence of irrigation water law 
                                                                        
LEWL 0.728* 2.683 
Provisions effective for solving conflicts among irrigation water users 
                   
LCRM 0.475*** 1.617 
Water law relevant for users under current and future situation 
 
LRCF -0.069 -1.189 
Water law relationship with other laws to promote water management 
 
LLOL 0.418 1.238 
Water law provisions to promote private sector participation      
 
LSPS 0.208* 3.491 
Constant  
 
 1.641* 3.019 
R2 
 
0.681 
Chi-square (2) 
 
76.521 
Breusch-Pagan 
 
63.147 
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Table 7.1: continued 
Source: survey data (October, 2012) 
*Significant at 1%  **Significant at 5%   ***Significant at 10% 
 
Dependent  
Variable 
Independent / explanatory variables Acronyms   Range 
Coefficient t-ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IRRIGATION WATER 
POLICY 
 
(PIWP) 
Project selection criterion is economic orientated         
 
PPSC 0.098*** 1.653 
Pay for use of irrigation water                                   
 
PUIW -0.079*** -1.683 
Form in which irrigation water is paid for                                               
 
PFIP 0.237 1.107 
Provisions for promoting private sector participation             
 
PGPP 0.091*** 1.714 
Extensiveness of private sector participation in irrigation        
 
PEPP 0.087 0.839 
Organised into Water Users ‘Associations (WUAs)             
 
PWUA 0.657* 3.218 
Extensiveness of WUAs ‘participation in irrigation water management 
                                                                                          
PEWA -0.181*** -1.650 
Provisions favourable for users’ participation in irrigation        
 
PGUP 0.128** 2.052 
Effect of other policies like fiscal policies in water management   
 
PEOP -0.121*** -1.645 
Water policy links well with water law                       
 
PWPL 0.201* 3.631 
Constant  
 
 0.918** 2.241 
R2 
 
0.702 
Chi-square (2) 
 
78.023 
Breusch-Pagan 
 
64.818 
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Table 7.1: continued 
Source: survey data (October, 2012) 
*Significant at 1%  **Significant at 5%   ***Significant at 10% 
Dependent  
Variable 
Independent / explanatory variables Acronyms   Range 
Coefficient t-ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
IRRIGATION WATER 
ADMINISTRATION 
 
(AIWA) 
Capacity of the administration of irrigation water at scheme level 
 
ACIW 1.106* 3.886 
Effectiveness of user groups / WUAs in irrigation water administration  
 
AEWA -0.063*** -1.741 
Private sector participation reduces water management burden  
 
APPA -0.077 -0.806 
Mechanisms of collecting updates and carry-out maintenance works  
 
AMUM 0.093 0.904 
Adequacy, relevant and reliability of water  
 
AARR 0.043 0.998 
Capacity to effectively administer irrigation water w.r.t law and policy ACLP -0.012 -0.363 
Constant 
 
 1.248** 2.064 
R2 
 
0.791 
Chi-square (2) 
 
73.947 
Breusch-Pagan 
 
67.184 
I t / l t r  ri l  Acronyms   Range 
Coefficient t-ratio 
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Table 7.1: continued 
 
 
 
Dependent  
Variable 
Independent / explanatory variables Acronyms   Range 
Coefficient t-ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INFORMAL IRRIGATION 
WATER INSTITUTIONS 
 
(IFWI) 
Clearly defined boundaries to withdraw irrigation water from CPRs 
 
ICPR 0.167 0.388 
Existing appropriation rules related to the local conditions 
 
IARL 0.186** 2.238 
Mechanisms, e.g. constitutions to assist in water management 
 
IMSL 0.783** 2.724 
Effectiveness of management mechanisms in water management  
 
IEMM 0.319* 4.543 
Effectiveness of monitoring, conditions & behaviour of appropriators 
  
IEMA -0.163*** -1.656 
Existence of regulation sanctions at scheme level  
 
IERS 0.689* 4.891 
Existence of rapid access to conflict-solving in a low-cost, local setting 
  
IECS 1.418* 2.860 
Users against rights of appropriators to create local-based institutions 
  
ICRA 0.278 1.019 
Effectiveness of users against rights of appropriators  
 
IECA 0.181 1.033 
Effectiveness of informal institutions on law, policy & administration 
 
IOEI 0.127 1.203 
Constant 
 
 1.613** 2.186 
R2 
 
0.817 
Chi-square (2) 
 
76.377 
Breusch-Pagan 
 
69.691 
Source: survey data (October., 2012) 
*Significant at 1%                       **Significant at 5%             ***Significant at 10%      
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Table 7.1 continued:  
Source: survey data (October, 2012) 
*Significant at 1%                       **Significant at 5%             ***Significant at 10%       
  
 
 
Dependent  
Variable 
Independent / explanatory variables Acronyms   Range 
Coefficient t-ratio 
 
INFORMAL IRRIGATION 
WATER INSTITUTIONS 
(IFWI) 
Irrigation water law 
 
LIWL 0.173*** 1.677 
Irrigation water policy 
 
PIWP 0.314* 4.612 
Irrigation water administration 
 
AIWA 0.279** 2.160 
Constant 
 
1.781* 3.985 
R2 
 
0.768 
Chi-square (2) 
 
91.231 
Breusch-Pagan 
 
73.453 
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7.2 Formal institutions 
7.2.1 Legal variables 
 
Five variables were found to be significant, 2 at the 1% level, 1 at the 5% level and 2 at 
the 10% level. The effectiveness of the water law to manage irrigation water significantly 
depends on its ability to address the issue of water rights. A positive regression coefficient 
of 0.151 at the 5% significance level suggests that access to irrigation water rights 
significantly strengthen the irrigation water law in the management of water resources. 
This also implies that an increase by one unit point results in a 0.151 increase the 
effectiveness of the water law to manage irrigation water resources. Demsetz (1967) and 
Coase (1960) argue that private property rights is the most efficient system of land use 
and the same argument can be borrowed for water use and management. Similarly, North 
& Thomas (1977) support such an inference by arguing that property rights provide 
incentives to encourage development and cultivation.  
 
However, it is also crucial to note that the format of water rights also strengthen the 
effectiveness of the water law to manage irrigation water resources. This is explained by 
the positive relationship between the water law and the format of water rights with a 
regression coefficient of 0.083 at the 10% significance level. A one unit increase in the 
explanatory variable leads to a 0.083 increase in the effectiveness of the water law to 
ensure efficient management of water resources.  Unclear/scattered or lack of format 
rights, for example, may result in the water law failing to effectively manage irrigation water 
resources as it increases risks and transaction costs (Coase, 1960). Lack of clear water 
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rights or scattered water rights do not instil a sense of ownership to farmers, a 
demotivating factor; hence, it is a disincentive for farmers to participate in effective 
agricultural water management.  
 
In his critique of instrumental rationality to further support the importance of institutions, 
Engle et al., (2007) argued that the human mind fails to deliberately and analytically 
process all available information to choose an action that maximises utility. It simply relies 
on routines, rules and roles when deciding what to do in a given situation. In light of this, 
knowledge of the existence of the water law amongst farmers is crucial. The study 
revealed that knowledge of the existence of the water law positively and significantly 
strengthens the effectiveness of the irrigation water law as indicated by the regression 
coefficient of 0.728 at the 1% significance level. The results suggest that if the explanatory 
variable is increased by one unit, there is a proportional increase by 0.728 in the 
effectiveness of the water law to manage irrigation water resources. This implies that if 
people are made aware of the irrigation water law and how it assists in the management of 
irrigation water resources, it increases the capacity of the water law to effectively manage 
water resources.  Lack of knowledge implies individuals have incomplete information and 
limited capacity to process information (North, 1993), thus it is necessary to educate 
farmers about the water law. This also implies unruly farmers are aware of the legal 
consequences and punishments for inefficient use of water resources.  
 
In addition, the water law also lays down the principles that govern irrigation water use, as 
such, farmers will opt to avoid punishments by behaving according to the laid down 
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principles. Hence, it is important for farmers to be aware of the principles that regulate the 
use of irrigation water through educating them on the water law and its relevance to their 
given setting. Farmers will also know the protocols they should follow to solve any 
conflicts. Based on the knowledge of the water law, farmers may also choose an 
alternative that maximises their personal preferences and make decisions that lead to 
efficient outcomes (Eggertsson, 1990; Williamson, 2008a) 
 
The research findings have revealed that if the water law provide for conflict-solving, this 
positively and significantly strengthen the effectiveness of the water law in the 
management of water resources. This is explained by a regression coefficient of 0.475 at 
the 10% significance level, suggesting that a one point increase in the explanatory 
variable will result in a 0.475 increase in the effectiveness of the water law in managing 
irrigation water resources through conflict-solving provisions. Effective conflict-solving 
provisions within the water law will ensure that certain protocols are followed without any 
bias towards the parts concerned. As such, if they are effectively implemented, it can lead 
to effective irrigation water law.  
 
Private sector participation in the irrigation sector can have an effect on how water 
resources are managed. As such, a water law that favourably provide for private sector 
participation can effectively manage water resources. A positive relationship, with a 
regression coefficient of 0.208 at the 1% significance level implies that provisions for 
private sector participation significantly strengthen the irrigation water law.  A one point 
increase in the explanatory variable leads to a 0.208 increase in the effectiveness of the 
 215 
 
water law to manage water resources. Clearly defined provisions that allow private sector 
to effectively participate agricultural water resources development and management can 
lead to effective water management, based on the fact that some private sector players 
may offer specialised services in irrigation water management, for example, some are 
better placed when it comes to water resources planning, development, management, 
funding, training etc. As such, if the water law provides for private sector participation, it 
becomes an effective institution in managing agricultural water. 
 
7.2.2 Policy variables 
 
Lack of enabling policies and effective institutional frameworks are major contributors 
towards poor management and utilisation of irrigation water (Namara et al., 2010). This 
section therefore presents an analysis of some policy issues that are used in irrigation 
water management and their overall influence on the performance of the irrigation water 
policy to manage irrigation water.  
 
The study findings revealed that the irrigation water policy is positively related to the 
criteria on how irrigation projects are selected (regression coefficient of 0.098 at the 10% 
significance level).  The results imply that a one unit point increase in the explanatory 
variable leads to a 0.098 increase in the effectiveness of the water policy to manage 
irrigation water resources. This suggests that project selection criterion significantly 
strengthens the effectiveness of the water policy to manage irrigation water resources. For 
example, if the irrigation water policy clearly defines selection of projects based on 
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economic growth and development objectives, the water policy will become an efficient 
and effective water management institution. This could emanate from the fact that once 
irrigation development projects become economic-oriented, efficient methods of allocating 
scarce resources, in this case, water, under market conditions comes into effect.  
 
The results of this study revealed a negative relationship between the effectiveness of the 
irrigation water policy and users paying for irrigation water, as shown by regression 
coefficient of -0.079 at the 10% significance level. The results suggest that if an 
explanatory variable is increased by one unit point, it will lead to a decrease in the 
effectiveness of the water policy to manage irrigation water resources. The implication in 
this case is that if the irrigation water policy has clearly specified clauses on users pay 
principles, then it can significantly lead to effective irrigation water management. This is 
because users may not be able to skip the payments as doing this may lead to disciplinary 
actions as specified by the irrigation water policy and water law.  
 
The negative relationship revealed between the effectiveness of irrigation water policy and 
payment of water use could be explained by the fact that the most farmers are not paying 
for irrigation water use as has been discussed in the previous chapter. This implies that 
while a significant relationship exists between the two variables, failure of farmers to pay 
for water use negatively affects the effectiveness of the irrigation water policy to manage 
agricultural water, hence, may lead to poor irrigation water management.  
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There is a positive relationship between the effectiveness of the irrigation water policy and 
availability of provisions promoting private sector participation within a water policy as 
revealed by a regression coefficient of 0.091 at the 10% significance level. The 
effectiveness of the water policy to manage irrigation water resources by promoting private 
sector participation increases by 0.091 if there is an increase by one unit point in the 
explanatory variable. The implication is that if a water policy clearly defines and favours 
private sector participation in water resources development and management, it increases 
its effectiveness in managing agricultural water. Unfavourable provisions may discourage 
private sector participation and in the long, may potentially lead to ineffectiveness of the 
water law to manage water resources due to loss of, for example, expertise in specific 
fields.  
 
Organisation of farmers into Water User Associations (WUAs) positively and significantly 
strengthens the effectiveness of the irrigation water policy to manage irrigation water. This 
has been revealed by a regression coefficient of 0.657 at the 1% significance level. 
Increasing an explanatory variable by one unit point leads to an increase in the 
effectiveness of the water policy to manage water resources by 0.657 if farmers organise 
themselves into groups. If farmers organise themselves into WUAs, there is a high 
possibility that they can will be efficient and effective irrigation water management. As 
such, favourable clauses within the irrigation water policy promoting and supporting users 
to organise themselves into users groups will go a longer way in sustaining efficient 
irrigation water use. WUAs may have to enforce the use of restricted rules and regulations.  
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In addition to the above, it is important to note that if the WUAs do not extensively 
participate in irrigation water management; this may derail the objectives of achieving 
effective irrigation water management. The empirical results of the study showed a 
negative relationship (regression coefficient of -0.181 at the 10% significance level) 
between the effectiveness of the water policy and the extent to which WUAs participate in 
agricultural water management.  Lack of provisions for effective participation of WUAs in 
the management of water resources will reduce the effectiveness of the water policy to 
manage water resources by 0.181 given a one unit point increase in the explanatory 
variable. The existing significant relationship implies that if the water policy allows for 
extensive WUAs participation, it can be an effective water management institution in 
agricultural water management. As such, the policy should take into cognisant the WUAs 
operations and activities at irrigation schemes and promote and support their existence as 
this can significantly lead to sustained irrigation water management.  
 
The negative relationship revealed in this research study could imply that the WUAs have 
not been extensive in irrigation water management. If the irrigation water policy promotes 
organisation of the farmers into user groups and/or WUAs, and allows for extensive 
participation of the users, it can effectively lead to sustained irrigation water management. 
 
However, it is important to note that if the water policy is not supportive of the users’ 
participation; this may lead to inefficient use and management of irrigation water 
resources. A positive regression coefficient of 0.128 at the 5% significance level implies 
that provisions that favour users’ participation gives birth to an effective irrigation water 
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policy that will ensure efficient and sustained agricultural water management. Increasing 
an explanatory variable by one unit point will lead to a 0.128 increase in the effectiveness 
of the water policy to manage irrigation water, given that water policy supports users’ 
participation in the management of water resources. In light of this, an effective water 
policy should thus define conditions which will favour and promote users’ participation in 
water resources management.   
 
Other economic policies related to irrigation water resources development and 
management, e.g. fiscal policies, can significantly contribute to effective irrigation water 
management. However, the results of this study revealed a negative and significant 
relationship between the irrigation water policy and its relationship with other economic 
policies (regression coefficient of -0.121 at the 10% significance level). A negative 
relationship between the irrigation water policy and related economic policies reduces the 
effectiveness of the water policy to manage irrigation water resources by 0.121 if an 
explanatory variable is increased by one unit point. This implies that if the other polices do 
not support and do not work in conjunction with other policies; agricultural water will be 
ineffectively managed. The negative relationship depicted could imply that the other 
economic policies are not supportive of the- and do not work hand-in-hand with the 
irrigation water policy. Such a relationship leads to an ineffective water policy as a water 
management institution and as such, the irrigation water policy should clearly define its 
relationship with other economic policies and how they can be structured and networked to 
work together to promote effective water resources management.   
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The linkage between the irrigation water- policy and law revealed a positive and significant 
regression coefficient of 0.201 at the 1% significance level. Increasing an explanatory 
variable by one unit point increases the effectiveness of the water policy by 0.201 to 
manage irrigation water resources if the irrigation water law and policy work in harmony. 
This suggests that if the water law relates well to the water policy, it will lead to an effective 
irrigation water policy that will ensure efficient and sustained water resources 
management. This implies that water management issues addressed in the irrigation water 
policy should accommodate the relevant water management issues included in the water 
law and vice-versa is true.  
 
7.2.3 Administration variables 
 
Administration of water involves implementing issues addressed in the irrigation water law 
and policy at ground level. As such, it is thus important to analyse and describe the 
relationship between irrigation water administration and the explanatory variables within 
water administration.  
 
There is a positive relationship between overall irrigation water administration and 
administration capacity at scheme level as revealed by a significant regression coefficient 
of 1.106 at the 1% significance level. A one unit point increase in the explanatory variable 
increases water administration institution’s capacity to manage irrigation water by 1.106. 
Such a relationship means that if administration capacity exists at irrigation schemes, this 
strengthens overall irrigation water administration as a water management institution. This 
 221 
 
implies that for water administration to be effective at scheme level administration capacity 
should be addressed in administration related issues. This can include capacitating 
farmers with administration roles, e.g. promoting organisation of farmers WUAs at scheme 
level.   
 
The empirical results of this study revealed a negative relationship between overall 
irrigation water administration and the effectiveness of user groups or WUAs in the 
administration of irrigation water. A significant regression coefficient of -0.063 was 
revealed at the 10% significance level. If the irrigation water administration institution does 
not allow for effective user/WUAs administration, its effectiveness decreases by 0.063 
given a one point increase in the explanatory variable. This therefore implies that for water 
administration to be an effective institution in managing irrigation water resources, 
conditions and administration issues should promote effectiveness of users to manage 
water resources. For example, the WUAs can formulate farm plans for the area, market 
local produce and distribute farm inputs, formulate rules for the maintenance of irrigation 
infrastructure, devise procedures for the distribution of water, and impose and collect 
irrigation fees (Samad 2002). A negative relationship observed could imply that currently, 
water users are not effective enough in the management of water resources. In light of 
this, it is thus important to lay down conditions and provisions that will promote user 
groups or WUAs to effectively administer agricultural water resources, particularly at 
scheme level. 
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7.3 Informal water institutions variables 
  
Informal irrigation water institution can be an effective irrigation water management tool 
provided local appropriation rules related to local conditions exist. Runge (1986) argues 
that people will cooperate for their common good without provision of external (state) 
coercion. In light of this, a positive regression coefficient of 0.186 at the 5% level was 
revealed between the effectiveness of informal irrigation institution and the existence of 
localised appropriation rules. The results imply that an increase in the explanatory variable 
by one unit point increases the effectiveness of the informal institution in managing water 
resources through formulating local rules accustomed to the local conditions. Such a 
positive and significant relationship suggests that creating local rules that are locally-based 
makes informal irrigation institution effective in the management of agricultural water at 
scheme level. Nabli & Nugent (1989) argues that institutions contain an element of 
predictability as institutionalised rules and norms hold a certain level of stability.  
 
In addition, as institutions change, societies adjust themselves accordingly to adapt to the 
changes (Shah et al., 2000; Williams, 1999) thus maintaining stability at scheme level. 
Localised appropriation rules ensure that users behave according to locally defined rules 
and regulations, failure of which punishments will be executed upon the offenders as may 
be defined by the rules. 
  
However, it is important to note that if these appropriation rules or conditions are not 
monitored effectively, this may derail the objective of the informal rules to manage water 
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resources effectively. This has been revealed by a significant regression coefficient of -
0.163 at the 10% significance level. A one unit point increase in the explanatory variable 
results in a decrease by 0.163 in the effectiveness of the informal institutions in managing 
irrigation water if the local rules are not monitored effectively. This implies that the informal 
institutions become effective water management institution if the created local rules are 
effectively monitored. Effective rules encourage members to co-operate towards a group 
strategy because they provide certainty about expected actions of others (Runge, 1981 & 
1986). However, a negative relationship could imply that effective monitoring of 
appropriation rules at scheme level was non-existent, and this trend negatively affects the 
effectiveness of informal rules to manage agricultural water resources. In this regard, it is 
therefore crucial to monitor the rules that farmers create to govern and regulate irrigation 
water use.  
 
Some mechanisms like constitutions, for example, can be effective tools of implementing 
localised appropriation rules and effectively monitoring them. In light of this, the analysed 
empirical results revealed a positive regression coefficient 0.783 at the 5% level. The 
relationship depicted in the results imply that if there is an increase in the explanatory 
variable by one point, it leads to a 0.783 increase in the effectiveness of the informal 
institutions in managing irrigation water through constitutions that ensure localised rules 
are implemented. The significant relationship depicted also implies that the informal rules 
become effective tools in water resources management if regulation mechanisms are 
existent at scheme level. If such management mechanisms are created and related to 
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local conditions, then users will behave accordingly, thus promotes the effectiveness of 
informal rules to manage water resources.  
 
However, if the management mechanisms are not effective in managing water resources, 
this can derail efforts to use informal irrigation institutions to manage water resources. 
Effectiveness of management mechanisms positively and significantly strengthens the 
effectiveness of formal rules in managing agricultural water resources. This has been 
revealed by a regression coefficient of 0.319 at the 1% significance level. This relationship 
imply that if an explanatory variable is increased by one unit point, the effectiveness of the 
informal institutions in managing water resources increases by 0.319, given that 
management mechanisms are effective in assisting in the management of water 
resources. The results suggest that the more effective the management mechanism, the 
more effective the informal rules become in the management of irrigation water resources. 
Therefore, it is crucial to ensure that the management mechanisms that are created have 
conditions that ensure their effectiveness, thus making informal rules effective in managing 
agricultural water resources.   
 
Effectiveness of management mechanisms can be defined by existence of regulation 
sanctions at scheme level, as these become a basis for dealing with users who may fail to 
behave according to the rules as defined by the management mechanisms. A positive and 
significant relationship has been revealed between effectiveness of informal irrigation 
institutions and existence of regulation sanctions at scheme level, as shown by a 
regression coefficient of 0.689 at the 1% level. Existence of regulation sanctions increases 
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the effectiveness of the informal institutions to manage irrigation water by 0.689 given a 
one unit point increase in the explanatory variable. The implication being that existence of 
regulation sanctions ensures informal rules become an effective and efficient tool in 
managing water resources. 
 
The capacity to rapidly solve conflicts in a local setting, at low costs at scheme level 
means that informal rules can become an effective institution in managing irrigation water 
resources. Existence of rapid access to conflict-solving in a low-cost and local setting 
positively and significantly strengthens the effectiveness of formal rules to manage 
agricultural water resources. This has been revealed by a regression coefficient of 1.418 
at the 1% significance level. Capacity to solve conflicts in local setting ensure a 1.148 
increase in the effectiveness of the informal water institutions in managing irrigation water, 
given a one unit point increase in the explanatory variable. This implies that farmers may 
simply solve their conflicts at scheme level than attempting to follow the formal channels to 
courts, which may take long to solve such conflicts.  In this regard, it is therefore important 
to promote rapid conflict-solving at schemes to effectively manage agricultural water 
resources through informal rules.   
 
7.4 Informal institutions versus formal institutions 
 
Informal and formal institutions are closely linked and greatly depend on each other. 
However, the informal institutions have remained largely independent of formal irrigation 
water institutions and operated at the periphery of the formal institutions. Several studies 
 226 
 
have acknowledged the fact that informal local level institutions can make a difference in 
water management (Bruns & Meinzen-Dick, 2000; Bruns & Meinzen-Dick, 2003; Maganga, 
2003; Mwakaje & Sokoni, 2003; Shah et al., 2001; Sokile et al., 2003; Van Koppen, 2003). 
 
It is therefore important to note that analysing the relationship between the informal 
institutions and the formal institutions in irrigation water management can provide valuable 
insights for designing holistic institutional mechanisms needed for filling the vacuum 
existing at grass-root level of irrigation water management.  
 
In light of the above, the nature of the relationship between each facet of the formal 
institutions (law, policy and administration) was analysed against the informal rules. This 
was to clearly evaluate the nature of relationship that exists between the informal rules 
and the formal rules.  
 
The irrigation water law positively and significantly strengthens the effectiveness of the 
informal rules to manage agricultural water resources as revealed by a regression 
coefficient of 0.173 at the 10% significance level. Embedding water law provisions within 
the informal institutions increases the effectiveness of the informal institutions in managing 
irrigation water resources by 0.173; given a one unit point increase the explanatory 
variable. This implies that the farmers may make use of clauses that are embedded within 
the water law to regulate and govern the use of irrigation water resources. For example, 
farmers may adopt the principles on which water rights are allocated to farmers, and from 
such, they can create their own rules that are aligned to such principles. In light of this, 
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favourable formal rules created at the top should also consider and accommodate the 
strength of informal rules formulated at the ground level. This means that the informal 
rules can become effective tools in managing irrigation water resources; provided the 
formal institutions take into cognisant the existence of social rules that govern the 
behaviour of users at scheme level. For example, the water law may formulate a set of 
rules for users who fail to abide by the given laws, yet at ground level, users have their 
own mechanisms and rules that they may want to use to punish irritant users. As such, 
formal rules should be formulated in a way that they work together with the informal rules.  
 
The irrigation water policy variable has been found to positively and significantly 
strengthen the effectiveness of the informal rules to manage the water resources. This has 
been revealed by a regression coefficient of 0.314 at the 1% level. A one unit point 
increase in the explanatory variable increases the effectiveness of the informal institutions 
in managing water resources by 0.314 if the water policy takes into cognisant the local 
conditions under which users operate. Such an inference suggests the water policy 
formulated to manage irrigation water resources should also accommodate the informal 
rules, for example, policies that may promote and empower organisation into WUAs or 
user groups (as they can formulate own localised rules that govern their activities) to 
ensure they effectively participate in the management of irrigation water resources. In 
addition, it is important to take note that policies are mainly made and implemented for 
humans, and their success depends on the behaviour of the same humans, who have 
their own beliefs, norms and rules that govern their behaviour. Thus, in as much as 
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irrigation water management is concerned, such a consideration needs to be taken on 
board. 
 
Lastly, but not least are the formal rules that administer irrigation water management. 
While administration of water management involves implementing the irrigation water- law 
and policy at ground level, and given that positive and significant relationships have been 
depicted between water law and policy, the relationship between the informal rules and 
water administration thus should not be underestimated.  
 
The same analysis has also depicted a positive and significant relationship between the 
irrigation water administration and the effectiveness of informal rules, based on a 
regression coefficient of 1.781 at the 5% level. A one unit point increase in overall 
administration of water resources leads to an increase by 1.781 in the effectiveness of the 
informal institutions to manage irrigation water resources if capacity to administer the 
management of irrigation water through informal rules is promoted.  This implies that the 
informal rules become effective in managing water resources if they work in conjunction 
with overall administration of agricultural water, especially given that administration of 
water resources happens on the ground level, where social rules may be highly dominant.  
This suggests that in as much as the formal administration rules try to manage irrigation 
water resources, there are also informal rules at the ground level that will overall govern 
and determine how users manage their own irrigation water resources in their given local 
setting. A case in point is where formal rules may implement administration rules that may 
benefit users who are not inhabitants of a given community, yet the users of such a 
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community may have their own rules that exclude them. In light of this, the research 
findings can confirm the need for formal administration rules to incorporate a set of 
informal rules in a given local setting to effectively manage irrigation water resources.   
 
7.5 Conclusion  
7.5.1 Formal institutions 
 
Five out of the seven variables were found to be significant, 5 at the 10% level. The 
variables that were found to be positively significant at the 10% level included the 
following; access to water rights, format of water rights, aware of the existence of the 
water law, availability of provisions for solving conflicts among irrigation water users, water 
law provisions to promote private sector participation, water law provisions to promote 
private sector participation in irrigation water resources management. Given that the water 
law comes into play to implement issues that have been addressed in the water policy, it is 
therefore crucial for the water law to effectively consider effective implementation of these 
aspects, particularly addressing meeting needs of the new farmers so as to achieve 
efficient and sustainable agricultural water management.   
 
The explanatory variables that have been found to significantly impact on the water policy 
to manage agricultural water included the following; project selection criterion, paying for 
use of irrigation water, impact of policies for promoting private sector participation, 
organisation of farmers into WUAs, extent of WUAs participation, effect of other economic 
policies, e.g. fiscal policy on water policy and the linkage between the water policy and the 
 230 
 
water law. The water policy basically should provide a favourable environment that 
addresses the issues as discussed in this paragraph, and most importantly, should link 
and coordinate well with other socio-economic polices and socio-economic law to achieve 
and promote agricultural water management.   
 
The variables that have been found to have a significant relationship with water 
administration were only 2 and these included; administration capacity and effectiveness 
of user groups in irrigation water administration. Taking into consideration that most issues 
addressed in the water policy and water law are implemented at ground level through 
administration, it therefore implies that capacity to administer agricultural water should be 
encouraged in a conducive environment that will provide for all stakeholders to partake in 
activities related to agricultural water resources development and management.    
 
7.5.2  Informal water institutions 
 
Eight variables were found to have a significant influence on the informal institution as a 
tool for effective management of agricultural water and these included; existing local 
appropriation rules suited to local conditions, management mechanisms, e.g. constitutions, 
effectiveness of management mechanisms, effectiveness of monitoring conditions and the 
behaviour of appropriators, existence of regulation sanctions, existence of rapid access to 
conflict-solving, effectiveness of users to challenge the right of appropriators in creating 
own local rules and effectiveness of informal institutions to influence  the formal 
institutions. The above discussion therefore calls for amalgamation of the informal 
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institutions into formal institutions as the issues that have been found to significantly 
impact on informal institutions seem to be effective at ground level to manage agricultural 
water. As such, policy reforms are needed that will regard the role, importance and 
significance of the informal institutions in managing water resources.   
  
7.5.3  Informal institutions versus formal institutions 
 
The results have depicted positive and significant relationships between the informal 
institutions and the formal institutions with respect to the water law, water policy and water 
administration. This implies that the formal institutions draw heavily from the informal 
institutions for them to be effective in managing agricultural water, hence, they cannot be 
ignored.  
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CHAPTER 8 - CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the main conclusions of the research study. In addition, policy 
recommendations are also formulated. The main thrust of institutional change within the 
irrigation water sector is to enhance the capabilities and increase the readiness of 
policymakers to solve the current and future agricultural water resources challenges with 
regards to their development and management. Given this thrust, the major goals of 
institutional initiatives in the water sector are transparent and these may include:  
 
 Treating water as an economic good where prices are attached to use of irrigation 
water,  
 Inculcating the payment culture,  
 Promoting effective, sustainable decentralized decision structures. 
 
However, institutional reform of the magnitude required to achieve these goals is a 
daunting challenge in Zimbabwe, particularly with ineffective, irrelevant and poorly 
functioning irrigation water institutions. The issue of how to effect irrigation water 
institutional change within the constraints and opportunities of political economy continue 
to remain elusive to both researchers and policymakers as most irrigation farmers still 
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remain disadvantaged with regards to irrigation water resources development and 
management. 
 
The identification of a strategy for irrigation water institutional reform with minimum 
transaction costs and maximum political acceptability requires sharp understanding of the 
analytical and operational linkages among the components of irrigation water institutions 
and their ultimate impact on irrigation water sector performance.  
 
However, it is important to note that institutions typically change incrementally rather than 
in discontinuous fashion (North, 1990). Even if some quick change is anticipated by a new 
policy or law, it is fairly common that the society adopts it slowly. The main reason for this 
incremental change is that there are many institutional elements which are interconnected, 
and a change gets cushioned by many other established institutional elements. 
Nonetheless, the important issue that then lies for policy makers is to ensure some policy 
issues that are recommended are put on the table for consideration, especially in 
Zimbabwe where policy changes are imminent due to new users in the irrigation sector.  
 
8.1  Conclusions: Preliminary findings 
8.1.1  Formal institutions 
8.1.1.1 Legal institutions 
 
The results have indicated that most of the farmers do not have access to water rights, 
while most of the farmers who had access to the water rights had unclear/scattered water 
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rights. Most of the farmers have also acknowledged that they were not aware of the 
existence of the water law, yet those who were aware of its existence; they indicated lack 
of provisions for conflict-solving and does not provide for effective private sector 
participation. With regards to the relevancy of the water law for the current and future 
situations, the farmers were of the opinion that it was not relevant and the water law was 
not related to other economic laws, e.g. energy and environmental laws. 
 
8.1.1.2 Policy institutions 
 
Farmers indicated that when projects are selected for implementation, they are not 
economic-oriented. In addition, farmers do not pay user fees, while those who 
acknowledged that they pay user fees do so based on partial recovery. Farmers have also 
highlighted that the water policy did not provide a conducive environment for private sector 
participation and for those who participate; the extent of participation was low.  
 
With regards to the water policy promoting organisation of farmers into user groups/WUAs 
fewer farmers were however organised into user groups, yet the extent of user groups is 
limited. This is because of the water policy that does not have clear provisions for user 
participation, especially noting that most of these farmers are new in the irrigation sector. 
Other economic policies, e.g. the fiscal policy have been found to have an impact on the 
water policy with regards to irrigation water management. However, most farmers are of 
the opinion that the water policy does not relate well with the water law. This could be 
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explained by the launch of the FTLRP which calls for water law and policy reforms to cater 
for the new farmers who benefited from the FTLRP.      
 
8.1.1.3 Administration institutions 
 
Most of the farmers have indicated that capacity to manage water resources existed at 
irrigation schemes; however, the user groups/WUAs were not effective enough to 
administer water resources. While private sector participation can be of great importance 
to administration of agricultural water at scheme level through training programmes, 
funding, etc., however, the extent of private sector participation was low.  
 
Collecting and keeping update and maintenance water data can assist in directing 
resources where they are greatly needed with regards to irrigation water management. 
However, it has been revealed that most farmers do not keep update and maintenance 
water data. Where farmers collect and keep water data, most farmers indicated that this 
data was of no use as most of it was not adequate, relevant and reliable. Overall, the 
farmers were of the opinion that water administration did not have the capacity to manage 
water resources through use of the irrigation water law and policy. In simple terms, there is 
no linkage between water administration and the water law and policy. Lack of association 
between the water law and policy has implications on administration since implementation 
of the latter institutions at ground level is accomplished through administration, as such, if 
the two do not relate, then administration will fail.  
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8.1.2 Informal institutions 
 
Most of the farmers have indicated that there were no clear boundaries to withdraw water 
resources from the CPRs, and this has been also compounded with lack of local 
appropriation rules at scheme level to regulate activities related to agricultural water 
management. In addition to local rules, users may have management mechanisms, e.g. 
constitutions. In this study, most farmers have indicated a lack of some of these 
management mechanisms, and where they existed, they were said to be ineffective. 
Monitoring conditions and the behaviour of appropriators at scheme levels was not 
effective, probably owing to lack of effective management mechanisms and regulation 
sanction to control activities at irrigation schemes.  
 
With regards to rapid conflict-solving mechanisms, most farmers have highlighted that they 
were not existent at their schemes. The users did not have the ability to challenge the 
rights of the appropriators to create their own local rules suited to their local conditions, 
and for the few who are able to challenge the rights of the appropriators to create their 
own local rules, the extent to which they challenge is ineffective and limited. Lastly, most 
farmers have highlighted that the informal institutions did not influence the formal 
institutions in managing water resources maybe because of the fact that the informal 
institutions are ignored and neglected. They are not regarded as instruments for effective 
irrigation water management, hence the lack of influence of the informal institutions on 
formal institutions.   
 
 237 
 
8.2 Conclusion: Empirical analysis 
 
The empirical results provide us with ample insights into the relative role and significance 
of institutional aspects in determining the performance of irrigation water institutions. 
 
8.2.1  Formal institutions 
8.2.1.1 Legal institutions: Role and significance 
 
The 6 institutional constituent variables that have been found to significantly contribute to 
the effectiveness of the irrigation water law to manage irrigation water resources included;  
 Access to water rights 
 The format of the water rights 
 Awareness and knowledge of the water law and its provisions 
 Existence of effective provisions for solving conflicts among irrigation water users 
 Relationship of the water law with other economic laws that promote irrigation water 
management and 
  Water law provisions that promote private sector participation 
 
8.2.1.2 Policy institutions: Role and significance 
 
With regards to policy institutions, 8 institutional constituent variables that have been found 
to significantly contribute to the effectiveness of the irrigation water policy to manage 
irrigation water resources included;  
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 Project selection criterion being economic oriented 
 Paying for use of irrigation water 
 Favourable policies for promoting private sector participation 
 Organisation of farmers into Water Users Associations (WUAs) 
 The extent to which WUAs participate in irrigation water management 
 Favourable policies for users’ participation in irrigation water management 
 Impact of other policies, e.g. fiscal policies on the water policy 
 The linkages between the water policy and the water law 
 
8.2.1.3 Administration institutions: Role and significance  
 
Only 2 institutional constituent variables that have been found to significantly contribute to 
the effectiveness of the irrigation water administration to manage irrigation water 
resources included;  
 
 Capacity of the administration of irrigation water and 
 Effectiveness of user groups/WUAs in irrigation water administration  
 
8.2.2 Informal institutions: Role and significance 
 
The informal irrigation institutions have also been found to have a significant impact on the 
management of irrigation water resources. This has been evidenced by 8 explanatory 
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variables that have been found to significantly impact on the informal institutions to 
manage irrigation water resources. The significant variables included; 
 
 Existence of appropriation rules related to the local conditions 
 Availability of mechanisms, e.g. constitutions to assist in irrigation water 
management 
 Effectiveness of these mechanisms in irrigation water management 
 Effectiveness of monitoring conditions and the behaviour of appropriators 
 Existence of regulation sanctions at schemes 
 Existence of rapid access to conflict-solving in a low-cost, local setting 
 Effectiveness of users to challenge the rights of appropriators to formulate locally-
based institutions and 
 The influence of the informal institutions on the irrigation water law, policy and water 
administration.  
 
8.2.3 Informal institution versus formal institution: Role and significance 
 
Informal institutions have been found to have direct and significant relationship with the 
irrigation water law, water policy and water administration. The implication of such a 
relationship is that the way in which formal water institutions should attempt to 
accommodate the informal institutions so that they are effective in managing water 
resources.    
 
 240 
 
8.3 Policy recommendations and insights 
 
The following are policy recommendations and insights for policy-makers with regards to 
achieving sustainable irrigation water management. 
 
8.3.1 Irrigation water law  
 
This study contends that any attempt to reform the water sector with the view to improve 
productive uses of water in rural areas, must confront the historical legacy of inequalities 
of access to land and water, which has perpetuated under the FTLRP. One way of 
attaining this is to promote wide-scale participation of all stakeholders in the debate about 
the water reform, its principles and objectives over a long period of time. This will also 
entail seeking policy suggestions from all stakeholders, particularly the poor, on how water 
policy can be improved. Such an approach will break the stranglehold that government 
and donors have on the water policy-making process. 
 
In addition, issuance of water permits to water users where it applies will go along 
promoting sustainable and efficient use of irrigation water resources. Water rights also 
give farmers the sense of ownership and sense of belonging to water user groups and as 
such, would use water in a sustainable and efficient manner. In light of this, the irrigation 
water law should ensure it has clear provisions for the issuance of water rights, especially 
to deserving users.  
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The water law should define clearly the provisions that will promote private sector 
participation. Active private sector participation in irrigation water resources development 
and management can assist in introducing new technologies, technical support and 
extension services to water users and in training water users in irrigation water resources 
development and management.  
 
In general, existing property rights over water may not be the most appropriate from equity 
and efficiency perspectives. Any new water right should guarantee that the farmers get 
water of the desired quality and quantity at the required time. As the WUAs are 
strengthened, it is essential to revise the enabling framework and water rights systems 
including land rights in order to secure efficient and equitable water allocations. 
 
8.3.2 Irrigation water policy 
 
In the Zimbabwean context, this study suggests that the water reform must be linked, in 
innovative ways to the FTLRP, which was aimed at providing access to productive land to 
rural people for livelihood improvement. It is the combined access to productive land and 
water, that water can be productively used to alleviate poverty and contribute to economic 
growth. 
 
In the corollary of the above, it can also be stated that although access to fertile land is 
crucial to productive uses of water, new water users need access to a broad portfolio of 
other assets central to the productive use of water. These include, among many others, 
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functioning irrigation technology and infrastructure. A dilapidated irrigation infrastructure 
underlies a lack of access to water for irrigation. A post-crisis water reform policy may 
need to have a broad conceptualisation of access to water that covers technological 
problems affecting the smallholder irrigation sector, and new water users more generally. 
Accordingly, a new water policy should focus on various issues related to irrigation 
technology, such as the development, provision and maintenance of relevant low-cost 
irrigation technology to communal farmers. 
 
Local level institutions of irrigation water management must be dynamic and flexible 
enough to engage and incorporate ‘new’ institutions representing ‘new farmers’ but also 
robust enough to ensure that there is effective communication and debate on water 
issues. 
 
One major issue is the politicisation of access to, and management of water partly as a 
result of, the politics that surrounded the FTLRP. The dominant political narrative that 
accompanied the FTLRP had the attendant effect of overt politicisation of access to water, 
with local political organisations of, for example, A2 farmers using ‘new’ institutional routes 
of water management, by-passing decentralised institutions of water management 
(Section 2.2.6), thereby undermining the effective functioning of ZINWA, catchment and 
sub-catchment councils. Yet, on the other hand, and regardless of the adverse effects 
such politicisation had on water reforms, this may provide opportunities for holding 
decentralised institutions of irrigation water management accountable to water users, and 
for providing voice to water users, as well as aligning politics and the water policy. 
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The irrigation water policy should encourage and promote user groups for water users. For 
example, once farmers are organised into user groups, every beneficiary of irrigation water 
should be a member of a particular irrigation water user group, e.g. Water Users 
Associations (WUAs). This would imply that all users follow guidelines that are given within 
a user group, failure of which they will be punished according to set rules and/or 
procedures. This would lead to efficient irrigation water management.  
 
The water policy should provide greater local control of water charges at local level water 
development. Revenue raised could also be used in funding water development projects 
and repair and maintenance of irrigation infrastructure within communal irrigation 
schemes. Therefore, there is need for clear a policy that inculcates a culture of paying for 
commercial irrigation water and ensuring water revenue is re-invested in water resources 
development and management. In addition, the policy should ensure the establishment of 
a water pricing structure consistent with cost and social efficiency.  
 
8.3.3 Irrigation water administration 
 
The government should intervene to encourage, promote and strengthen Water User 
Associations (WUAs), e.g. formation of effective, farmer-defined WUAs, so that they can 
accomplish their mandates without difficulties or interferences and ensure they are 
capacitated to administer irrigation water. There is a need to strengthen WUAs so that 
they deal with not just water allocations but undertake the complex tasks of financial 
management and technical support to communities to ensure sustainable management of 
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irrigation resources. These capacities were weak in most WUAs, and governments need 
to improve skills and knowledge to enhancing local administrative, managerial, and 
financial capacities of participants. In addition to this, water administration issues should 
ensure promotion of farmer managed and operated systems as this instils a sense of 
ownership in managing their irrigation systems, so is water. In addition, the policy should 
cater for co-opting of new settlers in water management structures and processes to 
ensure their cooperation.    
 
The water legislation should provide for user pay principles to fund administrative and 
participatory functions. Moreover, there is also need of strengthening local water 
management where stakeholder and local participation is promoted and establishing 
effective institutional structure and strengthening new water institutions. 
 
Water administration issues should encourage better coordination between public-public 
and public-private sector bodies. In areas where there is little water development, 
government and other actors (e.g., private sector, NGOs and other development agencies) 
should be active in funding water development since there might be inadequate local 
revenue to fund such activities, and the functioning of decentralised institutions of water 
management. 
 
There is need for information dissemination campaigns where the importance of 
regularising water users is undertaken. 
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8.3.4 Informal institutions  
 
Interventions to strengthen the capacity of the informal systems in managing water 
resources should be formulated and implemented effectively. This is because the formal 
institutions draw heavily from the informal institutions if they are to effectively work. Some 
local arrangements such as one-to-one conflict resolution mechanisms are more efficient, 
more cost-effective, longer-lasting and more widely accepted among local water users 
than most top-down state-driven institutions. When considering formal state-based 
institutions, water users should not think that they are a panacea to all water management 
challenges. 
 
In this regard, local informal water institutions should not be discarded as primitive and 
obsolete tools. Local water management arrangements need to be given time to evolve, 
with limited interference from external agencies, as they seek to address emerging water 
management imperatives especially in an environment that has been overwhelmed by 
new users in the irrigation sector. 
 
8.4 Areas for further study 
 
This study only focused on the formal and informal institution-performance linkages that 
exist between the formal institutions (irrigation water law, water policy and water 
administration) and the informal irrigation water institutions, and their constituent variables. 
However, more research is needed where the intra-linkages within formal irrigation 
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institutions will be evaluated to assess the nature of the linkages existing between them 
e.g. the linkages between the irrigation water law and irrigation water policy or between 
the irrigation water law and irrigation water administration.  
 
In addition, exogenous factors need to be included also in further studies as both the 
formal and informal institutions do not operate in a vacuum. The extent to which these 
exogenous factors affect the irrigation water institutions need to be evaluated also. 
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APPENDIX 1: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
EFFECTIVNESS OF IRRIGATION WATER INSTITUTIONS IN ZIMBABWE 
 
A NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (NIE) THEORY APPROACH 
 
 
 
The objective of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of irrigation water institutions 
(formal and informal) in irrigation water management and the nature of the existing linkages 
between these institutions. 
The overall goal is to develop effective and sustained agricultural water management 
institutions in Zimbabwe, particularly after the launch of the “Fast-Track” Land Reform 
Programme of 2000. 
I therefore request that you spare some of your time to respond to herein given questions 
to the best of your knowledge. The researcher undertakes to keep the information private 
and confidential. 
Please, you are kindly requested to answer ALL the sections as given in the questionnaire 
Your cooperation on the above is appreciated. 
Thanking you in advance!!! 
 
RESPONDENT DETAILS 
 
 
1. Type of irrigation system (Please tick appropriately) 
A1 irrigation scheme  
A2 irrigation scheme  
Communally / resettled scheme  
 
2. Age………………………years 
 
3. Number of years in education 
 
Primary  
Secondary  
Tertiary  
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A. IRRIGATION WATER LAW 
 
 
A1. Do you have irrigation water rights? (Please √ the appropriate box) 
1 yes 
0 otherwise 
 
A2. If YES to the above, in what form (Please tick the appropriate) 
 0 = no water rights  1 = unclear/unauthorised/scattered rights  
2 = common state property 3 = riparian system25 4 = correlative (proportional) sharing 
5 = licenses/permits 
A3. If NO to A2 above, what are the constraints for not accessing the irrigation water rights? 
 1..................................................................................................................................... 
2..................................................................................................................................... 
3..................................................................................................................................... 
4..................................................................................................................................... 
5.................................................................................................................................... 
6..................................................................................................................................... 
A4. Are you aware of the existence of the irrigation water law?  
 1 = yes  0 = otherwise    
A5. If yes, are there any clauses that provide for solving conflicts?  
1 = yes  0 = otherwise 
A6. State some of these conflict solving provisions? 
1..................................................................................................................................... 
2..................................................................................................................................... 
3..................................................................................................................................... 
4..................................................................................................................................... 
                                                          
25
 Riparian water rights system is an arrangement where water is allocated among those who possess land 
about its source.  
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5............................................................................................................................ 
A7. In your own judgemental opinion, using a scale of 0 – 1026, do you think these provisions of 
solving conflicts are effective among irrigation water users?  
A8. If no, what are the major challenges you encounter? 
1..................................................................................................................................... 
2..................................................................................................................................... 
3..................................................................................................................................... 
4..................................................................................................................................... 
5............................................................................................................................ 
 
A9. On a scale of 0 – 10, do you think that the water law is relevant for irrigation water users 
under the current and future situation? 
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
A10. On a scale of 0 – 10, how does it relate well to with other laws that you may know that try to 
promote effective irrigation water management? 
 ....................................................................................................................................... 
 
A11. On a scale of 0 – 10; and in your own opinion, how do you rate the water law provisions for 
private sector27 participation in the following: 
 ....................................................................................................................................... 
  
A12. How effective and relevant is the water law and related laws to the current situation and 
future situation, using a scale of 0 – 10? 
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
 
 
B. IRRIGATION WATER POLICY 
 
 
                                                          
26 Zero meaning the worst situation and ten meaning an ideal situation. The intermediate values are interpreted as the extent 
the actual situation deviates from either the worst or the ideal situation.  
 
27
 Private sector may include organizations like the private companies, NGOs, community participation, etc 
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B1. In your own opinion and based on your experience as a farmer, do you think the project 
selection criterion is economic oriented? 
 1 = yes   0 = otherwise 
 
B2. Do you pay for use of irrigation water? 
 1 = yes   2 = otherwise 
  
B3. In what form do you pay for irrigation water? (Tick the appropriate) 
 1 = full subsidy  2 = partial recovery  3 = full-cost recovery 
 
B4. On a scale of 0 – 10, do you think the government policies are favourable for promoting 
private sector participation in irrigation water management? 
....................................................................................................................................... 
B5. In your own opinion, how extensive is private sector participation in irrigation water 
management? (on a scale of 0 – 10) 
....................................................................................................................................... 
B6. Are you organised into Water Users’ Associations?  
1 = yes 0 = otherwise 
 
B7. On a scale of 0 – 10, how extensive is WUAs’ participation in irrigation water management? 
 …………………………………………………………………………………………… 
B8. Are the government policies favourable for users’ participation in irrigation water 
management (on a 0 – 10 scale) 
....................................................................................................................................... 
B9. Do you think other policies like fiscal policies, economic policies, etc., affect irrigation water 
management policy in managing water resources? (Use a scale of 0 – 10) 
....................................................................................................................................... 
B10. As a farmer, using your perception judgement on a scale of 0 – 10, do you think the water 
law links well with the water policy? 
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
 
C. IRRIGATION WATER ADMINISTRATION 
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C1. How is the administration of irrigation water organised? 
 1 = basin  2 = catchment  3 = sub-catchment 4 = other (specify) 
 
C2. In your own opinion, how strong is the capacity of the administration in irrigation water 
management at your irrigation scheme (use a scale of 0 – 10) 
 ....................................................................................................................................... 
 
C3. If private participation was allowed, would you think it would reduce the burden on irrigation 
water administration and management? (use a scale of 0 – 10)  
  
C4. If yes, in what ways? 
 .................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................  
C5.  In your own judgemental perception on a 0 – 10 scale, how effective are user groups or 
WUAs in administration of irrigation water? 
 ....................................................................................................................................... 
 
C6. Do you have mechanisms of collecting updates and do maintenance of irrigation water at 
scheme level? 
 1 = yes    0 = otherwise 
 
C7. If the answer is 1 to the above, what are some of these mechanisms? 
 .................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................... 
 
C8. Based on your judgement on a scale of 0 – 10, how adequate, relevant and reliable are 
water data in irrigation water management 
 ....................................................................................................................................... 
 
C9. On a scale of 0 – 10, do you think you have the capacity to effectively administer irrigation 
water through the water law and water policy  
 ....................................................................................................................................... 
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D. INFORMAL WATER MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS 
 
 
D1. What is the level of organisation at your irrigation scheme? 
 1 = A1 group 2 = A2 group 3 = communal/resettled 4 = other (specify) 
 
D2. Are there clearly defined boundaries to withdraw irrigation water from Common Pool 
Resources (CPRs) 
 1 = existing   0 = otherwise 
 
D3. Are there existing appropriation rules related to the local conditions with regards to 
irrigation water management? 
 1 = existing   0 = otherwise 
 
D4. Identify some of these rules 
 …………..l...................................................................................................................... 
....................................................................................................................................... 
 ……................................................................................................................................ 
  
D5. Do you have mechanisms, e.g. constitutions to assist in irrigation water management at 
scheme level? 
 1 = yes 0 = otherwise 
 
D6.  How effective is the constitution in the management of water resources, on a scale of 0 – 
10 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
D7. What are the responsibilities of the committee as determined by the constitution?  
Post Duties 
e.g. Chairman  
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D8. What mechanisms are there to ensure that responsibilities are effectively accomplished? 
 .................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................... 
 
D9. Using your judgement, on a scale of 0 – 10, how effective are monitoring, conditions and 
the behaviour of the appropriators? 
 ....................................................................................................................................... 
 
D10. Is there an existence of regulation sanctions in irrigation water management for users who 
fail to act accordingly? 
 1 = existing   0 = otherwise 
 
D11. Is there an existence of rapid access to conflict solving in the low-cost, local setting with 
regards to irrigation water management? 
 1 = existing   0 = otherwise 
 
D12. Are there any users who challenge the rights of appropriators to create their own local-
based institutions suited to their own local set-up? 
 1 = yes    0 = otherwise 
 
D13. On a scale of 0 – 10, to what extent do these people challenge the rights of appropriators 
to create their own institutions based on their diverse local set-ups? 
 ....................................................................................................................................... 
 
D14. What are some of the ways in which these people challenge creation of local institutions? 
.................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................... 
 
D15. On a scale of 0 – 10, how effective are informal institutions / set of rules on the water law, 
policy and administration? 
 .............................................................................................................................. 
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